New Book on Perseverance and Apostasy

Let me say first, how grateful to the Lord I am to be able to share this news with you all. I'm thankful to return to the blog and see some small growth (some growth is often better than none at all), so thank you for your love, support, and prayers. There are so many blogs in the blogosphere today with so much to say that I often think my labor of love here leaves much to be desired. But the Lord has a unique way of taking what we think is nothing and transforming it for His glory. And that's what the Lord has done here at The Center for Theological Studies. And I'm blessed to share this blog with each of you, that you have joined me for the biblical ride of a lifetime. 

Today, I'm back to share some news that has me beaming inside and out: by the Lord's grace, I have published a book. Titled Short-Sighted Faith: Once Saved, Always Saved (OSAS) and the Doctrine of Perseverance, the book is devoted to examining OSAS as a doctrine and showing why it is unbiblical. Yes, (gasp), I disagree with the notion of Once Saved, Always Saved. If you've been keeping afloat of the blog, I often critique Calvinist theologians and their claims because of my view that Scripture is against them. They can't explain multiple passages in Scripture, which makes me distrust their conclusions. So, prepare to see in this book the results of my 9 years of leisure pursuit of Calvinism, Arminianism, and a few years of Molinism. 

Just to give some details about the work, the price of the book is $9.99 for the Kindle Edition. For those wondering about a paperback version, that too, is available. Since August is my birthday month (I turn 33, Lord willing, on August 21st), I am running a special sale on the paperback version of my new book. Between today, August 1st, and the end of the month, August 31st, those who purchase the book can expect a price tag of $10.00 for the paperback copy. Now, the change to the paperback price have yet to take effect, so don't be surprised if you can't purchase it at that price today. Give the changes 3 days or so to take effect, and feel free to check in at Amazon sooner (you might see it appear within 12 hours or so). 

As always, I'd like to give honor to the Lord and His Son, Jesus Christ, who have made this all possible. I consider myself to be a servant of the Lord, doing what I believe to be the work of God in going and making disciples. Some of us evangelize the world by preaching on foreign soil; others do it by writing books that travel worldwide. I have been blessed to do the latter, and I pray that Christ is exalted and that you, my readership, will be edified and inspired to continue running the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith, as Hebrews 12:1-2 says. 

This book is the first of, Lord willing, many to come. It has been my dream to write and publish since I could remember, and I pray that my love for the work of God shines through. 

And, as for the question pressing on everyone's minds, "Did I enjoy the process?," well, let's just say that when I finished editing the manuscript, my spirit said, "I want to do it all over again."

God bless. 

The Land and Its Possibilities, Part II: Middle Knowledge, Molinism, and Hebrews 6:7-8

In my last post, I looked at the text of Hebrews 6:7-8 to discuss the land (representing the Christian) receiving the rain (the blessings of God, Heb. 6:4-5), and the possibilities of bearing fruit or bearing thorns and thistles. In the last post, I stated that, contra Wayne Grudem, the text is not discussing two types of lands but one land with two possibilities of land growth---whether it be to bear fruit and receiving God’s blessing, or to bear thorns and thistles and be eternally cursed by God. I also stated that Grudem’s commitment to Calvinism is problematic in that the verse doesn’t give just one option for the land (to bear fruit), but also that the land can be cursed. And when one considers that this “land” (person) receives rain (blessings) from God, we see that the land, although given everything to make it thrive, can bear thorns and thistles and come to nothing.

Let’s look at the text of Hebrews 6:7-8 once more:

“For the earth which drinks in the rain that comes upon it, and bears herbs useful for those by whom it is cultivated, receives blessing from God; but if it bears thorns and briers, it is rejected and near to being cursed, whose end is to be burned” (Hebrews 6:7-8, NKJV).

Verse 7 refers to the land that bears fruit: it “receives” a blessing. The Greek word for “receives” is “metalambano,” which means “to receive, to partake, to be made a partner.” Notice that verses 7-8 flow with verses 4-6, since the land that “partakes of the blessing from God” (v.7) represents those who “have become partakers of the Holy Spirit” (v.4).

But what about verse 8? “but if it bears thorns and briers, it is rejected and near to being cursed, whose end is to be burned.” Peter O’Brien states that this verse has something to say about human responsibility:

“The second half of the illustration also portrays soil that has been well-watered and nurtured, but by contrast it produces ‘thorns and thistles’ (v.8)...THE RESPONSIBILITY FALLS ON THE LAND AND THUS WITH THE PERSONS, NOT WITH GOD. Those who commit apostasy, in spite of the many blessings that have been showered on them by God, are like a well-watered land that produces thorns and thistles” (Peter O’Brien, “The Pillar New Testament Commentary: Hebrews.” Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2010, pp. 228).

Who is responsible for falling away? The persons themselves. This is demonstrated by the fact that the subject of the “falling away” of Heb. 6:6 is “those who were once enlightened...have tasted the heavenly gift...become partakers of the Holy Spirit.” For those who doubt that these verses refer to believers, look at the words of the writer later in the epistle:

“But recall the former days in which, AFTER YOU WERE ILLUMINATED, you endured a great struggle with sufferings” (Heb. 10:32, NKJV).

The Greek word for “were illuminated” is “photisthentes,” which is translated as “being enlightened” or “being illuminated.” The verb itself is a participle, which means that the helping verb, “were,” is really translated as “having been enlightened.” According to Thayer’s Dictionary of the New Testament, the word “photisthentes” means “to enlighten spiritually, to imbue with saving knowledge.” So those who were enlightened were those who came to saving knowledge. And this is connected with salvation in 1 Timothy 2:4 (“to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth”).

Back to Hebrews 6:8. The word for “rejected” (regarding the land that drinks the rains but bears thorns and thistles) is “adokimos,” which is translated as “rejected, not standing the test, not approved, unfit, unproved, REPROBATE” (Thayer’s Dictionary). Paul Ellingworth, author of the “New International Greek Testament Commentary: Hebrews,” translates the word “adokimos” as “worthless” (328). The word “adokimos” also appears in 1 Cor. 9:27; Romans 1:28; 2 Cor. 13:5, 6, 7; 2 Tim. 3:8; and Titus 1:16.

The description of the land that bears thorns and thistles is that it is “to be burned.” This burning, according to O’Brien, “does not suggest a restorative or disciplinary process. Rather, it describes THE PUNISHMENT THAT AWAITS THOSE CONDEMNED BY GOD. THE TEXT IS SPEAKING OF A FIERY JUDGMENT ON APOSTATES” (O’Brien, “PNTC: Hebrews,” page 229). Paul Ellingworth states that burning is the theme of divine judgment and is found in Heb. 10:27; Ps. 18:8 (LXX 17:9); Is. 30:27; Jer. 4:4; Jer. 21:12; Mt. 13:30, 42; Mt. 25:41; Jn. 15:6 (Ellingworth, “NIGTC: Hebrews,” page 328).

I’ve covered verses 7 and 8 of Hebrews 6 so as to give the reader some insight into what the passage is presenting to the reader (and the intended audience of scattered believers in the Dispersion).

Now, the next question would be, “Well, how does this tie in to the issue of middle knowledge?” To answer this question, we must first understand what middle knowledge is. The site “Monergism.com” provides answers to this (for those who want to read the whole of information on middle knowledge, click on the middle knowledge link to the right of the main page) from John Frame:

“This knowledge (a) is a knowledge of what would happen under such-and-such conditions, and (b) is based, neither upon God's nature nor upon his decree, but upon the free decisions of created beings. Thus God knows what will happen if David re-mains in Keilah, and what will happen if he does not (I Sam. 23:1-13); and he knows it, not because he controls the course of history, but because he knows what free decisions people will make in¬dependently of his controlling decree. This con-cept found favor with Lutherans (e.g., Quenstedt) and with Arminius and some of his followers. The Reformed agree that God knows what would happen under all conditions, but they reject the notion that this knowledge is ever ultimately based on man's autonomous decisions. Human decisions, they argue, are themselves the effects of God's eternal decrees (see Acts 2:23, Rom. 9:10-18, Eph. 1:11, Phil. 2:12-13).
John M. Frame "Scientia Media" from Evangelical Dictionary of Theology.”

As is evident from the definition, middle knowledge is a third type of knowledge that indicates what human creatures “would” do. There are two other types of God’s knowledge in this system: natural knowledge (what God knows about Himself as well as all possibilities of worlds He could create), and free knowledge (what God knows human creatures “will” do). The difference between God’s middle and free knowledge is that, in middle knowledge, God’s knows the possibility of human choices, whereas in free knowledge, He knows what a person will actually choose.

