I decided to step back from my series on Open Theism a bit in order to get some breathing room. I am constantly thinking of you, my dear readership, knowing that for some of you, I’ve probably worried you sick with this series on Open Theism I’ve been doing. I’m sure that for many of you, reading these posts on Open Theism is as insane for you as it has been for me to write on it. My friend Nicole (who is a follower of the blog) and I have spent much time out for dinner reading and rereading Clark Pinnock’s words. Her eyes “pop out of their sockets” (just kidding!) everytime I read a rather “heterodoxical” quote from Pinnock’s work. Believe me, it has been hard for me to digest Openness Theology these last two weeks or so. I ask that you pray that the Lord would smile on the work done here at the Center for Theological Studies and grant me the energy and strength to finish the series well. We’ve come through a great deal of the series...but there’s still some more to endure. I will finish the series soon.
For now, though, I’d like to place an intermission in the series, starting today. For the day (if not for a day or two following, maybe more), I’d like to focus on an issue that I’ve spoken and written much about here---that being, the Doctrine of Perseverance/Eternal Security.
It’s amazing how familiar themes of theology continue to revisit me when I least expect it. I am studying New Testament Theology this semester, and was given an enormous assignment of 350 pages of reading (for this one class alone) that was due today. All of this reading was added to reading for another class---which consisted of an entire book (150 pages) and 65 pages of reading from two or three other books. All in all, my total of reading for this week was 565 pages (almost 600). Pray for me about school. I need all the supernatural strength I can get.
Our New Testament Theology class started reading the four Gospels: Matthew, Mark, Luke, John. Since Matthew comes first in the canon, all of our beginning reading was on Matthew’s Gospel. Robert Gundry writes the chapter on Matthew in Kevin Vanhoozer’s edited work, “Theological Interpretation of the New Testament.” He points out perseverance as a recurring theme in the Book of Matthew:
“Because of double mention by Matthew, it bears emphasis that under persecution one must persevere to be saved: ‘But the one persevering to the end---this one will be saved’ (10:22; 24:13). In contrast is the one who hears the word and receives it immediately and joyfully, but because of tribulation and persecution turns out to be ‘temporary’ and stumbles into sin rather than bearing the fruit of good deeds (13:20-21). MATTHEW’S STRESS ON THE NECESSITY OF PERSEVERANCE IS NOT BALANCED BY AN EQUAL STRESS ON THE COMFORT OF ETERNAL SECURITY, so that a systematic theology must supplement Matthew with John and Paul” (Robert H. Gundry, “Matthew,” from “Theological Interpretation of the New Testament: A Book-By-Book Survey, Second Edition" by Kevin Vanhoozer, General Editor. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008, pages 34-35).
If we take a look at Matthew’s account of the Parable of the Sower and the Soils, we discover that the difference between the seed on stony (or rocky) ground and that on good ground is that the seed on good ground “bears fruit and produces” (v.23). In other words, the seed on good ground produces fruit, matures in its walk with Christ. The seed on stony ground is the one who “endures only for a while.” When hard times come, “tribulation or persecution arises because of the word,” the seed itself “stumbles.” As I’ve constantly asked here at the blog, how then, can persecution arise “because of the word,” if the seed on stony ground is not saved? After all, did not Paul and Barnabas preach to those in Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, “exhorting them [the people] to CONTINUE IN THE FAITH, and saying, ‘We must THROUGH MANY TRIBULATIONS ENTER THE KINGDOM OF GOD’” (Acts 14:22, NKJV)? Did not Barnabas encourage the people of Antioch that “they should continue with the Lord” (Acts 11:23)? Did not the apostle Paul write to the church at Ephesus that “all who desire to live godly in Christ Jesus will suffer persecution” (2 Tim. 3:12)? Did not Paul himself write to the Thessalonians, telling them that their faith and endurance in persecution and tribulation was so that they would be “counted worthy of the kingdom of God” (2 Thess. 1:4-5)?
There are so many other verses I could point out, but Robert Gundry’s quote above provides something for us to think about. Systematic Theology consists of pairing up seemingly paradoxical verses together, side-by-side, and reconciling the two verses or teachings. For instance, systematic theology answers the question of, “How do we reconcile Paul’s words in Romans 8 about ‘nothing separating us from the love of God’ with Jude’s words to ‘keep yourselves in the love of God’?” For those who desire to see verses paired up side-by-side like this, see my “Hermeneutics” section as well as my “Doctrine of Perseverance” section to the right side on the main page.
Does Matthew’s account of the Parable itself undermine “the comfort of eternal security,” as Gundry calls it? Yes it does! One cannot have “necessary perseverance” and “eternal security” exist side-by-side.
