The Confirmation of Our Salvation (Hebrews 2:1-4)

“For this reason we must pay much closer attention to what we have heard, so that we do not drift away from it. For if the word spoken through angels proved unalterable, and every transgression and disobedience received a just penalty, how will we escape if we neglect so great a salvation? After it was at the first spoken through the Lord, it was confirmed to us by those who heard, God also testifying with them, both by signs and wonders and by various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit according to His own will” (Hebrews 2:1-4, NASB).

The last two posts have been consumed with a discussion of the “many convincing proofs” Jesus gave post-resurrection to demonstrate that He had risen from the dead. Three of the proofs involved showing the nail scars in His hands, the piercing in His side (where blood and water came down), as well as His eating fish and loaves in a meal with His disciples. The text states that these were “convincing proofs”; and if I had been alive and seen Jesus’ nail scars, pierced side, and observed Him eating fish and loaves, I would have been completely convinced it was Him, too!

In this post, however, I intend to leave our discussion of the signs of the resurrection and turn our attention to the evidence of the truth of our salvation. One would think it enough that Christ confirmed the reality of His resurrection; however, it’s a special privilege to know that there are signs which confirm not only our Savior, but also our salvation. As I have mentioned in the last few posts, studying these signs of both our great Savior and our great salvation provide a potent, scriptural critique of Reformed Epistemology, a critique which many believers could easily forget and abandon in favor of a system that consumes itself with confirming the believer’s rationality. We are rational for believing, not only because Christianity is true...but also because evidence confirms it.

Let’s direct our attention to the scripture passage provided above, Hebrews 2:2-4. In verse 2, the writer(s) of the epistle compares the new covenant (our great salvation) to the old covenant (where angels spoke words that could not be changed, where sins and disobedience resulted in all sorts of penalties such as death). The writer says that if the old covenant had harsh penalties where one could die for sin and disobedience, “how shall we escape if we neglect so great a salvation” (Heb. 2:3, NASB)?

Notice two things here. First, our salvation is “great.” Second, notice that we will suffer penalty if we “neglect” salvation. What does it mean to “neglect” salvation? The word means “to be careless of” or “to pay no attention to” (http://www.biblestudytools.com/lexicons/greek/nas/ameleo.html).

One who neglects salvation is one who gives no thought to living as though he or she is not saved. And the writer says that to do this would result in a greater penalty than sins suffered under the old covenant. In short, one should fear the penalty of the New Covenant more than the Old.

But the writer doesn’t stop there. Yes, our salvation is great. Yes, our salvation in the New Covenant is greater than the supposed “salvation” the Jews believe the Old Covenant provided. But there’s more: not only is the New Covenant better and greater in penalty, it is also true and confirmed as such:

“After it was at the first spoken through the Lord, it was confirmed to us by those who heard, God also testifying with them, both by signs and wonders and by various miracles...” (Heb. 2:3b-4a)

How do we know the salvation of the New Covenant is better and greater and more true than the “salvation” of the Old Covenant? 1) the salvation of the New Covenant was spoken by the Lord Jesus Christ Himself on earth (Mark 1:14); 2) it was confirmed by His followers, the disciples, particularly the apostle Simon Peter (Acts 2:22-36). John “the Beloved Disciple” records this as well, writing to the churches that he had seen with his eyes and heard the words of Christ, the one who was in the beginning with God (1 John 1:1). 3) not only did the apostles, those who heard Christ teach and preach, confirm it by their word of mouth, God also confirmed it along with their testimony, providing signs, wonders, and miracles (see Mark 16:20). If you read Mark 16:20, you’ll see that the text says, “the Lord worked with them, and confirmed the word by the signs that followed.” The Lord had just told the disciples in Mark 16:17 that “these signs will accompany those who have believed.” In other words, the signs would demonstrate the rationality and truth of Christianity.

Last but not least, God also confirmed the truth of Christianity by providing various spiritual gifts to the church, the body of Christ. We can see these in Ephesians 4, 1 Corinthians 12, and Romans 12. The believer in Christ can be certain of his salvation because of the spiritual gifts he or she has been given by God. Those gifts manifest themselves in each believer’s life, and the church itself can also confirm with the believer the genuineness of their salvation and their calling from God.

Here in Hebrews 2, we have been given evidences that attest to the truth of Christianity. As I said in an earlier post, the evidence/arguments do not declare Christianity to be true (it is true whether or not I know the evidences or arguments). Nevertheless, the truth will have confirmation. This is where I disagree most with Reformed Epistemology: it claims that the truth is independent of evidence and argument, thereby suggesting that “if there aren’t any” evidences or arguments (Plantinga’s claim), one would still be rational in believing Christianity is true. However, as we have seen in the last post and this one, Christ confirmed that He had risen from the dead with “many convincing proofs”...and the truth of salvation was confirmed with many signs, wonders, miracles, and spiritual gifts. Again, it seems to me that the truth is always confirmed by evidence, evidence that attests to the truth of the claim.