Let’s use Hebrews 6:7-8 (this is an ideal passage for our discussion of middle knowledge). These two verses present us with two options for the land (“One Land, Two Possibilities”): the land (the believer) can either bear fruit and receive eternal life from the Lord, or the land can bear thorns and thistles and be declared “adokimos” (reprobate) in the end. Now God knows what the land in question will do; however, the land itself is responsible for what will happen to it. As Peter O’Brien states in his Hebrews commentary (PNTC, see above), the person is responsible for their apostasy (should it happen), not God. God presents two options before the believer: to persevere and be saved, or to fall away and eternally perish. And God possesses middle knowledge because He knows that every believer “COULD” persevere, but He also knows that every believer “COULD” fall away. In the end, each believer will be judged for their works (2 Cor. 5:10) because they had two options, not just one. Each believer’s fate was not determined by God, but their own perseverance before God.

However, middle knowledge (as impressive as it sounds) is NOT Molinism. What is Molinism? Molinism involves the three logical moments of God’s knowledge (natural, middle, and free knowledge) as well as a little extra. What is this “little extra” in Molinism? It is the added tenet to middle knowledge of “God’s divine decree to create His SELECTED WORLD” (see theopedia.com/Molinism for more info on Middle Knowledge and Molinism). God doesn’t just have foreknowledge of creaturely actions, He also determines which choices will come to pass.

If we apply this to Hebrews 6:7-8, God not only knew that the believers could either receive eternal life or eternal punishment...He also determined a world where some would bear fruit and receive life while others would bear thorns and thistles and be cast into Hell. To put it briefly, God determined some to be elect and others to be reprobate.

I know this language sounds unbelievable (and dishonoring to the Almighty God) to say the least; but Molina himself, the founder of Molinism, did not back down from this statement:

“Without consideration of any particular individual’s salvation, damnation, or non-existence, God enters into an all-encompassing predestinary determination of what world to actualize, which arrives at completion through his sovereign creative decree. On Molina’s view, then, predestination, COMPRISING ELECTION AND REPROBATION, are logically simultaneous with the divine creative decree, as predestination, in the words of Craig, ‘involves God’s willing that aspect of the world comprising the natural circumstances and supernatural gifts of grace which form the milieu in which a person freely responds to God’s gracious initiatives.’ FOR BY CHOOSING WHICH FEASIBLE WORLD TO ACTUALIZE, GOD PREDESTINES TO SALVATION, OR ELECTS, EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THAT WORLD WHO WOULD FREELY ACCEPT HIS PREVENIENT GRACE, AND HE PREDESTINES TO DAMNATION, OR REPROBATES, EVERY INDIVIDUAL IN THAT WORLD WHO WOULD FREELY REJECT HIS PREVENIENT GRACE” (Kirk R. MacGregor, “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology.” Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007, page 77).

Here we can set up a syllogism to explain MacGregor’s quote:

I. God picks a world.
II. The selected world contains those who accept Christ and those who reject Christ.
III. God, therefore, picks those who accept Christ and those who reject Christ.

In case you think the syllogism is a bit harsh, read these words from Kirk MacGregor:

“We must not therefore think that predestination, for Molina, depends upon human choice. FOR EVERY ELECT PERSON, GOD COULD HAVE JUST AS EASILY CHOSEN ANOTHER FEASIBLE WORLD IN WHICH THE SAME INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE FREELY REJECTED HIS SAVING GRACE OR NOT EXISTED AT ALL. LIKEWISE, FOR EVERY REPROBATE PERSON, GOD COULD HAVE JUST AS EASILY CHOSEN ANOTHER FEASIBLE WORLD IN WHICH THE SAME INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE FREELY EMBRACED HIS SALVATION OR NOT EXISTED AT ALL” (“A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,” page 77).

Simply put, God chose both the elect and reprobate in this world; however, in another life, the elect could have been reprobate and the reprobate could’ve been elect. God’s “arbitrary choice” explains why the elect and reprobate comprise the persons they do---not the condition of faith.

If we apply this to the text of Hebrews 6:7-8, Molinism teaches that God determined the world in which some would be saved, some would be damned, and others would fall away from the faith. In another life, however, God could’ve actualized a situation where the saved would be damned (through either apostasy or sheer unbelief), the damned would either fall away or been saved, and those who fell away would either never believe or been saved. But the current world consists of these three types of persons, with PARTICULAR PERSONS IN EACH GROUP, because God ordained it to be. God picked the apostates, unbelievers, and believers alike. To make it more personal, Joe is damned in this life because God picked this world; in another life, Joe could’ve been saved. Could Joe have fallen away? Yep. Even in another life, Joe could’ve been a Christian who hardened his heart and fell away from the Gospel---all because God decided to actualize that world instead of another one. The world selected is due to the arbitrary will of God---God’s mere whim. What does MacGregor say to defend his theological system from attack?

“At this juncture it must be emphasized that God is not guilty of foisting a ‘divine sting operation’ upon the reprobate, as the circumstances in the world he chooses to actualize (as well as every other feasible world) are freedom-preserving and do nothing to cause either the reprobate to spurn prevenient grace or the elect to embrace it” (“A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,” page 78).

Contra MacGregor, does it really make sense to say that, despite God choosing a world in which some will believe and others disbelieve, those in either camp had a real choice? If God has selected the choice that will be actualized, how then is the choice genuinely a human choice (especially if the reprobate person could have been elect in another world, if God had so determined it)? I think that Molinists here attempt to substitute determinism for divine foreknowledge. It is God’s foreknowledge that leaves room for creaturely freedom. But to put divine determinism in the place of divine foreknowledge now makes God the author of sin and evil---since God is choosing a world where some will be damned. This goes against Matthew 25:41, where the Lord never mentions that Hell was prepared for one single human being! Now some Molinists would say that God’s determination does not take away from man’s choice; however, since it is God who decides which choice will be actualized, the human has “determined choice” (choices determined by God) and “virtual choice” in virtual worlds (that are never actualized and can never be proven as having existed). God, then, “chooses the choice,” determines human action. In the end, the Molinist system amounts to divine predeterminism (just as Calvinism does).

As we’ve seen, Hebrews 6:7-8 affirms middle knowledge (two or more possibilities of action), but does not affirm Molinism (since the person determines their actions, not God). In my next post, I will discuss the Doctrine of Apostasy and talk about why apostasy poses a threat to Calvinist and Molinist theology.

The Land and Its Possibilities, Part I: Introduction

I rarely get the opportunity to go back and read through my posts here at CTS. But every now and then, when I’m frustrated with a new post (which occurs seldom), and need to mentally relax a bit, I return to reading random posts from the site. Usually, it’s something in a post written months ago that will spark ideas for a new one.

Yesterday, I happened to read an old post that got me to thinking about Middle Knowledge and Molinism all over again. And I thought, “I should do another post on this”---so here it is!

Today’s post will deal with Hebrews 6. Now, before you assume I’m gonna deal with verses 4-6 about falling away, be assured that I’m not. This post is not gonna deal with those verses. Instead, I’m gonna deal with “the land and its possibilities,” found in verses 7-8. We’ll see why the example does not refer to two lands, but instead one land with two choices open before itself. The land, of course, refers to the believer who has tasted “the rain of God’s goodness” and can either bear fruit and receive a blessing or bear thorns and thistles and be eternally damned.

Now, verses 4-6 will serve as the context of verses 7-8, since the key to biblical interpretation (hermeneutics) of any passage is to read verses in their context. We cannot just pull verses 7-8 out of the rest of chapter 6 and hope to understand what the author is doing. Verses 4-6, then, talk about the believer who has received the goodness of God: “those who were once enlightened, and have tasted the heavenly gift, and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God and the powers of the age to come” (Hebrews 6:4-5, NKJV).

In verse 7, the writer says, “For the earth which drinks in the rain...” The word “for” here connects verse 7 back to verses 4-6. So verses 7-8 are very much connected to the verses on apostasy that precede it. The land example doesn’t just come out of nowhere. It is logically connected to the verses that come before.
Verses 7-8, however, have been misapplied and taken out of context by well-known theologians such as Wayne Grudem:

“The difference was not in the kinds of events experienced but IN THE KINDS OF GROUND THE RAIN FELL ON. The way the ground responds to the rain reveals the kind of ground it was in the first place” (Wayne Grudem, “The Perseverance of the Saints,” from “Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace.” Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000, page 155).