Let’s take the example of a job. Why do you get up and go to work each morning? Chances are, you go to work because you need the money...and therefore, you need the job. You go to work each morning in order to provide for yourself or a family; and you know that if you fail to report to work and do your job, you may not keep your job very long. By getting up and going to work each morning, you consent to the idea that your job has a “conditional security” about it---that is, as long as certain conditions exist (your personal commitment, great performance, dedication, good health, company’s financial strength, etc.), you have a job. Let’s say one day, however, your company decides to take your job from you. Does the pain of losing a job hurt? Yes. However, the question becomes, what can be done? The company itself never promised you that you would be “eternally secure” in your job, did they? Chances are, no one on earth has gotten that good of a job. If you have found an eternally secure job, let me know so that I can sign up tomorrow...
If your job is eternally secure, though, why do you need to work so hard and stay so committed? Doesn’t the idea of daily commitment to your work “undermine” the so-called eternal security of your work? If your job is guaranteed, why not take longer vacations than you should? Why not skip coming in to work most mornings? Why not call in sick at least once every week? Why not blatantly defy your boss, if you have eternal security? If your security is “eternal,” and that eternal promise comes from your boss (“I will forever maintain your job, as long as you live”), why must you continue to work as though YOU are keeping your security? If my security is eternal, then I don’t need to keep it. By working to keep it, I am working AGAINST the eternal security I have (instead of working with it).
Why do I use this example in this manner? Because, with Gundry’s quote above regarding necessary perseverance and eternal security, we find that both of these theological concepts are opposites. If God has granted eternal security, then why would He give us commands to follow and urge us to persevere as though we must keep ourselves on the right road? Why must we “keep ourselves in the love of God” if God is going to keep us in His love? To argue that “perseverance is necessary” AND “eternal security is true” is to argue a contradiction. Both cannot be right; otherwise, God’s Word affirms contradictions (which means that there is contradiction in God, since the Word reveals the character of God).
If both are to coexist, there must be some conditions provided. Perseverance is necessary regardless. This, then, becomes a biblical rule. What about eternal security, you may ask? Eternal security can only exist WITHIN PERSEVERANCE. Therefore, eternal security exists AS LONG AS an individual eternally perseveres in the faith! For the individual that endures to the end (Matthew 10:22; 24:13), that individual experiences “eternal security”; for the seed on stony ground that falls away, that seed was only “conditionally secure” in Christ.
Calvinism has provided eternal security as the all-defining idea in Scripture; but Matthew’s Gospel poses problems to the doctrine itself. Most Christians, in response to Matthew’s stress on human responsibility, have unconsciously placed necessary perseverance and unconditional eternal security side-by-side. But if eternal security is “unconditional,” then how can perseverance be mandatory (since it is a “condition” for eternal life)? One cannot have an “unconditional” eternal security beside a “condition.” Security in Christ is either “unconditionally eternal” (forever without condition) or “conditional” (with condition). One cannot have it both ways...
Thursday, September 9, 2010
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
"Most Moved Mover": Language and the Personhood of God
“I DO NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSUME THAT GOD IS A PURELY SPIRITUAL BEING WHEN HIS SELF-REVELATION DOES NOT SUGGEST IT. It is a true that from a Platonic standpoint, the idea is absurd, but this is not a biblical standpoint. And how unreasonable is it anyway? The only persons we encounter are embodied persons and, if God is not embodied, it may prove difficult to understand how God is a person” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 34).
In my last post, I tackled Pinnock’s idea that God has a body. I stated that, according to the Scriptures, God is spirit (John 4:24), meaning that He does not have a body. Even in what we know biblically about evil spirits (for example), demons search for bodies to indwell because they do not have bodies. God then, being the Good Spirit, must surely not need a body to dwell in!!
In this post, I wanna deal with the confusion of Clark Pinnock’s comments regarding the divine nature and a body. Pinnock’s use of Christ and the Incarnation is really an issue of God’s essence versus personal attributes. David W. Bercot provides insight on the distinction between these two concepts. First, Bercot tells us about the nature of a thing:
“In theology, ‘nature’ or ‘substance’ refers to the essence or class to which a person or creature belongs. All humans are of one nature or one substance, regardless of differing personal characteristics...Now, THE NICENE CREED AFFIRMS THAT THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE OF THE SAME NATURE OR SUBSTANCE...IF THE SON WERE NOT OF EQUAL NATURE OR SUBSTANCE AS THE FATHER, HE WOULD NOT BE FULLY DIVINE; HE WOULD NOT POSSESS TRUE GODHOOD” (“Christ, Divinity of”; from “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs: A Reference Guide to More Than 700 Topics Discussed by the Early Church Fathers” by David W. Bercot, General Editor. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1998, page 113).
Next, what are personal attributes?