I make the same appeal again I made earlier in the series: Christianity is true whether or not evidence or argument is known by the individual in the same way that a person is either innocent or guilty when walking into a courtroom where he or she is being tried for murder. That person’s innocence or guilt can only come out in the courtroom. In the same way, Christianity’s truth exists before I know any evidence or arguments for it. Nevertheless, there will be evidence to confirm its authenticity. Why? Because the believer and unbeliever live in God’s world, where all truth is God’s truth, and where all truth (like Christ and Christianity) has confirmatory evidence. If there is no evidence, then it is very likely (even highly so) that the claim is not true. God bless.

"Many Convincing Proofs": The Signs of The Resurrection

  Throughout this series on Reformed Epistemology, I have aimed to present Dr. Plantinga’s presentation of RE in a fair manner. Though I am imperfect, and could easily misrepresent others due to the depravity of man and the Fall, I have aimed to represent RE accurately. I pray that my labor has resulted in blessing, for both those who agree with me and those who disagree.

One of the weaknesses of RE (in my estimation) is that the system claims that one need neither evidence nor argument to be deemed rational for theistic belief. I have pointed out that this argument aims to preserve the truth of Christianity while eliminating the dependence of the truth on evidence; what really happens, though, is that, by severing evidence and argument from truth, one allows that which is irrational to be true (since evidence nor argument is needed for something to be true). This does not seem right. The truth is always confirmed by the evidence...but to allow Christians to be rational in their faith (though there is no evidence) is to make Christians appear “illogical” in their faith. If Christianity is true (and I believe it is), Paul does not lie when he states that God’s invisible attributes (His eternal power and Godhead) have been displayed in “the things that have been made” (Rom. 1:18-20). Since God has revealed Himself, the truth and the evidence will always corroborate, not oppose, each other.

In today’s post, I will cover Jesus’ work post-resurrection: that is, His signs He gave His followers to demonstrate that He had really risen from the dead. The purpose of this post is to examine the numerous proofs Jesus gave...and thereby display our Lord’s willingness to provide tangible proof of His resurrection (despite the truth of the claims He made). Our Lord did not “risk” the truth of His claims; He simply confirmed the truth of them.

To begin this post, let’s look at Luke’s words about Jesus in his prologue to the book of Acts:

“The first account I composed, Theophilus, about all that Jesus began to do and teach, until the day when He was taken up to heaven, after He had by the Holy Spirit given orders to the apostles whom He had chosen. To these He also presented Himself alive after His suffering, by many convincing proofs, appearing to them over a period of forty days and speaking of the things concerning the kingdom of God” (Acts 1:1-3, NASB).

When most people read about the life of Christ, they turn to the gospels; but how many people turn to Acts 1 when reading of the life of Christ? Very few. And in the Acts prologue lies some very useful information we would not have without it. First, notice that Luke’s gospel was nothing more than “all that Jesus began to do and teach” (Acts 1:1). It was not all Jesus did and taught...rather, the work of Christ in the gospels was only the beginning of Jesus’ ministry. And why? Because the Spirit would continue the work of Christ. As Jesus Himself said, “but when He, the Spirit of truth, come, He will guide you into all truth...He will glorify Me, for He will take of Mine and will disclose it to you” (John 16:13-14). In other words, the Spirit would take what Jesus taught and teach it to believers.

Acts 1:3 tells us that it is to the apostles that He showed Himself to have risen from the dead. The Greek word for “convincing,” tekmerion, refers to “that from which something is surely and plainly known on indubitable evidence, a proof” (http://www.biblestudytools.com/lexicons/greek/nas/tekmerion.html). The word tekmerion is only used once in the New Testament. What Luke says here is that Jesus provided indisputable evidence of His resurrection to the disciples, such that they found it too hard to disbelieve.

In today’s post, I desire to investigate some of the proof Jesus’ provided to make the case that He had risen from the dead. One such proof is found in John 20, where Jesus first appears to the disciples after His resurrection:

“So when it was evening on that day, the first day of the week, and when the doors were shut were the disciples were, for fear of the Jews, Jesus came and stood in their midst and said to them, ‘Peace be with you.’ And when He had said this, He showed them both His hands and His side. The disciples then rejoiced when they saw the Lord” (John 20:19-20, NASB).

What is significant about this moment in John’s chapter is that the text tells us the disciples secluded themselves “for fear of the Jews.” Since they had been with Jesus, they feared what the Jews would do to them. If the Jews crucified Jesus, and the disciples had been with Him, then the disciples feared the Jews would crucify them, perhaps.

And it is in the midst of this fear that Jesus comes to them to show that He had risen. What does He show them when He comes? “both His hands and His side.” He showed His hands because He had nail scars in them from the cross; He showed His side because He had been pierced in His side and they saw both blood and water streaming down. And the moment they see these physical proofs, they “rejoiced when they saw the Lord.” In other words, seeing these physical proofs, the disciples knew that it was Jesus standing among them.