Grudem then places a footnote at the end of the above quote, in which he writes: “...the author is not thinking of the same piece of land at all, for he clearly thinks of two distinct possibilities for two very different kinds of ground” (“Still Sovereign,” page 155).

In the first quote, Grudem focuses on the “kind of ground” the land was. This is not the emphasis of Hebrews 6. Peter O’Brien, the author of “The Pillar New Testament Commentary: Hebrews,” disagrees with Wayne Grudem:

“Decisive for understanding the parable is the harvest: ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON WHAT IS PRODUCED AT THE END, not on the preliminary stages of growth” (Peter O’Brien, “The Pillar New Testament Commentary: Hebrews.” Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2010, page 228).

O’Brien states that the harvest is where the focus of the verses is, not the land itself. It’s not the land that is being evaluated, but the harvest. This is what will happen on the Day of Judgment, where each person is judged for what he or she has done, not a predetermined heart condition (2 Cor. 5:10).

Grudem and other Calvinist theologians assume that a person’s heart cannot change, that a person is given a predetermined condition---but that is not the case. And that is the problem with his exegesis: he assumes that a person can have no change in his or her heart towards God. But this is incompatible with the rest of Hebrews, where the writer warns the congregation of turning away from God: “Beware brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief IN DEPARTING FROM THE LIVING GOD...exhort one another daily...lest any of you BE HARDENED THROUGH THE DECEITFULNESS OF SIN” (Heb. 3:12-13, NKJV). How can a person “be hardened” or “become hardened” through sin if their hearts were hardened in the first place? So the person in the congregation whose heart becomes hardened is one whose heart was at first soft towards God, but has repeatedly resisted the Spirit over time and “grown cold” to God and His blessings. This shows a heart change, something that Calvinist theologians cannot stand to admit.

Go back to Hebrews 6:7-8. Notice that the text says “the earth” or “the ground,” not “earths” (plural) or “grounds” (plural). The text does not give the plural but the singular to show that there are two possibilities for this one land being discussed: The text “depicts two kinds of responses that can be made to the warning” (Peter O’Brien, “PNTC: Hebrews,” page 227). These two responses relate to the two kinds of harvest, NOT the land. There is only one land mentioned, but two possibilities: the land can either bear fruit or the land can bear thorns and thistles. There are two possibilities open for the land in question.

I quoted Wayne Grudem in this post (along with Peter O’Brien) to show you that Grudem’s exegesis is driven by his theological system. Grudem is Calvinist, and Calvinism makes no room in its system for possibility or choice. This is why he constantly mentions that those who fall away are those that “had never been truly saved in the first place” (“Still Sovereign,” page 156). Why such an emphasis on “first place,” or “the beginning”? Because Grudem is consumed by the idea of “predeterminism,” where a person is decided by God to either be elect or reprobate before the foundations of the world---and time manifests that God-given status. The emphasis is not on the actions of the person in time, but God’s declaration of that person from before time began.

The text of Hebrews 6:7-8, however, affirms two choices for the land in question. Verse 8 states, “but if it [the land, v.7] bears thorns and briers, it is rejected and near to being cursed, whose end is to be burned” (Heb. 6:8, NKJV). So the land can either bear fruit and receive blessing from God, or bear thorns and be eschatologically burned in the end [i.e., receive eternal damnation from God].
Middle Knowledge involves two or more choices regarding a certain action. First, in order to assess the importance of this passage, we have got to be able to see the text clearly. Grudem cannot do this because he is blinded by his commitment to Calvinism. In my next post, I want to discuss how middle knowledge fits into the text of Hebrews 6:7-8, and show what implications this has for preservation and apostasy. Stay tuned...

Middle Knowledge and the Independent God

“1) Middle knowledge is dependent knowledge, dependent upon the responses of creatures. 2) God is a totally independent being. 3) Therefore, God cannot have middle knowledge.”

Yesterday, I went to visit a very well-known force in the evangelical world. Some friends and I went to pay him a visit, and we got to sit down for a while and talk with this wonderful man of God. It was amazing to get to meet this person that I’ve heard so much about in my time at seminary, someone whose work I’ve even read before and am quite familiar with.

With a group of 13, we sat around and asked him questions about various things we’ve been studying in our own schools. One of the students asked this man about middle knowledge. His response was the above quote I provided.

Out of respect for the individuals, I will not publish their names here. However, what I wanna do in this post is examine the response to middle knowledge and assess its veracity.

Do I think the above syllogism provides a powerful statement against middle knowledge? No, I do not.

My reason? Because of the word “dependent.” The word “dependent” can mean a lot of things, but in the syllogism itself, the word “dependent,” while referring to the actions of human beings (as the man assumed), foremost refers to the action of God to create them. Another word for “dependent” in philosophical terminology is “contingent.” According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, Second Edition:

“Contingent: ‘conditional; dependent. May or may not occur. Accidental’” (“Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, Second Edition.” New York: Berkeley Books, 2001).

The word “contingent,” as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, means that something is “dependent.” But notice that the dictionary does not tell us “what” the item or object is dependent “upon.”

What is middle knowledge dependent upon? It is contingent (dependent), but the knowledge itself is based upon God’s decision before the foundations of the world to create. Creation and humanity are “contingent” beings, which means that God freely chose to create us. It was not necessary that you and I be born. God was not forced to create us, nor did He have to. The fact that He did attests to the free will of God. If God had chosen not to create us, then we would not exist and God would not have known anything about us.

With this statement intact, let’s talk about “knowledge.” The given formula for knowledge (according to J.P. Moreland and Garrett DeWeese in their book, “Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult”) is:
K = JTB
Where “k” is knowledge, “j” is “justified,” “t” is “true,” and “b” is a given belief.

In order for knowledge to be knowledge, then, not only must the proposition be a personal belief, it must also be “true” and “justified.” It must correspond with reality (“true”) and have solid evidence (“justified”). Since it is the “truth” component that interests us most in the moment, we will examine Moreland and Deweese’s assessment of what it means for knowledge to be “true”:

“So what do we mean when we say that a proposition is true?...truth is a property of a proposition, and a proposition is made true by a fact. Something about the way the world is determines the truth of a proposition, so truth is determined by a relation between a proposition and the world. (The theory of truth we shall defend---the classical correspondence theory---is a metaphysical theory.)” (Garrett DeWeese and J.P. Moreland, “Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult: A Beginner’s Guide to Life’s Big Questions.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005, pp. 59-60).

So knowledge is only that which is “true,” and truth is determined by whether or not something is seen or operates in our world. For example, what do we do with the fact that in Jonah, the Lord declares doom and destruction but then forgives them and does not bring the destruction upon them He had so fervently promised? If truth is based on that which corresponds to reality, then the Ninevites had a genuine opportunity to turn from their sin. God’s declaration of doom to them, then, was a “conditional prophecy,” one that was “conditional” in that the Ninevites could choose to repent or not to repent. If we fail to argue that this is “conditional” knowledge, then we make God out to be a liar, which is a direct contradiction of the Scriptures (Romans 3:4).

Since we now know that “conditional” statements are knowledge, we must now get to the bottom of the meaning of the word “conditional” (“contingent” or “dependent”). As I aforementioned, the word “contingent” or “dependent” refers to the idea that first, God chose to create us. Secondly, however, the word “dependent” refers to the choices of human beings. Since God has granted genuine human responsibility and libertarian freedom, God knows what man will do BECAUSE MAN WILL DO IT, not because He has determined it to be so.

And this is where believers of a differing theological persuasion go wrong when they attempt to say that “God’s knowledge here is dependent upon the choices of creatures.” What they desire to do (as did the author of the syllogism above), is to assert God’s “independence” from the creature and make out God’s knowledge of creaturely actions to be an episode of “God needing humanity to know something or respond,” etc. But God knowing creaturely actions is a result of knowing that He gave them the power over their actions. As Alfred Freddoso writes:

“According to Molina, what God knows by His middle knowledge is, to be sure, dependent on what His creatures would do in various situations. From eternity God knew that Peter would deny Christ in such-and-such circumstances. But if Peter had not been going to deny Christ in those circumstances, then God would not have believed what He in fact believed. So we may properly say that God’s middle knowledge is from eternity ‘counterfactually dependent’ on what creatures will do if placed in various circumstances. But this DOES NOT DISTINGUISH MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE FROM ANY OTHER SORT OF KNOWLEDGE GOD HAS ABOUT CREATURES...so the mere fact that God’s middle knowledge is counterfactually dependent on what creatures would do is not at all problematic, but is rather A SIMPLE CONSEQUENCE OF GOD’S BEING NECESSARILY OMNISCIENT” (Alfred J. Freddoso, “Divine Passivity,” from the Introduction to Molina’s “On Divine Foreknowledge” (“Concordia, Pt. IV”). Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, page 67).