“‘Personal attributes’ are something altogether different. Personal attributes refer to the individual characteristics and differences between members of the same class or nature...According to Genesis, at one time there were only two humans on the earth, Adam and Eve. These two humans shared the same nature or substance. Adam was not more human than Eve, nor was Eve more human than Adam. They were equal in nature or substance. Now, does that mean that the first two humans were equal or identical in personal attributes? NO, IT DOES NOT. ADAM WAS NO DOUBT TALLER AND STRONGER THAN EVE. FURTHERMORE, EVE HAD COME OUT OF ADAM, BEING FORMED FROM HIS RIB. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVE HAD THE ABILITY TO GIVE BIRTH TO CHILDREN AND TO BREAST-FEED INFANTS. ADAM COULD DO NEITHER OF THESE THINGS” (Bercot, “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs,” page 114).
I think the example of Adam and Eve helps us understand better what Bercot means by “nature” versus “personal attributes.” For instance, all humans, by “nature,” are human; however, not all humans possess the personal attribute of “tallness,” or “shortness.” Another example of differing personal attributes would be “eye color.” Some humans are green-eyed, some blue-eyed, some brown-eyed. But eye color does not make one person more “human” than another. Since not all humans share the same eye color, eye color cannot be a part of the nature of humanness.
From Clark Pinnock’s own words above, God’s self-revelation suggests that God has a body. God, as revealed in Christ Jesus, demonstrates that the Father are the Son are both embodied (according to Pinnock). Is there proof for this? No. According to David Bercot, the early church deemed this notion of an “embodied” Father in the Trinity a heresy:
“THE EARLY CHURCH BELIEVED THAT THE FATHER COULD NEVER BECOME INCARNATE NOR COULD HE EVER MAKE HIMSELF VISIBLE TO HUMAN EYES. To the early church, this would have been a denial of the Father’s unique personhood...RATHER, IT UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH THINGS ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINITY. RATHER, THOSE ATTRIBUTES ARE SIMPLY DIFFERING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FATHER AND THE SON. So the early church affirmed that the Father is greater than the Son---as to personal attributes, but not as to nature” (Bercot, “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs,” page 114).
Bercot’s first sentence in bold caps gives us a valid response to Pinnock’s claim. If the Father ever became “incarnate,” then it would mean “a denial of the Father’s unique personhood.” Why? Because the Son’s unique task was to take on flesh. If the Father took on flesh, then how would the Father differ from the Son? In fact, the Father and the Son could be conflated (in this thought) into one, and we then have a “duo” (Father/Son and Spirit) instead of a “Trinity.”
Why did the early church deny the “incarnate” possiblity of the Father? Not only did they deny it because it would eliminate the Father’s uniqueness of person, it would also add an unnecessary attribute to the attributes of divinity. Why does divinity “necessarily” consist of embodiment? In fact, there is no evidence biblically of “eternal embodiment”---rather, there is a set time in which Christ is born and comes to earth. Scripture tells us that “the Word became flesh, and took up residence among us” (John 1:14, HCSB). Notice the text does not say, “The Word, who was flesh, dwelt among us.” Rather, it states that “the Word BECAME flesh.” Philippians 2 clarifies this event even further, stating that Christ “emptied Himself by assuming the form of a slave, taking on the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:7). The fact that Christ “took on the likeness of men” demonstrates that at a certain point, Christ added a human nature to the divine. What need would there be to mention this if Christ was “eternally embodied”?
It is Christ’s embodiment on earth that gives Him uniqueness in the Trinity. And Christ assumes the human nature not just to assume something foreign to His divinity; rather, He does so in order to die for the sins of the world.
Pinnock states that God’s self-revelation leads one to assume that God may have a body; however, Pinnock here is confusing the distinction of Christ from the Father as something that is essential to the nature of Godhood. What is essential to Godhood is “divinity,” pure divine essence. Embodiment, then, becomes part of the personal attributes of Christ, attributes that distinguish Him from the Father.
Without taking on human flesh, Christ would still be God. But if Pinnock has his way, Christ “needed” to take on flesh in order to “become” God (isn’t this the exact reverse of the biblical account, that Christ “became flesh”?). In short, Pinnock is here arguing that the human nature is “essential” to Godhood; once again, his desire to “overcome...the tilt towards a metaphysic of being and attain a metaphysic of becoming” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 142) clouds his better judgment.
In my last post, I tackled Pinnock’s idea that God has a body. I stated that, according to the Scriptures, God is spirit (John 4:24), meaning that He does not have a body. Even in what we know biblically about evil spirits (for example), demons search for bodies to indwell because they do not have bodies. God then, being the Good Spirit, must surely not need a body to dwell in!!
In this post, I wanna deal with the confusion of Clark Pinnock’s comments regarding the divine nature and a body. Pinnock’s use of Christ and the Incarnation is really an issue of God’s essence versus personal attributes. David W. Bercot provides insight on the distinction between these two concepts. First, Bercot tells us about the nature of a thing:
“In theology, ‘nature’ or ‘substance’ refers to the essence or class to which a person or creature belongs. All humans are of one nature or one substance, regardless of differing personal characteristics...Now, THE NICENE CREED AFFIRMS THAT THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE OF THE SAME NATURE OR SUBSTANCE...IF THE SON WERE NOT OF EQUAL NATURE OR SUBSTANCE AS THE FATHER, HE WOULD NOT BE FULLY DIVINE; HE WOULD NOT POSSESS TRUE GODHOOD” (“Christ, Divinity of”; from “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs: A Reference Guide to More Than 700 Topics Discussed by the Early Church Fathers” by David W. Bercot, General Editor. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1998, page 113).