Doubting Thomas (as he is always infamously known) was not with them; but when he returned to the disciples’ company, the disciples told him that they had seen Jesus, to which he responded negatively (see John 20:25). Eight days later, Jesus reappears to the disciples (this time, Thomas is among them), and says the same thing He said to the disciples (minus Thomas) the first time. Knowing Thomas’s statement (“unless I see in His hands the imprint of the nails, and put my finger into the place of the nails, and put my hand into His side, I will not believe”, Jn. 20:26), Jesus tells Thomas, “Reach here with your finger, and see My hands; and reach here your hand and put it into My side; and do not be unbelieving, but believing” (Jn. 20:27).

Why does Jesus allow Thomas to feel the places where there were scars? Because without it, Thomas refused to believe. Jesus’ words to Thomas in verse 29 have been used to make the case that faith is more important than evidence:

“No doubt there is more than one point here [John 20:29]; a central point, surely, is that those who have been given faith are indeed blessed. Their faith is a gift requiring joyful thanksgiving, not a moral lapse requiring shamefaced repentance. One who has faith, therefore, is (or may very well be) justified according to the model” (Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pages 254-255).

True, faith is not a “moral lapse”...but faith is a moral lapse if it does not involve reasoning and evidence. Faith in and of itself is not a moral lapse...but blind faith is. And Jesus did not ask the disciples to have blind evidence. Remember, He showed His scars to the disciples (minus Thomas) in John 20:20). He said what He did to Thomas because Thomas required absolute evidence. For Thomas, he needed more evidence than the other disciples in order to believe. Jesus’ point to Thomas was that those who need absolute evidence will never find what they seek. Rather, one must believe that the evidence that is presented is true, even thought it may be only a small portion. Even when the evidence is presented, one must have faith and accept what is presented as true. If one requires absolute proof of the truth, then one will never find it. Luke, of course, calls the evidence Jesus presented as “convincing” because it could not be disputed. If I saw someone who died, now appeared to be alive from the dead, and had nail scars in His hands and feet and piercing in His side to prove He was the one who had died, I would believe, too!

No one on earth is placed in a state where they are told to believe in the absence of evidence. Though Jesus is in heaven today, and though we did not live in the time of the disciples, we still have substantial evidence today that testifies to the resurrection of Jesus...including the testimony of the disciples themselves in the Scriptures. And if something happened today, like a shooting or a robbery or a hurricane event, to find out what happened we would talk to those who experienced it...and unless we discovered the witnesses were really liars, we would assume it to be true. Unfortunately, we live in a world where lots of people lie for personal reasons...but then, we have the evidence. The tangible, physical evidence will point us to the truth. If someone says he was shot (for example), but shot himself, all we need to do is get forensics experts on the case. The evidence doesn’t lie. It didn’t lie for the disciples in the face of Jesus, and it does not lie today. I will talk more about the “many convincing proofs” in my next post. Stay tuned...

"They Were Not Irrational Then, We Are Not Irrational Now": Reformed Epistemology and the Anachronistic Fallacy

In my latest posts, I have approached some of the objections of Reformed Epistemology. This post seeks to point out an argument made by proponents of RE that I think is a fallacious one: that is, the idea that the standard for rationality centuries ago is the standard for rationality now.

A statement made by a proponent of RE is as follows:

“Surely there have been many people in the history of Christianity who have had no clue about science, no interest in science, no ability in science, no opportunity to study scientific evidence or theistic arguments, but who still believe in God and Christianity. Were they all irrational?”

This is the question that lies before us: since those in history before us didn’t have access to scientific evidence and theistic argument, and they were not deemed irrational, why should the modern-day Christian be deemed irrational for not knowing about theistic arguments and scientific evidence? I have a simple answer to this: because, in the current world, we have more access to such arguments and evidence than ever before.

I could use the format of the RE proponent’s question and create one of my own. Let’s do it. Asking the above question is similar to asking this question (mine):

“Since individuals of the pre-Enlightenment days believed the earth was flat, and they weren’t deemed irrational, why should individuals of modern-day civilization be thought irrational for thinking the earth is flat?”

See the problem with the RE proponent’s question? It is what I call the “Anachronistic Fallacy,” where the circumstances of a previous day and time are placed upon a current day and time. In the case of the flat earth question I pose, what was believed about the earth in the pre-Enlightenment period (that the earth was flat) is used to justify those in the modern day who think the earth is flat (though the evidence has already been published which testifies to the earth being round, instead). How foolish of me would it be were I, in the twenty-first century, to hold to the “flat-earth” idea of the pre-Enlightenment? The fact that those of that time had little to no access to scientific evidence and believed the earth was flat (not to mention fixed without motion) gives me no right (in the technological age in which I live) to claim these statements. Should I do so today, I will be deemed irrational because the evidence testifies to the contrary. Scientific progress eliminates the rationality of the flat-earth and fixed-earth claims.

This could apply to any example I could use. Interestingly enough, inclusivists make the same claim. “If people could be saved in the pre-Christ times without believing in Jesus, why can’t they be saved now without believing in Jesus?” the argument goes. The solution to this, however, is that the Scriptures explicitly state that there was a time of ignorance, but that time has now passed (Acts 17:30). With changing times and increased knowledge comes increased responsibility.