So when Molinists discuss the concept of “middle knowledge” and label it as “dependent,” “conditional,” or “contingent,” it is because humans are “contingent” beings, created by the free act and free will of God. Because humans are contingent beings, God’s knowledge of them is also “contingent” (had He not chosen to create us, He would not “know” about us...because God cannot “know” that which is “false” (like contradictions) or “imaginary” (like a half-man, half-beast figure or the “square root of -1”).

To give a quick example, God having middle knowledge regarding Adam and Eve’s choices of whether to eat the forbidden fruit or not to take nothing away from God. Rather, God must possess knowledge of the genuine choice He gave if He would hold Adam and Eve responsible for their sin, and He must also possess knowledge of what choice Adam and Eve would actually make (if they possessed libertarian freedom). This two-part knowledge of God has in some sense a necessary aspect (since He has self-awareness of His actions), as well as a contingent or dependent aspect (God knew Adam and Eve would sin BECAUSE they would sin, not because He determined they would).

Nothing about this takes away from the “independence” of God; rather, we establish God’s independence in arguing that creation (and thus humanity) came about by the free will and act of God, while exalting God’s “exhaustive” foreknowledge. God’s foreknowledge truly becomes exhaustive when we see that God even knows the choices that are available IN ADDITION TO what each of us would actually choose. What about this takes away from God’s independence?

Middle Knowledge: Enemy of Divine Simplicity?

"‘The Tractatus’ is a Deistic, not a pantheistic, work, and Spinoza presupposes the traditional understanding of God. In particular, his argument is based on the CLASSIC DOCTRINE OF DIVINE SIMPLICITY, which states that GOD’S KNOWLEDGE, WILL, GOODNESS, POWER, and so forth ARE ALL REALLY IDENTICAL AND ONE WITH HIS ESSENCE. The question Spinoza raises is, in effect, HOW CAN GOD’S KNOWLEDGE BE NECESSARY AND HIS WILL BE CONTINGENT, IF THESE ARE IDENTICAL?

Now contrary to Spinoza, CLASSICAL THEOLOGY DID NOT CLAIM THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS CHARACTERIZED BY NECESSITY. For example, God knows the truth ‘The universe exists.’ But God was under no obligation to create the universe. Since creation is a free act, he could have refrained from creating anything at all. If God had not created the world, then he would instead know the truth ‘No universe exists.’ Necessarily, then, whatever God knows is true; BUT IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE CONTENT OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE BE WHAT IT IS. Had he created a different world or no world at all, the content of his knowledge would be different. Hence, just as God is free to will differently than he does, SO IS HE ABLE TO HAVE DIFFERENT KNOWLEDGE THAN HE DOES” (William Lane Craig, “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics,” Third Edition. Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2008, page 264).

In two days, I will begin again in my studies for the Spring 2010 semester. In my preparation for a Christian Apologetics class, I have begun reading “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics” by noteworthy philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig. For those of you who may not know enough about him, I suggest you read “Reasonable Faith” as well as “Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship to Time” and “The Only Wise God,” all three having been written by Craig himself. “The Only Wise God” is all about middle knowledge and its theological and philosophical role in academic discourse. These three books will give you quite an introduction to the man himself. And then, let’s just say that you will understand the reason why I admire him so much. Thank God for learned men like William Lane Craig!

Today, though, I’m back to address a statement a friend (named Bill) made to me the other day. I met him out at the coffeeshop, while reading Craig’s “Reasonable Faith,” and he and I began to talk about the doctrine of divine simplicity--- the idea that God is “simple” (not composed of parts, not having “constitution” as humans or objects have). The doctrine of divine simplicity states that God is not divided in essence, attributes, etc. According to Norman Geisler, the doctrine of divine simplicity states that

“God is simple, not composed of parts. He is absolutely and indivisibly one in essence” (Norman Geisler and H. Wayne House with Max Herrera, “The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism.” Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2001, page 17).

My dear friend Bill said to me, “Because God is simple in essence, He cannot have middle knowledge. Why? Because if God had middle knowledge, then He would be POTENTIALITY, not PURE ACT. And God is all actuality, no potentiality whatsoever.”

Let’s assess this, though: could God have middle knowledge and still be “pure act”? Yes. And I think this is where Bill’s argument goes south. If God possesses middle knowledge, then He must “have some use for it.” What is that use? To grant free creatures libertarian freedom. As Molina himself notes,

“even though (and I am mindful of this) the holy Fathers did not use the distinction between free and natural knowledge in God in those very terms, and even though, likewise, they did not distinguish a middle knowledge between free and purely natural knowledge, still BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT THEY TAUGHT THAT THOSE FUTURE CONTINGENTS THAT DEPEND ON OUR FACULTY OF CHOICE ARE not going to exist because God foreknows that they are going to exist, BUT RATHER THAT GOD, BECAUSE HE IS GOD, that is, BECAUSE OF THE DEPTH OF HIS INTELLECT SURPASSING THEIR NATURE, knew that they were going to exist because THEY WERE SO GOING TO EXIST THROUGH FREEDOM OF CHOICE...and this, plainly, is nothing other than to affirm middle knowledge—--at least in fact, if not in our very words” (Luis de Molina, “Concordia, Pt. IV, Disputation 53, Part 2, Section 22. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, page 229).

Molina writes what William Lane Craig affirms: that God possesses middle knowledge “because of the depth of His intellect,” which stretches beyond the intellect of His free creatures. The church fathers themselves (as stated by Molina) affirmed that God possessed knowledge of creaturely actions. In order for God to grant genuine choice, He Himself must “assume” that a choice involves options that will never be realized (since this is the nature of choice: I will choose to go right instead of left on the highway, etc.).

William Lane Craig wrote above (in the beginning quote) that God’s knowledge is under no necessity to be what it is. Since God did not have to create the world and give humans libertarian freedom, He did not have to “know” of their choices---since He could have created a world where man’s every choice would be determined. The fact that God allows such choice must be something that God does not forget(for He is faithful to His covenant and His promises). If He gave man reign over the earth, God must not “forget” that in His relationship with man. And we know that the same God who promised never to flood the earth again is the same God who will not violate creaturely freedom.

If you know of someone who is philosophical in thinking but is not as well-equipped in theology, please take time to show them 1 Samuel 23. In it, we find God telling David that Saul would hand him over---and yet, it does not happen!! How do we characterize God’s knowledge? My friend Bill would advocate that this knowledge of God would be “natural” knowledge, knowledge of all possibilities; however, if that were the case, then the “possibility” of David being handed over would have existed BEFORE God decided to create one world (according to Molinist theology). However, when God decided to select one world out of infinitely many worlds, God was free to select a world where David’s being captured was NOT a possibility.

Secondly, if David being handed over was not going to “actualize” in the current world, why would the Lord have told David this? If David’s being captured was not an actual possibility, then God was telling David of another world He could have actualized (and was thus deceiving David about the world He chose to create). The Lord’s words to David indicate that David’s being handed over was as “actual” a possibility as his escape. Therefore, on the basis of libertarian freedom, I am inclined to interpret God’s knowledge of 1 Samuel 23 as distinct from His “natural knowledge” (knowledge of all possibilities) and “free knowledge” (knowledge of all actualities, or knowledge of all creaturely decisions). Middle knowledge then, provides a way to reconcile God’s exhaustive infallible foreknowledge with genuine libertarian freedom.

Middle knowledge, in this way, is not seen as an “enemy” of divine simplicity---rather, on the basis of logical moments of God’s knowledge (not chronological), we can gain a better grip on the doctrine itself. However we attempt to reconcile truths of Scripture, we cannot do so at the expense of divine foreknowledge.

Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Molinism In The Great Debate (Molinism 101)

“Middle knowledge also provides the key to God’s providence. Indeed, one of the most helpful consequences of the doctrine of middle knowledge is the reconciliation of divine sovereignty and human freedom...Given middle knowledge, THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION between God’s sovereignty, WHICH SEEMS TO CRUSH HUMAN FREEDOM, and human freedom, WHICH SEEMS TO BREAK GOD’S SOVEREIGNTY, is resolved. God is able to plan a world in which his designs are achieved by creatures acting freely. Praise be to God!” (William Lane Craig, “The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.” Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999, page 135).