Next, what are personal attributes?
“‘Personal attributes’ are something altogether different. Personal attributes refer to the individual characteristics and differences between members of the same class or nature...According to Genesis, at one time there were only two humans on the earth, Adam and Eve. These two humans shared the same nature or substance. Adam was not more human than Eve, nor was Eve more human than Adam. They were equal in nature or substance. Now, does that mean that the first two humans were equal or identical in personal attributes? NO, IT DOES NOT. ADAM WAS NO DOUBT TALLER AND STRONGER THAN EVE. FURTHERMORE, EVE HAD COME OUT OF ADAM, BEING FORMED FROM HIS RIB. ON THE OTHER HAND, EVE HAD THE ABILITY TO GIVE BIRTH TO CHILDREN AND TO BREAST-FEED INFANTS. ADAM COULD DO NEITHER OF THESE THINGS” (Bercot, “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs,” page 114).
I think the example of Adam and Eve helps us understand better what Bercot means by “nature” versus “personal attributes.” For instance, all humans, by “nature,” are human; however, not all humans possess the personal attribute of “tallness,” or “shortness.” Another example of differing personal attributes would be “eye color.” Some humans are green-eyed, some blue-eyed, some brown-eyed. But eye color does not make one person more “human” than another. Since not all humans share the same eye color, eye color cannot be a part of the nature of humanness.
From Clark Pinnock’s own words above, God’s self-revelation suggests that God has a body. God, as revealed in Christ Jesus, demonstrates that the Father are the Son are both embodied (according to Pinnock). Is there proof for this? No. According to David Bercot, the early church deemed this notion of an “embodied” Father in the Trinity a heresy:
“THE EARLY CHURCH BELIEVED THAT THE FATHER COULD NEVER BECOME INCARNATE NOR COULD HE EVER MAKE HIMSELF VISIBLE TO HUMAN EYES. To the early church, this would have been a denial of the Father’s unique personhood...RATHER, IT UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH THINGS ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINITY. RATHER, THOSE ATTRIBUTES ARE SIMPLY DIFFERING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FATHER AND THE SON. So the early church affirmed that the Father is greater than the Son---as to personal attributes, but not as to nature” (Bercot, “A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs,” page 114).
Bercot’s first sentence in bold caps gives us a valid response to Pinnock’s claim. If the Father ever became “incarnate,” then it would mean “a denial of the Father’s unique personhood.” Why? Because the Son’s unique task was to take on flesh. If the Father took on flesh, then how would the Father differ from the Son? In fact, the Father and the Son could be conflated (in this thought) into one, and we then have a “duo” (Father/Son and Spirit) instead of a “Trinity.”
Why did the early church deny the “incarnate” possiblity of the Father? Not only did they deny it because it would eliminate the Father’s uniqueness of person, it would also add an unnecessary attribute to the attributes of divinity. Why does divinity “necessarily” consist of embodiment? In fact, there is no evidence biblically of “eternal embodiment”---rather, there is a set time in which Christ is born and comes to earth. Scripture tells us that “the Word became flesh, and took up residence among us” (John 1:14, HCSB). Notice the text does not say, “The Word, who was flesh, dwelt among us.” Rather, it states that “the Word BECAME flesh.” Philippians 2 clarifies this event even further, stating that Christ “emptied Himself by assuming the form of a slave, taking on the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:7). The fact that Christ “took on the likeness of men” demonstrates that at a certain point, Christ added a human nature to the divine. What need would there be to mention this if Christ was “eternally embodied”?
It is Christ’s embodiment on earth that gives Him uniqueness in the Trinity. And Christ assumes the human nature not just to assume something foreign to His divinity; rather, He does so in order to die for the sins of the world.
Pinnock states that God’s self-revelation leads one to assume that God may have a body; however, Pinnock here is confusing the distinction of Christ from the Father as something that is essential to the nature of Godhood. What is essential to Godhood is “divinity,” pure divine essence. Embodiment, then, becomes part of the personal attributes of Christ, attributes that distinguish Him from the Father.