And this idea of increased responsibility is also seen in the Gospels themselves. Jesus uses the idea of greater revelation and greater responsibility when contrasting Tyre and Sidon with Chorazin and Bethsaida:

“Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles had been performed in Tyre and Sidon which occurred in you, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes. But it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the judgment than for you” (Luke 10:13-14, NASB).

Here, Jesus is contrasting these cities on the basis of the miracles done (“if the miracles had been performed in Tyre and Sidon”). Jesus’s words condemned Chorazin and Bethsaida because these two cities had seen the Lord Jesus perform miracles, while Tyre and Sidon had not. As a result of Chorazin and Bethsaida’s hard-heartedness, the judgment would be less for Tyre and Sidon than these two cities. In brief, more special revelation leads to greater judgment; less special revelation leads to lesser judgment.

Someone could say today, “Well, what about the person who lives out in the middle of nowhere, whose family has very little formal education or training at all? Does that person have to know scientific evidence or theistic arguments in order to be rational in their theistic belief?” This seems like a fair question, but it presumes that such individuals live so far away from technology that they have no access to these arguments or evidences at all. The truth is, however, that today’s individual living out in the “boondocks” still has greater access to evidence and arguments than someone living on an island. In fact, statistics reveal that more people today have a television than have indoor plumbing (see Dr. Alvin Reid’s Radically Unchurched: Who They Are And How To Reach Them, page 167). And desktop computers and laptops have become even more affordable today. I still remember when my mom bought our first desktop, a Compaq Presario, for around $2000. Today, we could probably buy a new desktop for $250-$300. This means that today’s desktops are (get this!) eight times more affordable than the average desktop was back when I was in seventh or eighth grade. Prices have improved over the last 14-15 years. Anyone that can buy an expensive pair of Nike shoes can afford a computer. This means that scientific evidence and theistic arguments are right at our fingertips!!!

All this is to say that, even the poorest person in the boondocks can probably afford more in the way of technology than an inhabitant on an island who has no possibility of technological access. So, is it true that we are as helpless as someone of the pre-Enlightenment period who wasn’t aristocratic and couldn’t afford to read and write? Not at all. In my estimation, then, we cannot use the intellectual helplessness of the pre-Enlightenment period and plaster it onto the twenty-first century. To do so would be nothing short of making excuses. 

Half the Question, Half the Answer: Plantinga On How One Can Know Christianity Is True

“A problem with evaluating this version of the argument is that the Reformed epistemologist (this Reformed epistemologist, anyway) doesn’t claim as part of his philosophical position that belief in God and the deliverances of IIHS do have warrant. That is because (above, p. 186ff.) in all likelihood they have warrant only if they are true, and I am not arguing that these beliefs are in fact true. No doubt the Reformed epistemologist does believe that they are true, and is prepared to claim that they are, even if he doesn’t propose to argue for that claim” (Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, page 347).

In the last post, I discussed the Truth Incarnate (Jesus in the flesh) and the incarnation of contemporary truth. It is my conviction that the Scriptures teach that the Word manifested Himself among us (humanity), and that the truth in the world today will, like Jesus its paradigm, manifest itself in physical evidences (such as argumentation, historical proof, etc.). To claim, however, that the truth need neither evidence nor argument (the stance of Reformed Epistemology) is to hold to an epistemology whose stance is counter-biblical.

In today’s post, I will focus on the inadequacy of Reformed Epistemology in the area of evidence. Not only does RE fail to address the issue of incarnation of truth (Jesus and modern-day evidence); it also fails to address the necessity of convincing others. One of the positive strengths of RE is that the view is consumed with helping assure Christians of the truth of their faith apart from evidence or argument. Plantinga states in his work Warranted Christian Belief that Christians can believe in the truth of Christianity because of the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit Himself shows us that the great things of the gospel are true. It’s not that an argument or evidence is needed to convince us. We are convinced because the Holy Spirit convinces us (John 16:7-11). Because we can know the gospel is true due to the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit need not evidence nor argument to make Christianity true. I would agree with Plantinga that Christianity is either true or not apart from evidence, in the same way that a trial suspect is either guilty or not before the court case begins. Where I disagree with Plantinga, however, is in his implied assumption that because truth is independent of evidence, therefore it need no evidence. Evidence should serve a confirmatory function---that is, the evidence will only confirm what the truth is. DNA, for instance, will not make someone the father of someone else’s child; the person either is or is not the father, prior to a DNA test. Rather, the DNA test only confirms the identity of the child’s father. It is the confirmatory function of evidence that makes evidence itself essential to any investigation of the truth. Having said all this, let me state that I believe Christianity is true independent of the evidence...but I do not think the evidence is “optional” in the investigation of the truth. Rather, because Christianity is true, the evidence will only confirm the truth of Christian belief.