This post will begin the new series on “Molinism 101.” As I promised my readership, we would embark on a serious theological journey for the next few months. As Scripture tells us, “Gird up the loins of your mind, be sober” (1 Pet. 1:13)!

I begin today with William Lane Craig’s quote above. I decided to start with this quote because it situates Molinism within a given theological context. The divine sovereignty-human responsibility debate has existed for over a millennium within the church, and continues to be debated amongst theologians and believers everywhere in the present day.

What is the nature of the debate, you may ask? Well, it comes down to this: If God is sovereign, and sovereignty implies control, then how can God be in control of everything (including our choices) and yet, man be responsible for his choices? If God has all control, then how can man be responsible for “that which is beyond his control” (i.e., his choice)?

I wrote a paper regarding this debate for Dr. Ken Keathley this past Fall Semester in his Theology I class. I spent a lot of time defending my view scripturally, but I want to engage the reader in some of my undergirding philosophy (and theology) as well. Doing this is important because it will give us a standard by which to measure the Molinist system, and to see whether or not it matches up.

Let’s place the problem of sovereignty and responsibility into a formal layout:

I. God is sovereign.

II. Man is responsible.

The two propositions above make believers uneasy. D.A. Carson calls the two “biblical tensions” in his book titled “Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension.” Divine sovereignty and human responsibility are labeled “in tension” because it seems illogical that man could seemingly, on the surface, have all responsibility but no sovereignty whatsoever!

But this idea of responsibility without sovereignty leads to a third proposition that we’ve yet to acknowledge:

III. With sovereignty (power) comes responsibility.

If proposition III is correct, then we have the following:

I. God is sovereign.

II. Man is responsible.

III. With sovereignty (power) comes responsibility.

But now, we have a dilemma on our hands: if sovereignty entails responsibility, how then, can man be responsible for his actions without some form of sovereignty? If God is sovereign, and with sovereignty comes responsibility, then God should be responsible, right? Well He will be---unless we revise our propositions above to the following:

I. God is sovereign.

II. Man is responsible.

III. With sovereignty (power) comes responsibility.

IV. Man is responsible because he has limited sovereignty.

The only way that God avoids responsibility here is if we grant that man has some limited God-given sovereignty (power) over his actions. In order to take the heat off of God and avoid making Him the author of sin and evil, we must revise our propositions to the following:

I. God is sovereign.

II. God, in His Sovereignty, has granted man a limited sovereignty (libertarian
freedom).

III. With sovereignty comes responsibility.

IV. Therefore, while God is sovereign, man has been given a limited sovereignty over his actions and thus, man has responsibility.

God has given man control over his individual actions---which means that, upon giving control, God has forfeited His responsibility for the actions of man. The only responsibility God maintains is the fact that He chose to give His creatures libertarian freedom. What His creatures choose to do with their libertarian freedom, however, is up to them...and they individually bear blame for their actions (actions have consequences).

If what I’ve said above makes any sense, we can affirm that man has limited sovereignty (libertarian freedom) over his actions. But this entails keeping in mind that God cannot perform logical impossibilities. For example, a logical impossibility would be a “square circle” or a “round square.” God cannot do those things because they are contradictory. In addition, He cannot be unfaithful because, to do so, He would deny Himself (2 Timothy 2:13). If these things be true, then God cannot give me the power of choice and then dictate or determine my choice. There is no such thing as a “determined choice.”

If choice is not determined, then this means that God’s sovereignty CANNOT be exercised in such a way (in every little choice I make) that He decides my choices. However divine sovereignty and human responsibility will be reconciled, they will not be reconciled in a system where God manipulates my decisions. If He has given me genuine choice, then this means that in every thing, I could choose what He wants...but also, I could choose AGAINST what He desires. For that is the meaning of choice: to choose between two things, one that is right and one that is wrong.

As we’ve seen in this post, man has a limited sovereignty, called libertarian freedom, over his choices. But what exactly IS libertarian freedom? And how does this libertarian freedom affect God and man in relationship? I will cover more on libertarian freedom (limited sovereignty) in my next post.

Scientia Media (Middle Knowledge) According to Arminius

As I stated in my last post, Classical Arminian scholar Roger Olson fears that acceptance of middle knowledge necessarily forces one to embrace determinism; however, as I stated in that post, Olson’s claim is not necessarily true: Arminius himself embraced middle knowledge, but was never a Molinist (despite many claims to the contrary).

Kirk R. MacGregor, in his “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,” emphasizes the distinctions in the affirmation of middle knowledge between Arminius and Molina:

“Profoundly trouble by Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination, the Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius (1560-1609) formulated an alternative theological system of creation and providence which he claimed was rooted in the theory of scientia media. Such an allegation is highly ambivalent, FOR IT DEPENDS UPON THE NARROWNESS OR BREADTH OF DOCTRINAL SUBSTANCE ONE ASCRIBES TO THIS THEORY. On the one hand, if the theory simply denotes THE DOCTRINE OF GOD’S PREVOLITIONAL COUNTERFACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, then Arminius’ system is undoubtedly based upon scientia media. On the other hand, if the theory is taken as shorthand for the full range of divine cognitive activities posited by Molina from God’s counterfactual knowledge to his creative decree, then Arminius’ system is not grounded in scientia media, as it deviates quite sharply from MOLINA’S DEPICTION OF GOD’S COMPLETE AND UNLIMITED DELIBERATION. This is a fact not sufficiently appreciated (if appreciated at all!) in the philosophical academy, which is all too quick to generalize that Arminius was a Molinist simply from his appropriation of middle knowledge, despite his severe but little-known departure from Molina on the immediately ensuing issues of election and reprobation...” (Kirk R. MacGregor, “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology.” Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007, pp.64-65).

According to MacGregor, whether or not Arminius was Molinist depends on how one defines “middle knowledge.” From what I’ve read of the literature, it seems that even modern Calvinists such as Terrance Tiessen (“middle-knowledge Calvinism”) and Bruce Ware (“compatibilist middle knowledge”) incorporate middle knowledge into their theologies. In my last post, titled “The ‘Paradox’ of Classical Arminianism,” I noted that Thomas Flint (“Divine Providence: The Molinist Account”) believes that middle knowledge is not native to the system we call Molinism---but that middle knowledge (God’s knowledge of counterfactuals) is something that every believer in Classic Theism(as opposed to Open Theism)should affirm. As a result, to affirm middle knowledge is not necessarily to affirm Molinism. That point needs to be made clear. So, Classical Arminians who affirm middle knowledge would still be in the Classical Arminian tradition. The Molinist system is “middle knowledge” PLUS unconditional election (which is something Arminius himself never affirmed). He considered the doctrine of unconditional election to be “repugnant to the nature of God,” “hurtful to the salvation of men,” and “injurious to the glory of God” (Jacob Arminius, “Declaration of Sentiments,” in “Writings,” 1:221-22, 230, 228).

For Molina, scientia media was predicated upon God’s unconditional predetermination of states of affairs, God choosing to do whatever He pleases. For Arminius, God’s scientia media (God’s knowledge of counterfactuals) was predicated upon man’s choice: “That ‘middle’ kind of knowledge must intervene in things which depend on the liberty of created choice or pleasure” (Arminius, “Public Disputations, 1:449; Arminius, “Private Disputations,” 2:39).

As we’ve seen, middle knowledge was utilized by both men, but differently. For Arminius, middle knowledge was “simple” knowledge---simple in that God “knew” (but did not determine) the future actions of His creatures. With Molina, however, God’s middle knowledge was “proactive” knowledge---God used His middle knowledge to meticulously plan every little detail of life as we know it.