Without taking on human flesh, Christ would still be God. But if Pinnock has his way, Christ “needed” to take on flesh in order to “become” God (isn’t this the exact reverse of the biblical account, that Christ “became flesh”?). In short, Pinnock is here arguing that the human nature is “essential” to Godhood; once again, his desire to “overcome...the tilt towards a metaphysic of being and attain a metaphysic of becoming” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 142) clouds his better judgment.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
"Most Moved Mover": God as Person
“The fact is that God loves to draw near to us through nature, theophany, and incarnation. God loves to take on form and make himself accessible. MOST PEOPLE, I SUSPECT, THINK THAT GOD CHOOSES TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH A BODY, WHILE BEING HIMSELF FORMLESS. That may be so, but it is also possible that God has a body in some way we cannot imagine and therefore, that it is natural for God to seek out some forms of embodiment. I DO NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSUME THAT GOD IS A PURELY SPIRITUAL BEING WHEN HIS SELF-REVELATION DOES NOT SUGGEST IT. It is true that from a Platonic standpoint, the idea is absurd, but this is not a biblical standpoint. And how unreasonable is it anyway? THE ONLY PERSONS WE ENCOUNTER ARE EMBODIED PERSONS AND, IF GOD IS NOT EMBODIED, IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW GOD IS A PERSON. What kind of actions could a disembodied God perform? Embodiment may be the way in which the transcendent God is able to be immanent and why God is presented in such terms. I would say that God transcends the world, while being able to indwell it. Perhaps God uses the created order as a kind of body and exercises top-down causation upon it” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, pages 34-35).
Clark Pinnock’s quote above was one of the most interesting quotes I stumbled upon in his work, “Most Moved Mover.” Over the last few posts here, I have been looking at so many statements Pinnock has made about Classical Arminianism, Calvinism, etc. But here, in his chapter on “Scriptural Foundations,” I finally got around to diagnosing the philosophical problem Pinnock faces. Yes, the chapter was about “scriptural” matters...but Pinnock’s problem is philosophical.
In his starting sentences of the above quote, Pinnock goes into a discussion of God’s embodiment. In other words, Pinnock entertains the idea that God could have a body: “Most people, I suspect, think that God chooses to be associated with a body, while being himself formless.” I think that God’s embodiment can clearly be seen in the Incarnation (Phil. 2:5-11), when Christ was conceived in Mary by the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary, raised as a Jewish boy, grew to become a man, and experienced the baptism of John and the confirmation of sonship and ministry by God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. In fact, the word “Incarnation” means “incarnate,” or “in” “carne,” the word “carne” being a parent word of our “carnivore.” The word “carnivore” refers to someone who eats meat (or flesh). So the word “Incarnation” refers to “in the flesh,” or “the act of Christ’s coming to earth in the flesh” or “the act of Christ’s coming to earth in human form.” This is why Paul is so quick in Philippians 2 to state that Christ “had come as a man in His external form” (Phil. 2:7, HCSB) and that He “assumed the form of a slave” (2:7).
But, make no mistake---the act of the Incarnation is so memorable and so special (for one, if not many reasons) because Christ CAME IN THE FLESH! As the apostle John states it, “The Word became flesh and took up residence among us. We observed His glory, the glory as the One and Only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14, HCSB). The fact that Christ came in the flesh, not only that Christ came to earth, is also significant. If Christ’s coming in human form was not significant, then we could conclude that Christ had always had an embodied form and that He possessed an “eternal humanity.” Dr. Ken Keathley finds an idea of eternal humanity troubling, and so do I. I think that to assert this idea that Christ always possessed a body not only “deifies” human flesh (which is absurd), but also erases the Incarnation. Why was Christ’s coming so special if Christ always had a body? I’m not saying that Christ could never have come to earth. There are biblical indications that seem to show that Christ indeed did come to earth in a pre-incarnate state, one of them being when the Angel of the Lord appears to Samson’s parents, Manoah and his wife. When Manoah asks for the angel’s name so he and his wife could remember him in honor, the angel responded, “Why do you ask My name,’ the Angel of the Lord asked him, ‘since it is wonderful’” (Judges 13:18, HCSB). After the encounter with the Angel of the Lord, Manoah then exclaims, “We’re going to die...because we have seen God!” (Judges 13:22) The “Angel of the Lord” has a capitalized “A” for Angel in most translations because the “angel” sent to Manoah and his wife was no ordinary angel. And the label of “wonderful” that the Angel gives Himself seems to be clearly revealed in the coming of Christ, who is called “Wonderful Counselor” (Isaiah 9:6).
However, what I am asserting is the uniqueness of the Incarnation; and the event itself becomes “down-graded” should Pinnock’s idea of God having “embodiment” be true. After all, why does God take on the form of man when clearly, He could have appeared to earth many times without it? God takes on human flesh because His atoning sacrifice on the cross would require it. While mankind sinned against God and had to pay the penalty, only God could pay the debt and rise from the dead. And both needs were met perfectly in the God-Man Jesus Christ.
But what about the Trinity members of Father and Spirit? Are they embodied? Pinnock does not seem to distinguish between Trinity members when he discusses the idea of embodiment, but this next section raises red flags:
“I DO NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSUME THAT GOD IS A PURELY SPIRITUAL BEING WHEN HIS SELF-REVELATION DOES NOT SUGGEST IT. It is true that from a Platonic standpoint, the idea is absurd, but this is not a biblical standpoint. And how unreasonable is it anyway? THE ONLY PERSONS WE ENCOUNTER ARE EMBODIED PERSONS AND, IF GOD IS NOT EMBODIED, IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW GOD IS A PERSON. What kind of actions could a disembodied God perform?”