Plantinga’s quote above provides insight into the apologetic methodology of the individual who holds to Reformed Epistemology: while they can confidently assert that Christianity is true, they will not “argue that it is.” Plantinga says, “I am not arguing that these beliefs are in fact true.” He also states that he would “claim” Christianity is true, though “he doesn’t propose to argue for that claim.” There is a difference between making a claim and arguing for it. One can claim that a stay-at-home mom is a serial killer, but one also has to prove that the individual is a serial killer. Just saying, “Well, can’t you see the truth? She’s got kitchen knives in her hand,” doesn’t make the mother a killer. One must have quite a bit of evidence to have someone take his or her claim regarding the mother seriously.

Think of math class. When I was growing up, it wasn’t enough to answer the math problem and say, “I got 35.” One also had to show how he or she arrived at the answer (35). It involved saying things like, “Well, I first multiplied these two numbers...then I divided by this...and then I added 12,” for example. In mathematics, one arrives at answers by performing certain known mathematical operations. By showing how you arrived at an answer, you let the teacher know that you understood how to solve the problem such that, if you had to solve another like it (that involved another answer), you could solve it on your own without the teacher’s help, every step of the way. Understanding the mathematical operations was key in math class...not just having the right answers. Should it not be the same way in anything else?

In the same way, one cannot just claim that “Christianity is true” without showing it. Showing it plays no role in convincing you that Christianity is true. If it did, you wouldn’t already believe that it is! Rather, convincing others of the truth of Christianity is independent of your belief that Christianity is true...but its purpose is designed to convince someone else of the truth of Christianity.

Taking these words into account, Plantinga’s decision to claim Christianity is true but not argue for it is due to his emphasis on the internal justification of the individual:

“Again, what I’ve really argued is that this believer is subjectively justified” (Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, page 102, footnote #56).

The key to justification here is “subjectively justified.” When something is “subjective,” it is based upon the preference of the person involved. So if justification is subjective, then it is based on the person’s conviction or belief. Thus, when Plantinga says that the believer is “subjectively justified,” he is saying that the believer is justified internally because he or she possesses no mental defects, and, having thought through their beliefs rationally, is warranted to believe in God. Internal justification and internal rationality go together---if someone is justified within themselves for how they arrive at theistic belief, then he or she is also “internally rational.” However, what Plantinga has abandoned for us is “external” justification---that is, whether or not we are justified toward other persons (including atheists and agnostics). In his section titled “External Rationality and Warrant: Faith is Knowledge,” Plantinga writes:

“...it [faith] is also unusual in the way in which that content is known; it is known by way of an extraordinary cognitive process or belief-producing mechanism. Christian belief is ‘revealed to our minds’ by way of the Holy Spirit’s inducing, in us, belief in the central message of Scripture. The belief-producing process is dual, involving both the divinely inspired Scripture (perhaps directly, or perhaps at the head of a testimonial chain) and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit. Both involve the special activity of God” (Plantinga, WCB, 256).

According to Plantinga, Christian belief is externally justified and rational because of the Holy Spirit who produced it. The Spirit serves as the “self-authenticating witness” of the truth of Christianity:

“When these beliefs are accepted by faith and result from the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (IIHS), they are produced by cognitive processes working properly...when it does produce this effect, therefore, it is working properly; thus the beliefs in question satisfy the external rationality condition, which is also the first condition of warrant” (Plantinga, WCB, 257).

Why are our cognitive processes working properly when we believe? Because God has designed us to know about His existence...and we can only know this when the Spirit internally woos us to receive Christ.

But this works against Plantinga’s claim. He states that he will “claim” Christianity is true, but not “argue” for it. But why? If according to the model, our cognitive processes are working properly when we believe in God, then one can only make sense to fellow believers, those who, like Plantinga and me, have the Holy Spirit to confirm the rationality of their faith. And if Reformed Epistemology is only concerned about fellow believers, then one need not explain why Christianity is true (or even defend Christianity---believers are already convinced). But what about the atheist and agnostic who do not believe? Can they know the Holy Spirit lives within believers? Can they vouch for the Holy Spirit’s presence? No.

If this is an epistemology for believers, fine...however, Plantinga desires his system to be able to ward off objections made by atheists and agnostics. How, though, will Reformed Epistemology accomplish this if it only seeks to “convince the already convinced”? In my next post, I will discuss the important role the believer is to play (by the aid of the Holy Spirit) in “convincing the unconvinced.” God bless.

The Truth Incarnate and The Truth Incarnated: Jesus and Contemporary Evidence

In my last post, I discussed Plantinga’s rebuttal to the objection that if RE is correct, then any community could “legitimately claim” that its belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. I stated that Plantinga’s problem is that he wants theistic belief to be both similar to our own beliefs (memory, perception, a priori intuition) and yet, different from other beliefs (because it involves the Spirit causing you and I to believe the great things of the gospel). Plantinga must declare whether or not it is similar to or different from other human beliefs. He must be unwavering on this question if he is to make the case for RE.

I also pointed out another problem with Reformed Epistemology (RE): that is, it separates truth from evidence to make truth independent of the evidence. The problem with such a notion is that it makes truth exist apart from evidence. If there is no evidence, one could still consider their belief to be rational. Plantinga himself states the following:

“I’ll conclude that in fact there is no reason at all to think that Christian belief requires argument or propositional evidence, if it is to be justified. Christians---indeed, well-educated, contemporary, and culturally aware Christians---can be justified, so I shall argue, even if they don’t hold their beliefs on the basis of arguments or evidence, even if they aren’t aware of any good arguments for their beliefs, and even if, indeed, there aren’t any [arguments or evidence]” (Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, page 93. End parenthetical insertion mine).