It is at this point that someone may ask, “Well, how does Arminius’s view of scientia media fit into his system?” Arminius, like Molina, believed that God had three logical moments to His knowledge before creating the world. MacGregor shows us the details of Arminius’s system:

“First, not surprisingly, is God’s scientia naturalis (natural knowledge), which he [Arminius] defines as the knowledge ‘by which God understands himself and all things possible’ (Arminius, “Public Disputations,” 1:448). Having perceived all possible free individuals he could create, in his creative decree God chooses a particular subset of these individuals which will, at the moment of creation, comprise the actual world [creation decree]. At this point God lovingly decrees to appoint Christ as Redeemer, Mediator, and Savior of all future created persons. Then God decrees both to save anyone who will receive Christ and to minister sufficiently and efficaciously the means (i.e. the Word, sacraments, etc.) for human appropriation of Christ. Next comes God’s scientia media (middle knowledge), by which He apprehends who would make good use of these means by freely receiving Christ and who, contrariwise, would freely reject Christ. Consequently, God decrees to save or damn particular persons based on his middle knowledge of who would or would not believe. Finally, simultaneous with the moment of creation is God’s scientia libera (free knowledge), by which his logically prior knowledge of all individuals in the actual world and his freely decreed dealings with them are now converted into foreknowledge. It is noteworthy that for Arminius, there is no divine deliberation (let alone Molina’s ‘absolutely complete and unlimited deliberation’) between God’s scientia media and scientia libera, as the rubric for the intervening predestinary decree has already been determined by God’s pre-counterfactual decree to elect believers and reprobate unbelievers. Rather, the divine deliberation transpires between scientia naturalis and scientia media, as it is there that God carefully ponders and decides upon which subset, if any, among the infinite range of possible individuals he wishes to actualize, the plan of salvation and the involvement of the second Trinitarian person within, and the means by which humans can appropriate his saving grace” (MacGregor, “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,” page 72).

Arminius’s system, then, incorporated middle knowledge as a way for God to predestine to salvation those who would believe (with libertarian freedom) and to reprobate those who would not believe (with libertarian freedom). One will not find in Arminius’s system of pre-creation what Molina contained: in other words, Arminius didn’t believe that middle knowledge was used by God to “select” a particular world containing divinely predetermined actions; no---instead, the world created was a world where humans would make their own choices and “not be placed into situations where they would freely choose what God had predetermined.” If God really predetermined that humans would have libertarian choice (according to Arminius), then God could not “pick” the choices of His human creation---for then, God’s granting of “choice” would be anything but free...

We’ve looked at Arminius’s system and how middle knowledge fits within it. However, we have not looked at Molina’s system and how it incorporates middle knowledge. I will begin wholeheartedly to examine Molinism as a system in the coming days.

The "Paradox" of Classical Arminianism

“The upshot is that classical Arminianism may involve a PARADOX: God’s exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge (simple foreknowledge) together with libertarian free will” (Roger Olson, “Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2006, 198-199).

I stumbled over Olson’s quote above a few days ago while rereading through some of Olson’s “Arminian Theology” once more. And then, on the same pages as the labeling of Classical Arminianism as “paradoxical,” came these words in a footnote:
“Some readers may wonder if I am affirming a logical contradiction here. I am not intentionally and certainly not comfortably doing so. I acknowledge a difficulty but am not convinced it is a sheer contradiction... I FEEL THE WEIGHT OF THE OPEN THEIST CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM...” (199).

Olson states that to some, the idea of God’s exhaustive foreknowledge and man’s libertarian freedom seems to be a “logical contradiction,” although he doesn’t seem to believe it is. And secondly, Olson also notes that he is quite aware of the Open Theist attack of Classical Arminianism.

Bruce Ware gives an example to show what he perceives to also be the Classical Arminian dilemma:

“For example, if God knows that later today Carl will take his family to the Oyster Bar restaurant for dinner and order a shrimp salad, then it must be the case that Carl will do just this and he may not choose differently. That is, because God knows this to be the case, and because GOD’S KNOWLEDGE BY DEFINITION IS INFALLIBLE, it follows that Carl will choose and do precisely and only as God knows he will. BUT IF THIS IS SO, THEN CARL IS NOT IN A POSITION IN WHICH HE COULD CHOOSE CONTRARY TO GOD’S FOREKNOWLEDGE. That is, he is not in which he could choose instead to eat by himself, or to take his family to Rose’s, or to eat leftovers at home and save the money. In other words, it appears that Carl is not able to choose differently than he will in fact choose, and if this is the case, then he does not choose freely. TRUE FREEDOM IN THE CLASSICAL ARMINIAN MODEL REQUIRES THE ABILITY, all things being just what they are, TO CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY THAN ONE DOES. But all things being just what they are, including God’s foreknowledge being just what it is, Carl must choose what God knows he will choose. Hence, he is not able to choose differently. And hence, he is not free. The challenge from open theism to other Arminians is simple: COMPREHENSIVE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND LIBERTARIAN FREEDOM ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE NOTIONS. YOU CANNOT HAVE BOTH TOGETHER. So, if you value libertarian freedom (as classical Arminianism clearly does), then you must be willing to give up your commitment to comprehensive divine foreknowledge” (Bruce Ware, “God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism.” Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000, page 36).

In bold terms, Ware comes right out and states the problem Open Theists have with their fellow Arminian (Reformed) brethren: “Comprehensive divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are mutually exclusive notions.” And this is what Roger Olson labels as the “paradox” of Classical Arminianism.

But what would you, the reader say, if I told you that both exhaustive foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are not “mutually exclusive notions”? To see this truth, let’s look at the story of David, Saul, and the men of Keilah again in 1 Samuel 23:10-13.

I wanna take some time to point out the features of this passage that are pertinent to our discussion.

First, notice that the Lord’s words to David indicate foreknowledge. The Lord told David, “He will come down”(1 Sam. 23:11), referring to Saul (v.13), and “they will deliver you” (v.12), referring to the men of Keilah. Saul had indeed planned to enter Keilah and get David, which is demonstrated by the fact that “he halted the expedition” (v.13). This eliminates the validity of the Open Theist position, which states that God doesn’t know something before it happens. Here, God knew what Saul was doing before Saul even did it (that is, before Saul came to Keilah).

Next, look at how real David’s libertarian freedom is: even though God tells him that he will be handed over to Saul, he escapes and Saul doesn’t even arrive in Keilah (v.13).

But this last statement poses a problem for those who believe divine foreknowledge and true libertarian freedom exists. God reveals His foreknowledge to David, but David is allowed to act AGAINST that which God has told him. God tells him that he will be handed over to Saul, but David ends up hiding in such a manner that Saul cannot find him.

How do we account for God’s foreknowledge here? The Open Theist would say, “See, God doesn’t get everything right. He forecasted the future wrong on this one.” However, I would disagree. Because the Bible seems to affirm God’s exhaustive foreknowledge everywhere (cf. Psalm 139), I would say that God’s words to David here are correct. What God tells David is true (Saul really is looking to make his way to Keilah and capture David). And Saul would have done that very thing---IF God’s words to David revealed a PREDETERMINED action! However, they do not, for David is allowed to escape the hand of Saul. David gets to exercise GENUINE CHOICE here; libertarian freedom, as a result, is not an illusion---but a very present reality. Therefore, any theology we hold to must emphasize true, genuine choice, not a choice that turns out to be “predetermined.” It is for this reason that many theologies are wrong. If we are gonna hold to a truly biblical theology, we cannot undermine true libertarian freedom in order to uphold what we believe to be God’s sovereignty. If God is sovereign, surely He can be sovereign DESPITE our choices---and He doesn’t have to “manipulate” us in any situation whatsoever to have His purposes accomplished.

Now, to the paradox. According to Bruce Ware’s comments above regarding the Open Theist critique of Classical Arminianism, we find that there seems to be some “tension” between God’s exhaustive foreknowledge and man’s true libertarian freedom. If God foreknows everything, and what He knows will happen, how is it that man can do OTHER THAN what God already knows? If God already knows what a person will do, aren’t that person’s choices predetermined? The Open Theist tells us, “if you wanna hold on to freedom, get rid of God’s foreknowledge.”

But there is a problem with the Open Theist’s answer. If God is all-powerful, and gives man power to make decisions, then to take away sovereignty from God (foreknowledge) means to take away responsibility from man. Man doesn’t have more responsibility without God’s foreknowledge---but less. This is why taking away God’s foreknowledge is not a good idea. Our power of choice is derived from God. If God is not sovereign, then man does not have free choice (and therefore, he has no responsibility as well). To use the Open Theist attack against the Open Theist, “Open Theists cannot have it both ways.”

Looking at 1 Samuel 23, we find then, that God reveals what He knows to David regarding his immediate future. However, how do we handle the fact that God tells David something that DOES NOT COME TO PASS? God has to be telling the truth, right? Yes. God is telling the truth. But if He’s telling the truth regarding David and yet, David ends up in a different scenario, then God must know that too, right? Yep. So God then possesses two different types of knowledge--- He knows what does happen, as well as “what COULD happen.” “Could” is a conditional statement, which means that true libertarian freedom is present here. When God tells David “He [Saul] will come down” and “they [men of Keilah] will deliver you,” the Lord is saying that, BASED ON DAVID’S ACTION, either Saul could get David or not. It wasn’t of necessity, but certainty (a contingent certainty depending on David’s action in the situation). At the moment God told David, David had a real genuine choice and could make a real, genuine decision about what to do. 1 Samuel 23, then, presents us with not only genuine choice of human beings (David specifically here), but also God’s exhaustive foreknowledge.