God has to be embodied, in Pinnock’s thinking, in order to be deemed “a person.” But where biblically do we ever find God being labeled by the biblical writers as “a person”? The only time we find God being labeled “a man” is in the person of Jesus Christ. But notice what happens when Christ dialogues with the Samaritan woman in John 4:
“God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth” (John 4:24, HCSB).
What did Jesus mean when He told the Samaritan woman that “God is spirit”? The most fitting answer, in my opinion, at least, is that Christ wanted the woman to know that God is not contained in one place (“an hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem,” Jn. 4:21). In addition, however, I think the affirmation that “God is spirit” testifies to the truth that God is not like man (in that man is flesh). God’s essence is completely distinct from humanity’s. But what about Pinnock’s remark that “I do not feel obliged to assume that God is a purely spiritual being when his self-revelation does not suggest it”? Doesn’t John 4:24 suggest in some manner that God IS a purely spiritual being? If so, doesn’t this mean that God does not have a body, like humanity?
I think at this point that it is safe to say that Pinnock is grasping at straws. From the Word of God, we find that “God is spirit,” meaning that God is immaterial, while man himself is “material” (flesh). If this is the case, then why would the “immaterial” need a “material” substance such as a body (even if it were not a fleshly one)?
And what about Pinnock’s remark that “if God is not embodied, it may prove difficult to understand how God is a person”? I will tackle this issue in my next post.
Clark Pinnock’s quote above was one of the most interesting quotes I stumbled upon in his work, “Most Moved Mover.” Over the last few posts here, I have been looking at so many statements Pinnock has made about Classical Arminianism, Calvinism, etc. But here, in his chapter on “Scriptural Foundations,” I finally got around to diagnosing the philosophical problem Pinnock faces. Yes, the chapter was about “scriptural” matters...but Pinnock’s problem is philosophical.
In his starting sentences of the above quote, Pinnock goes into a discussion of God’s embodiment. In other words, Pinnock entertains the idea that God could have a body: “Most people, I suspect, think that God chooses to be associated with a body, while being himself formless.” I think that God’s embodiment can clearly be seen in the Incarnation (Phil. 2:5-11), when Christ was conceived in Mary by the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary, raised as a Jewish boy, grew to become a man, and experienced the baptism of John and the confirmation of sonship and ministry by God the Father and God the Holy Spirit. In fact, the word “Incarnation” means “incarnate,” or “in” “carne,” the word “carne” being a parent word of our “carnivore.” The word “carnivore” refers to someone who eats meat (or flesh). So the word “Incarnation” refers to “in the flesh,” or “the act of Christ’s coming to earth in the flesh” or “the act of Christ’s coming to earth in human form.” This is why Paul is so quick in Philippians 2 to state that Christ “had come as a man in His external form” (Phil. 2:7, HCSB) and that He “assumed the form of a slave” (2:7).
But, make no mistake---the act of the Incarnation is so memorable and so special (for one, if not many reasons) because Christ CAME IN THE FLESH! As the apostle John states it, “The Word became flesh and took up residence among us. We observed His glory, the glory as the One and Only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14, HCSB). The fact that Christ came in the flesh, not only that Christ came to earth, is also significant. If Christ’s coming in human form was not significant, then we could conclude that Christ had always had an embodied form and that He possessed an “eternal humanity.” Dr. Ken Keathley finds an idea of eternal humanity troubling, and so do I. I think that to assert this idea that Christ always possessed a body not only “deifies” human flesh (which is absurd), but also erases the Incarnation. Why was Christ’s coming so special if Christ always had a body? I’m not saying that Christ could never have come to earth. There are biblical indications that seem to show that Christ indeed did come to earth in a pre-incarnate state, one of them being when the Angel of the Lord appears to Samson’s parents, Manoah and his wife. When Manoah asks for the angel’s name so he and his wife could remember him in honor, the angel responded, “Why do you ask My name,’ the Angel of the Lord asked him, ‘since it is wonderful’” (Judges 13:18, HCSB). After the encounter with the Angel of the Lord, Manoah then exclaims, “We’re going to die...because we have seen God!” (Judges 13:22) The “Angel of the Lord” has a capitalized “A” for Angel in most translations because the “angel” sent to Manoah and his wife was no ordinary angel. And the label of “wonderful” that the Angel gives Himself seems to be clearly revealed in the coming of Christ, who is called “Wonderful Counselor” (Isaiah 9:6).
However, what I am asserting is the uniqueness of the Incarnation; and the event itself becomes “down-graded” should Pinnock’s idea of God having “embodiment” be true. After all, why does God take on the form of man when clearly, He could have appeared to earth many times without it? God takes on human flesh because His atoning sacrifice on the cross would require it. While mankind sinned against God and had to pay the penalty, only God could pay the debt and rise from the dead. And both needs were met perfectly in the God-Man Jesus Christ.