This is a quote that I think bears some discussion, though I’ve already discussed it much in the series. Plantinga wants to allow Christians without knowledge of arguments and evidence to be justified in their beliefs (and even rational for so believing); nevertheless, he not only wants to make uneducated Christians justified and rational in their Christian belief, but he wants to say that, even if no arguments or evidence existed, such persons would still be justified and rational for their belief in God.

Today’s post, then, is designed to discuss why I disagree with Dr. Plantinga’s thesis. Of all that I have said in this series, very little of it may be read or remembered; but what I want believers to remember is this post. It is designed to give a biblical argument as to why I disagree with Dr. Plantinga. I just believe that, if RE is a Christian epistemology (it is considered to be an apologetic methodology, see “Five Views on Apologetics”), it should adhere to the Scriptures themselves. After all, is Scripture not supposed to be the ultimate source by which children of God live their lives in this world? If it is, then we cannot (nor should we) hold to an epistemology that is counter-biblical. And in my estimation at least, RE is counter-biblical...which makes it hard for me in my Christian conscience to endorse it.

Why do I title this post “The Truth Incarnate and The Truth Incarnated”? Because my disagreement with Reformed Epistemology has to do with the idea of “The Truth Incarnate” (Jesus Christ as the truth, John 14:6, and His incarnation) as well as “the truth incarnated” (how truth should be discovered today).

First, let’s look at Jesus Christ. Jesus declares in John 14:6, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me” (New American Standard Version). It is in John 14:6 that we find Jesus stating that He Himself is “the truth,” the guideline of truth, truth embodied. The Truth became incarnate when He took on flesh, was born of the virgin Mary, and was raised as a carpenter’s son. John tells us in his prologue, “And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14, NASB). The Word, John says, which was “in the beginning with God” (Jn. 1:2) came to earth and walked among men. From these verses alone, we see that “The Truth” (Jesus) became incarnate---that is, Jesus, though divine deity in heaven, left heaven and came to earth to reside with men. He left His exalted state for a lowly, earthly existence.

Here’s a question we should ask ourselves: “did Jesus necessarily have to come to earth?” No. He is God and did not have to surrender His life to die for sinful man. Since we were the ones who sinned, we were the ones who needed to die for the sin we committed. Jesus, however, offered His life on behalf of the world. He Himself once said,

“For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down My life so that I may take it again. No one has taken it away from Me, but I lay it down on My own initiative. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it up again” (John 10:17-18).

Jesus voluntarily offered up His life for all of humanity. He was not forced to do so. “The Truth,” Jesus Christ Himself, did not have to provide evidence of His existence in the present world...but He did. He “became flesh,” John tells us, and resided among men. Though Christ would still have existed without the Incarnation, nevertheless, He came on behalf of the world. The Incarnation was of great value to God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, though Christ would still be God (and the Trinity would still have existed) without it.

And the “Truth Incarnate” (Jesus Christ) provides an example for “the truth incarnated” (that is, how truth is seen and perceived in the contemporary world). If Christ is our God, Lord, Savior, and paradigm for the Christian life, then we are to be Christ-like and have actions that point unbelievers to Christ. I am a believer that what one believes about life will determine what one lives in life. If a Christian has wrong ideas about God and themselves, he or she will live a very haphazard Christian life. But if someone correctly understands his or her shortcomings, weaknesses, and the greatness of God (as well as His truth), then that individual will be impacted by the knowledge of the truth to live it out. In fact, those who know more of the truth will be far more convicted by their own consciences and the Spirit than someone who does not.

Now, if Jesus, “The Truth” (John 14:6), manifested Himself in our physical world, should not truth manifest itself in our physical world? What about Romans 1? It tells us that “His [God’s] invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse” (Rom. 1:20, NASB). God’s “invisible” attributes have been seen in “what has been made”---that is, the physical world. And the only reason why we know God exists is because, as Paul says here, “that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them” (Rom. 1:19). Humanity knows that God exists because God has given tangible, unambiguous proof of His existence. I have discussed Romans 1 in one of the posts in the series on Reformed Epistemology.

According to Romans 1, God’s existence is revealed in what has been made, the physical world, the creation. So here, we see that God has revealed Himself in two ways: 1) general revelation (creation, Romans 1) and 2) special revelation (the face of Jesus Christ, John 1:14).

But what about “truth,” lowercase truth? We’ve discussed “Truth,” that being Jesus; but why should “truth” (lowercase) be revealed in the world? The answer is simple: because, as I’ve often heard it said, “All truth is God’s truth.” Whatever is true and right and just and noble and holy and of good report in the world is God’s truth. If Jesus is the paradigm of truth, and He manifested Himself in the physical world, why would “truth” not manifest itself? If all truth is God’s truth, and God’s very character is truth (John 14:6), then all truth must conform to Christ, who is the very paradigm of truth itself. As such, truth in the world (ideas, morality, etc.) will reflect the character of the Divine Lawgiver Himself.