But what about Olson’s label of Classical Arminianism as containing a “paradox”? The paradox involves divine foreknowledge. The paradox is solvable, but Olson denies help when he writes the following:

“MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IS NO HELP because it assumes the possibility of counterfactuals of freedom and leads to determinism” (“Arminian Theology,” page 199).

How else can we explain 1 Samuel 23? Both God’s foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom were demonstrated. We can’t explain away the "seeming" determinism if all God knows is exactly what happens. 1 Samuel 23 does not lie under the label “David experiences EXACTLY WHAT GOD FOREKNOWS.” In fact, David does not experience what God foreknows; rather, he is able to change the course of events and make a choice that denies God’s prophecy from coming about. To account for God’s foreknowledge (His knowledge of David’s future was contingent knowledge based upon David’s choice), we must affirm middle knowledge---which is the very thing Olson denies!

In addition, Olson notes that “middle knowledge...leads to determinism.” I think this is a problematic statement for the simple reason that if you talk to any Molinist, they will tell you that Christians can affirm middle knowledge WITHOUT being Molinist in their theology. Thomas Flint affirms the same:

“Though the terminology of natural and free knowledge is Molinist, it is important to remember that we have thus far said nothing with which any traditionalist could reasonably take issue. No sensible proponent of that view could deny that some truths are necessary, and hence not such that God could choose to make them false; therefore, no such proponent could deny that some of God’s knowledge is natural. Nor could any such advocate plausibly deny that some truths are contingent, and that their truth is dependent upon God’s having freely chosen to act in a certain way; hence, no such advocate could deny that some of God’s foreknowledge is free. Our employment of Molinist language...should not mislead one into thinking that anything thus far affirmed would be controversial within the traditionalist camp” (Thomas Flint, “Divine Providence: The Molinist Account.” Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998, page 38).

Therefore, one can be Classical Arminian and still affirm middle knowledge---without leading to determinism or even Molinism. Arminius himself held to a certain Middle Knowledge. With regards to Arminius, I will discuss his view of scientia media (middle knowledge) in my next post.

Changing the Course

“Likewise, in 1 Kings 23:10-12 David consulted the Lord about whether Saul was going to descend upon Keilah, and the Lord responded, ‘He will descend.’ He consulted again, about whether the men of Keilah, who had received nothing but kindness from David, were going to hand him and the men with him over into the hands of Saul. And the Lord responded, ‘They will hand you over.’ Notice, God knew these two future contingents, which depended on human choice, and He revealed them to David. YET THEY NEVER HAVE EXISTED AND NEVER WILL EXIST IN REALITY, and thus they do not exist in eternity either” (Luis De Molina, “Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the ‘Concordia.’ Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, page 117).

For the last two days, I’ve been reading through Luis de Molina’s Part IV of his “Concordia.” Part IV is the only portion of the Concordia that has been translated, but it’s all that’s needed. Having read over half of Part IV, I can tell you that Molina gives enough information regarding “Molinism” as a system in Part IV. He leaves no stone unturned...

Today, though, I’m back to tackle some of the evidence for middle knowledge that Molina uses in his Concordia: the story of David, Saul, and the men of Keilah.
Molina cites the passage as “1 Kings 23:10-12,” but Freddoso (translator of the Concordia) provides a footnote with these words:

“1 Sam. 23:10-12. Molina, of course, uses the Vulgate rather than Hebrew titles for the historical books of the Hebrew Scriptures. The Hebrew 1 and 2 Samuel correspond to the Vulgate 1 and 2 Kings...” (117).

For us, then, the reference will be 1 Samuel 23:10-12. The text is as follows:
“Then David said, ‘O Lord God of Israel, Your servant has certainly heard that Saul seeks to come to Keilah to destroy the city for my sake.

Will the men of Keilah deliver me into his hand? Will Saul come down, as Your servant has heard? O Lord God of Israel, I pray, tell Your servant.’ And the Lord said, ‘He will come down.’

Then David said, ‘Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul?’ And the Lord said, ‘They will deliver you.’

So David and his men, about six hundred, arose and departed from Keilah and went wherever they could go. Then it was told Saul that David had escaped from Keilah; so he halted the expedition” (1 Sam. 23:10-13, NKJV).

I can remember that the first time I read this passage referenced for middle knowledge was when I read Bruce Ware’s “God’s Greater Glory.” Ware argues for a compatibilist middle knowledge, incorporating middle knowledge into his Calvinistic theology. When I read the example of David escaping the hand of Saul by the knowledge the Lord provided, I realized that I had to affirm middle knowledge into my system. The knowledge God provided had to be incorporated into my system somewhere, right?

But what about the system of Molinism? Well, that’s another story. 1 Samuel 23:10-13 teaches me about God’s knowledge, but it doesn’t say anything about God actualizing one set of actions instead of another set of actions, and that God placed David into the circumstances he was in, knowing that David would choose to escape. God did know that David would escape (He foreknows all things, including those things that COULD happen---in this case, “could” involved the men of Keilah handing David over to Saul); however, this did not involve the Lord desiring that David “run for his life” or that Saul would capture David. Instead, what we find is “certainty” of events, not “necessity.”

Why is there not a trace of necessity in 1 Sam. 23:10-13? Necessity is not found in the passage because although God tells David that the men of Keilah would hand him over, it does not come to fruition: “Then it was told Saul that DAVID HAD ESCAPED from Keilah; so he halted the expedition” (1 Sam. 23:13).

What we find in the declaration of the Lord is “certainty” (it would happen), not “necessity” (it must happen, or that it would infallibly happen). Therefore, the Lord’s declaration of events to David must be considered as “counterfactuals,” knowledge that is “counter to fact” or “contrary to fact” (i.e., information of events that do not come true). Although the men of Keilah did not get the opportunity to hand David over, such knowledge from God was useful for David, who used the information to plan his next move (his escape from Keilah).

David was able to “change the course” of events in his life (and Saul’s) by utilizing the God-given knowledge of Saul’s future plans. Notice here that there is no predetermination. If this passage taught predetermination or foreordination, then David would never have escaped (seeing that God’s knowledge of the men of Keilah capturing David would come to pass). Up until the moment David escapes, what God tells David is true: Saul will certainly come for David in Keilah. However, David decides to flee, and what once was a possibility no longer is (the men of Keilah will not get to hand David over to Saul).

Let me get right to the point: does 1 Samuel 23:10-13 support Molinism? No. However, the passage does show us that humans have genuine libertarian freedom...and that this power of choice is so powerful that it can change the course of events in a given situation. It seems that, in the final analysis, God does not place individuals in certain situations to “get them to do what He desires,” but instead allows them to be self-determining and determine their own circumstances. Instead of affirming predeterminism, the passage itself affirms true libertarian freedom. And, on the theological scoreboard, this biblical evidence awards one more point to Classical Arminianism.

The God of Non-Contradiction, Part I

In my last post, I discussed the idea that two opposing terms must be qualified if they are to correspond to reality. For instance, God is not contradictory—and we must think about this, for example, when we see God allowing nations to be murdered and destroyed and yet His Word tells us not to murder (Exodus 20). “Murder” and “not murder” cannot exist in the same way at the same time. To do so is to live with a blatant contradiction that doesn’t make any sense.

For those of you who have been reading the material here, for the last few weeks, I’ve been constantly mentioning what’s called “the Law of Non-Contradiction” (which I espoused in the above paragraph of this post). To give another example (other than murder), let’s use the words “short and tall.” No one can be BOTH short and tall at the same time. However, the opposing “heights” can be relative—for instance, “shorter than her aunt” but “taller than her grandmother” resolves the contradiction. In order for contradictions to be resolved, they must be “qualified,” or given a relative qualifier (being tall “in relation to” someone or something else). This is the key to resolving the idea of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility. The biblical doctrines of “God’s Sovereignty” and “man’s responsibility” ARE NOT CONTRADICTIONS! They are not paradoxes that we must live with. Because God is consistent and logical (a God of Order), we can resolve these two biblical doctrines and uphold them both equally.