But what about the Trinity members of Father and Spirit? Are they embodied? Pinnock does not seem to distinguish between Trinity members when he discusses the idea of embodiment, but this next section raises red flags:
“I DO NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO ASSUME THAT GOD IS A PURELY SPIRITUAL BEING WHEN HIS SELF-REVELATION DOES NOT SUGGEST IT. It is true that from a Platonic standpoint, the idea is absurd, but this is not a biblical standpoint. And how unreasonable is it anyway? THE ONLY PERSONS WE ENCOUNTER ARE EMBODIED PERSONS AND, IF GOD IS NOT EMBODIED, IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW GOD IS A PERSON. What kind of actions could a disembodied God perform?”
God has to be embodied, in Pinnock’s thinking, in order to be deemed “a person.” But where biblically do we ever find God being labeled by the biblical writers as “a person”? The only time we find God being labeled “a man” is in the person of Jesus Christ. But notice what happens when Christ dialogues with the Samaritan woman in John 4:
“God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth” (John 4:24, HCSB).
What did Jesus mean when He told the Samaritan woman that “God is spirit”? The most fitting answer, in my opinion, at least, is that Christ wanted the woman to know that God is not contained in one place (“an hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem,” Jn. 4:21). In addition, however, I think the affirmation that “God is spirit” testifies to the truth that God is not like man (in that man is flesh). God’s essence is completely distinct from humanity’s. But what about Pinnock’s remark that “I do not feel obliged to assume that God is a purely spiritual being when his self-revelation does not suggest it”? Doesn’t John 4:24 suggest in some manner that God IS a purely spiritual being? If so, doesn’t this mean that God does not have a body, like humanity?
I think at this point that it is safe to say that Pinnock is grasping at straws. From the Word of God, we find that “God is spirit,” meaning that God is immaterial, while man himself is “material” (flesh). If this is the case, then why would the “immaterial” need a “material” substance such as a body (even if it were not a fleshly one)?
And what about Pinnock’s remark that “if God is not embodied, it may prove difficult to understand how God is a person”? I will tackle this issue in my next post.
Monday, September 6, 2010
Contradiction in God: The Inconsistency of Open Theism
I’m back to discuss the ideas found in Clark Pinnock’s theological system of Open Theism. He has made implicit claims in his book that Classical Arminianism is inconsistent, as can be demonstrated by the following:
“In fact, by doing so [introducing new interpretations into the discussion], we have made Arminian thinking sharper and clearer and the only and obvious alternative to the conventional options. Our Calvinist critics call it ‘consistent’ Arminianism, a judgment I am not inclined to reject” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, pages 11-12).
But today, it is Pinnock’s system of Open Theism that will be put in the hot seat, not mine. Many Calvinists and Open Theists themselves consider Openness Theology to be a consistent Arminian system, but today’s post will show one of many problems with the system: how the system itself holds to a God who changes in essence, but remains unchanging in His character.
First, let’s note Pinnock’s words regarding God’s changing essence:
“While the creatures can be relational, God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
Yet and still, Pinnock can affirm that God’s character remains unchanging:
“Let us not treat the attributes of God independently of the Bible but view the biblical metaphors as reality-depicting descriptions of the living God, whose very being is self-giving love. When we do so, God’s unity will not be viewed as a mathematical oneness but as A UNITY THAT INCLUDES DIVERSITY; God’s steadfastness will not be seen as A DEADENING IMMUTABILITY BUT CONSTANCY OF CHARACTER THAT INCLUDES CHANGE” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 27).
“Not only are we as persons affected by God, he is affected by us, or to put it another way, GOD IS UNCHANGEABLE WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHARACTER BUT ALWAYS CHANGING IN RELATION TO US” (page 41).
“God’s character is stable but God is not static when it comes to associating with creation” (page 85).
What these examples show us is Pinnock’s desire to maintain that God’s character is unchanging, but that his essence is changing. This, however, poses problems for Open Theism. As Jay Wesley Richards writes:
“While this strategy [to argue constancy only in God’s character] has some appeal, it hardly seems adequate to say that God’s character is merely contingently reliable and steadfast. If God is perfect, then surely God is ESSENTIALLY reliable and steadfast, since it is surely better to be reliable and steadfast in all possible worlds than only in some. So GROUNDING GOD’S RELIABILITY AND UNCHANGEABLENESS IN HIS ESSENCE MAKES SENSE” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity, and Immutability.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003, page 198).