If truth will reflect “The Truth,” Jesus, it, like Jesus, will be incarnated---in other words, the truth will be evident, clearly seen in the physical world, in a way that men and women can understand it. And this is why I disagree with Reformed Epistemology. RE is so consumed with the truth that it cares very little about evidence. But our Lord was not like this: even after His resurrection, Luke tells us that He gave “many convincing proofs” of His resurrection (see Acts 1:3). In addition, our great salvation was confirmed by many signs and wonders (see Hebrews 2:2-4). Did God have to? No. But still, He did anyway. And the fact that “The Truth” could be incarnate and incarnate the truth about Himself with signs and wonders and proofs dispels the notion that truth need neither argument nor evidence.

I will discuss Acts 1:3 and Hebrews 2:2-4 in another post. In this post, I wanted to provide a biblical case (in addition to my post on Elijah and the Mount Carmel Experience, 1 Kings 18) for why I disagree with Reformed Epistemology. I love truth, as do proponents of Reformed Epistemology. At the same time, however, I think Jesus, the Truth Incarnate, shows us a better way to uphold truth in the world. God bless.

           

Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection (SGP): Objections to Reformed Epistemology, Part 3

“Although reformed epistemologists would not have to accept voodoo beliefs as rational, voodoo followers would be able to claim that insofar as they are basic in the voodoo community they are rational and, moreover, that reformed thought was irrational in this community. Indeed, Plantinga’s proposal would generate many different communities that could legitimately claim that their basic beliefs are rational...Among the communities generated might be devil worshipers, flat earthers, and believers in fairies, just so long as belief in the devil, the flatness of the earth, and fairies was basic in the respective communities” (Michael Martin, Atheism, page 272; quoted by Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, page 345).

In my last post, I discussed Plantinga’s claim that theistic belief was similar to memory belief, a priori intuition, and perception. If this is the case, then belief in God must be subjected to reason and correspondence to reality; it would thus require evidence to validate the claim that theism is true. This spells problems for Reformed Epistemology.

In today’s post, I am back to tackle the SGP: the Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection. Plantinga presents the objection:

“...according to SGP, someone who took any proposition p in the basic way could legitimately claim that p was properly basic---properly basic with respect to rationality, says Martin---that is, such that it can be both rationally accepted and accepted in the basic way. Take any possible community and any beliefs accepted as basic in that community: the epistemologists of that community could legitimately claim that these beliefs are rationally accepted in the basic way” (Plantinga, WCB, 345).

In other words, the issue is no longer (as in the Great Pumpkin Objection, GPO) that any belief could be true, but the idea that any belief could be claimed or asserted as true. There is a distinction to be noted here between whether or not a belief is true and whether or not a belief is claimed as truth.

Here is Plantinga’s response to the SGP objection:

“Suppose we think of the Reformed epistemologists as actually claiming that belief in God and the deliverances of the IIHS enjoy warrant in the basic way; suppose further that they claim this ‘legitimately’---that is, under the current interpretation, suppose this claim itself has warrant for them. Would it follow that for any proposition p, if there were a community who endorsed p, these people (or the epistemologists of their community) would be warranted in believing that p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those in this community? It would not follow. Suppose the extended A/C model is true (not just possible); then (a) the central claims of the Christian faith are, in fact, true, (b) there really are such cognitive processes as the sensus divinitatis and IIHS, and (c) their deliverances do meet the conditions for warrant...It doesn’t follow, of course, that the voodoo epistemologist is also warranted in claiming that voodoo belief is properly basic with respect to warrant. For suppose voodoo belief is in fact false, and suppose further that it arose originally in some kind of mistake or confusion, or out of a fearful reaction to natural phenomena of one sort or another, or in the mind of some group hoping to gain or perpetuate personal political power. If so, then those original voodoo beliefs did not possess warrant. Suppose still further that these voodoo beliefs were passed on to subsequent generations by way of testimony and teaching. Now if a testifier testifies to some belief p that has no warrant for her, then p will also have no warrant for anyone believing it on just the basis of her testimony. If p has no warrant for the testifier, then it has none for the testifiee either---even if the latter’s faculties are working perfectly properly” (Plantinga, WCB, 347-348).

Plantinga wants us to “suppose voodoo belief is in fact false” and “suppose...that it arose in some kind of mistake or confusion.” But why should we assume this about voodooism? We are never told. We are simply told to assume the worst about voodooism, though there is no evidence cited or reasons given to justify the claim. In addition, not only is the voodoo religion attacked, but also the origin of the religion: It “arose out of a fearful reaction to natural phenomena...or in the mind of some group hoping to gain or perpetuate personal political power” (WCB, 348). But this is simply to assume the worst about voodooism without providing sufficient reasons for why we should assume the worst. Secondly, does not the attack on the origin of voodooism match the Freud-Marx complaint against Christianity’s motive for theistic belief as “wish fulfillment”? Plantinga attempts to attack this claim when Freud and Marx attack Christianity:

“In polemic, it is common to attack someone’s views by claiming that the denial of what they think is patently obvious (i.e., such that any right-thinking, properly-functioning person can immediately see that it is so); we then attribute their opposing this obvious truth either to dishonesty (they don’t really believe what they say; after all, who could?) or to their being blinded by something or other---maybe a reluctance to change, an aversion to new ideas, personal ambition, sexism, racism, or homophobia” (Plantinga, WCB, 150).