Axel D. Steuer writes:

“We seem, in brief, to be caught in the paradox that, whether we affirm or deny that God can create such beings, we end up by imposing a limit to God’s power. The options for resolving this supposed ‘Paradox of Omnipotence’ seem to come down to denying either divine omnipotence (and hence divine freedom) or human freedom...however, I believe that there is yet another way of resolving this supposed paradox...In brief, an omnipotent God is able to do whatever such a being wants to do short of involving itself in a self-contradiction. And one of the things God presumably wanted to do and in fact accomplished was THE CREATION OF BEINGS CAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN FREE ACTIONS, i.e., with freedom or a degree of self-control” (Axel D. Steuer, “The Freedom Of God And Human Freedom.” Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 36, pp. 171-172).

“An omnipotent God is able to do whatever such a being wants to do short of involving” Himself in that which goes against His nature. In other words, God will not make a “round square” or a “square circle,” because these two objects are contradictory in nature. It’s the same thing with humans: God will also not create a “She-Man” or a “He-woman,” because male and female are two distinct genders that cannot be crossed. One cannot be both male and female at the same time in the same way. People are often considered to be masculine in some things (like sports) and feminine in others (like watching romance movies, eating healthy, shopping, etc.). Men are even considered to be “feminine” in some cases when they cry in front of other guys. But we all know that when a man is labeled “feminine,” he is labeled as such WITH RESPECT TO crying (his emotions)—not that he is actually a woman! And when a woman is labeled “masculine” in her field (like working on cars, for example), we know that she is not really a man, but masculine IN RELATION TO her field of labor. Both genders must be qualified to coexist harmoniously.

And it is this approach must be carried over to the intensive theological debate regarding the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man:

“Now, while this ability of free human agents to control their own choices may seem to place a limit on God’s omnipotence, that is not really the case. For this self-control or freedom is a property of the human agents God chose to create and IN NO WAY REDUCES GOD’S POWER AND FREEDOM to create, destroy, intervene, or in any other way to exert divine control over the lives of all creatures. The suggestion or demand...that the Deity BE ABLE TO CONTROL, EVEN MORE DIRECTLY, THE MECHANISM OF SELF-CONTROL OF HUMAN AGENTS amounts in effect to...the demand that GOD ACTUALLY BECOME IDENTICAL WITH SOME OF THE CREATURES—for only then could God have absolute or total control over their free choices or mechanisms of self-control...since this impossibility of God’s determining the free decision of agents other than Himself is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY, God’s power is not diminished by the fact that persons cannot be created both HAVING a degree of self-control or freedom of action and LACKING such self-control” (172).

Have you ever heard the statement, “God is gonna control my self-control?” chances are, if you’ve heard it, you are one of very few and I’d like to meet you (smile)! God has given His children, via the Spirit, the fruit of self-control. Since God has given us the power to control ourselves, God is not gonna FORCE me to control myself. If God were to do that, then He would be violating the power of self-control that He gave me. This is why we think it ridiculous, for example, when a parent lets a child raise himself or herself—because children are unable to raise themselves; and how much sense does it make for a parent to let children “parent” themselves? If children are gonna be their own parents, then what do they need a “mom and dad” for? And everyday life testifies to the contradiction of children “parenting” themselves—look at how many go on to be involved in a number of sad tragedies, whether it be children engaging in unprotected, pre-marital sex or drugs or gangs, etc. We see the downward slope of contradictions all the time. Contradictions are not just silly on the surface; they are also tragic in real life. It’s amazing to think of how different the world would be if humanity spent time correcting its contradictions...

I have one more quote of Steuer’s to examine in my next post.

Not Yet Reconciled

“But why would a proponent of middle knowledge...want to maintain that this world contains no ‘pure loss’ if this is possible? The answer is related to the problem of evil. There are two basic theodicies. Proponents of the greater-good defense maintain that there is no unnecessary evil, no ‘pure loss.’ All events stand as necessary components in the unfolding of God’s perfect plan. Proponents of the free will defense, on the other hand, maintain that some evil is ‘pure loss,’ the result of human decision-making over which God voluntarily gave up control by granting humans significant freedom.

Now let us suppose—as happens to be the case—that some proponents of middle knowledge want to utilize the free-will defense. Then of course they need to maintain that God was not able to bring about the exact world he wanted, for otherwise there could be no ‘pure loss.’ Or, to state the general point differently, to the extent that the proponent of middle knowledge wants to utilize the free-will defense, she or he must opt for a weaker reading of T2—of God’s control—than that affirmed by the theological compatibilist or paradox indeterminist. The proponent of middle knowledge cannot have it both ways” [David Basinger, “Divine Control and Human Freedom: Is Middle Knowledge The Answer?” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 36, no. 1 (March 1993): 64].

In one of my recent posts, I discussed the issue of gratuitous evil and quoted some of Luis Molina’s words regarding the “greater good” theodicy. Molina stated in the quote that God only allows that which He can bring a greater good from. I stated in the post that 1 Peter shows us what gratuitous evil is and argues for its existence. If all evil is intended to exist by God with the purpose being “His glory,” then why does Peter tell us that there is “no credit” in suffering when we suffer for our own faults, but glory in suffering for Christ? Evidently, Peter was not a fan of the “greater good” theodicy. And I think Peter’s words are echoed throughout the rest of Scripture.

In addition, what about the observations noted in our world? What about the tragedies that happen everyday? What about issues like divorce, which Jesus said was not so “from the beginning” (Mark 10:5-9)? What was Jesus saying when He refused to comment on the explanations regarding recent deaths of those in Luke 13?

“And Jesus answered and said to them, ‘DO YOU SUPPOSE THAT THESE GALILEANS WERE WORSE SINNERS than all other Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you, NO; but unless you repent you will all likewise perish. Or those eighteen on whom the tower in Siloam fell, and killed them, DO YOU THINK THAT THEY WERE WORSE SINNERS THAN ALL OTHER MEN who dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, NO; but unless you repent you will all likewise perish” (Luke 13:2-5, NKJV).

In John 9, we have a case where the man born blind from birth was healed by Jesus and vindicated as not suffering blindness as a result of sin. Jesus said that the man was born blind “so that the works of God should be revealed in him” (John 9:3, NKJV). In Luke 13 however, Jesus doesn’t say this. The Galileans whose blood is mingled with the sacrifices didn’t die so that God’s work could be manifested; those on whom the tower fell did not die so that God’s work could be manifested. Instead, we find Jesus silent on these matters. Perhaps these tragedies took place because of “pure loss” in our world...

What we find scripturally is that some events are allowed to happen because God desires to use them (He “permits” them to happen). However, there are other events like those of Luke 13 on which Jesus is silent. These events, then, do not serve a divine purpose. They are allowed because of the fallenness of our world.

Basinger’s quote above shows us that middle knowledge serves a purpose as related to Deity. Because God knows all things (including things that would have been certain in another world), He has a much stronger grip on world events than does the God of simple foreknowledge; however, in the grand scheme of things, He too, cannot violate the power of choice that He has given His creatures. If a person believes in true libertarian freedom, then that advocate of middle knowledge does not have a God who is the strong tyrant of the Calvinist system. But another point Basinger makes is that this God is also unlike that of the “paradox determinist,” one who advocates a God who determines the choices of humans. To them, the ideas of divine power and human responsibility are a “paradox,” a contradiction. My response would be the following, though: if these two biblical doctrines are “contradictory,” then what are we saying about God? To make these two contradictory is the same as saying that the Lord murders nations but then turns around and tells us to not commit murder (Exodus 20)—without realizing that the Lord’s execution of the other nations is because of righteous judgment. The problem is though, that the ideas have not been qualified. There is a solution, since these two concepts cannot exist in the same manner at the same time (according to the Law of Non-Contradiction). To accept “biblical paradoxes” is a dangerous thing. If the Bible shows us the nature and character of God, and the Bible contains “contradictions,” then what does this say about God? That God is contradictory?

If life consists of such “gratuitous” evil, then is God still sovereign? Yes, He is. Does the presence of such evil weaken the power of God? Absolutely not! But what it does show us is that there is a Lord who made man “lord” over the earth (Gen. 1:26-28, Psalm 8) and gave him true, genuine choices.

I think there is some truth to the idea of God’s middle knowledge. But I think that it has been employed (in some sense) as a way to give God “greater control” over our choices—and I’m rather suspicious of it. The writer of Hebrews was more right than he realized when he wrote, “but now we do not yet see all things put under him” (Hebrews 2:8b). If believers are going to take God as sovereign, then something has to account for the fact that the world had to be reconciled to God in Christ (2 Corinthians 5:19) and that this reconciliation is yet to be fully actualized in our world. That can’t be done if theologians continue to ascribe tighter control of humanity’s choices to God. With an increased tighter control, God comes to bear more responsibility for the world situation—and man even less...