Plantinga claims that the opposition (Freud and Marx, Dawkins, etc.) does this in the F&M complaint as well as in other statements made. However, does he not do this when he labels the unbeliever as “irrational” in his unbelief (WCB, top of page 186)? And does he not do this again when, in his words about voodooism, he tells the reader to assume that voodooism came about because of fear of natural phenomena, persons clamoring for political power, and that the religion was born out of mistake or confusion? He does what he quotes others as having done on page 150: claiming that Christianity (the opposite of voodoo) is true, and that “properly-functioning” persons, that is “rational” individuals, could see it (because individuals are only “properly-functioning” when they believe in God). While it is opposite Freud and Marx (who claim Christian belief is irrational), it is still the same tactic used nonetheless.

Aside from Plantinga’s shortcomings, let’s take a look at the Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection (SGP). Can other communities claim that their non-Christian beliefs are warranted in the same way that Christian belief is? Plantinga says they cannot, but I respectfully disagree. If there is no evidence presented to demonstrate truth or falsity, any belief can appear to be legitimate.

A good example of this can be seen in the movie Unknown, released just this year (2011). The main role in the movie is played by Liam Neeson, one who is no stranger to great roles in great movies. He plays the role of a hired assassin, trained over months to kill a professor who is working on a great technological advancement for the world. At the beginning of the movie, we are not told Neeson’s occupation as an assassin...rather, all we are told is that Neeson is a doctor, headed to an international conference in Germany, where he will present his research. He gets into a car accident with a taxi driver, ends up in a hospital with permanent amnesia, and forgets his real identity. So, he claims to be “Martin Harris.” His Swiss watch is supposedly a gift from his wife to him, and is marked with the words “From E.H. to M.H.” His wife’s name is Elizabeth, and his name is Martin. We presume that Neeson must be “Martin Harris” because of the initials on his watch (M.H.). Who would wear a watch that bears initials not matching their own?

But then, when Neeson is claiming that “Elizabeth” is his wife (she being at the party with someone else), we discover that there is another person claiming to be “Martin Harris.” The new guy claiming to be “Martin Harris” wears a university badge. When one goes to the university website, the new guy’s photo is under the name, “Martin Harris.” The new guy even has a badge that says, “Martin Harris.” Neeson, on the other hand, does not have his identification to prove he is “Martin Harris.” To make matters worse, when Neeson begins to cite to the men in the room the conversation he had with one of the doctors, the second guy chimes in and starts completing the sentences with the same words as Neeson. It seems that these two men know the same details, recite the same sentences, and both claim to be “Martin Harris.” At this point in the movie, both can make legitimate claims to the identity of “Martin Harris,” though the audience seems to find Neeson most believable. The university professor, though claiming to be “Martin Harris,” appears to be a fake, someone who is setting Neeson up, someone who’s after him, etc. The audience could immediately think “conspiracy theory” when the other guy attempts to steal the identity of the man the audience accepts as “Martin Harris.”

In the end, however, neither Neeson nor the university professor is the real Martin Harris; in fact, “Martin Harris” does not even exist. The identity, we discover in the movie’s end, is nothing more than a cover identity for Neeson, who, as I mentioned earlier, is a hired assassin, trained over months to kill a professor who is introducing his new technological advancement (concerning corn crops).

Why do I use this example? I do so to make a point: that is, while neither person was really “Martin Harris,” at the time, such claims to legitimacy could be made. And the audience, in addition, found the claim of Neeson to be believable. Having watched the movie, I simply never questioned Neeson’s role as the doctor going to an international conference in Germany. With the other non-Christian communities of Plantinga’s quote, claims to legitimacy can be made if, like Neeson, Christianity has no evidence or argument to “seal the deal” in doubting minds and convince others of its exclusive right to truth. While the other non-Christian faiths may not be true at all, to an inquiring individual, they may appear as true as Christianity in their claims. Plantinga may not admit it, but the real question is not “Are these non-Christian religions true?”, but rather, “Can they seem as true as Christianity?” And without evidence, one can only reach, as William Lane Craig says, an “epistemological stalemate” (see William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, Third Edition).

Plantinga claims throughout his work that Christianity is true or false without regard to evidence or argument...but by separating truth from evidence or argument, he allows Christianity to be “true” but “irrational” all at the same time. And by allowing Christianity to be both justified and irrational, he also allows other religions to be both justified and rational in their claims.

This connecting idea of truth with evidence (that is, that truth manifests itself in the evidence) is an idea I will explore in my next post. Stay tuned...