If God’s essence is changing, as Pinnock said it has to for the sake of real relations, how then, can God’s character remain the same? If God must have real relations, then must not his relations with humanity change to fit his changing essence? The point here is that one cannot argue God as unchanging in character when His very nature itself is changing. This not only places God’s character above His essence (which is troubling in itself), but also seems to posit contradiction within God. This notion, however, is contradicted by Jesus’ words regarding good and evil trees:
“A good tree doesn’t produce bad fruit; on the other hand, a bad tree doesn’t produce good fruit. For each tree is known by its own fruit. Figs aren’t gathered from thornbushes, or grapes picked from a bramble bush. A good man produces good out of the good storeroom of his heart. An evil man produces evil out of the evil storeroom, for his mouth speaks from the overflow of his heart” (Luke 6:43-45, Holman Christian Standard Bible).
Every tree is labeled by the fruit that it gives birth to. In addition, “a bad tree doesn’t produce good fruit.” The essence of what the tree is will be made known by public fruit. In other words, the actions (character) testifies to the essence of the tree. Jesus then brings it home: a person will be known by the things they do. “A good man produces good out of the good storeroom of his heart. An evil man produces evil out of the evil storeroom...” How then, could God Himself be one whose essence is changing, while still claiming that He is the Lord and He changes not (in other words, that His character does not change)? That’s quite a contradiction to place on God. And it would contradict His words here. How could God tell us to either be one designation or the other, but then turn around and be both (changing and unchanging) within Himself?
To assert Pinnock’s claim of God’s “changing” essence would undermine the nature of God’s existence as a necessary being. Richards writes:
“Furthermore, for the essentialist God’s essence is not only immutable. IMMUTABILITY IS THE VERY QUALITY THAT DISTINGUISHES GOD’S ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES FROM HIS ACCIDENTAL ONES: the essential properties are, by definition, unchanging, since they are the same in every possible world. The essentialist consigns change or the potential for change only to God’s accidental properties” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 199).
Let’s take an attribute of God, such as “omniscience.” If God’s essence is unchanging, then God will be “omniscient” in every possible world He could have made (possible worlds referring to states of affairs). If, however, there is change in God’s essence, then how can we be sure that God would remain omniscient in ANY world that He could have made? If God changes in essence, then He can be omniscient in one world but lack omniscience in another world. After all, Pinnock’s theology does follow the work of Charles Hartshorne, who is a process theologian. Jay Wesley Richards, in his book, provides a very fitting quote regarding Hartshorne’s view of the divine essence:
“In God’s actual concrete state, he is dependent on every other entity, not for his abstract essence or existence, but for the particularity of his actuality. HIS CONTINGENT STATES ‘CONTAIN’ AS IT WERE HIS NECESSARY ASPECT. For this reason, Hartshorne can claim that relativity is itself the basic principle of contrary theological attributions. It is the one ‘absolute.’ SO GOD IN HIS CONCRETE STATES IS ‘FOREVER INCOMPLETE’ BUT ALSO FOREVER INCREASING IN VALUE. HEREIN LIES TRUE DIVINE PERFECTION” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 168).
If God’s “contingent state” contains the idea of His “unchanging” essence, then in one possible world, God could be unchanging in essence...but He could be “changing in essence” in another possible world. God can change in His essence, according to Charles Hartshorne. Secondly, God in this system is “forever incomplete but also forever increasing in value.” God does not have an identity; His identity is changing, “becoming.” And no matter how much God changes in essence, He will be “forever incomplete,” never allowed to become fully God, regardless of the circumstances. In other words, we now have “an imperfect God” who is as imperfect as His humanity!
And the worst part is that Pinnock advocates some of the views of Charles Hartshorne. I have been very careful to use certain quotes regarding Hartshorne that are characteristic of the statements of Pinnock himself. And if Pinnock were still alive, he would advocate the words regarding Hartshorne above. Just look at the statements below:
“The open view shares something with process thought: what we want to overcome is the tilt towards a METAPHYSIC OF BEING and attain a METAPHYSIC OF BECOMING” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 142).
Interestingly enough, Pinnock has moments when he asserts that God’s essence is unchanging:
“In God’s case, we might say that who God is does not change byt what God experiences changes. GOD’S NATURE DOES NOT CHANGE but his activities and relationships are dynamic” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 85).
“God’s experiences change, while God’s essential nature remains the same...God is changeless in nature but ever changing in his experience of a changing world” (86).
“God is immutable in his essence but flexible in his dealings” (87).
“Immutability is about God’s unchanging trinitarian nature and relational faithfulness...God is changeless in nature but his nature is that of a creative agent and personal God” (88).
This is in contrast to Pinnock’s words earlier on in his work, which state that God’s essence must change in order for Him to relate to His creation.
But then, Pinnock wavers back and forth between God being immutable and God not being immutable:
“Arius too rejected the incarnation because it posited change and suffering in God. And he was right; if God truly enters this world, HE IS NOT IMMUTABLE” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 91).
But then, Pinnock still attempts to place God above mankind:
“At the same time, we need to distinguish, as in the case of immutability, ways in which God does and does not suffer. SURELY GOD DOES NOT SUFFER IN EVERY WAY THAT WE DO AS MORTAL, SENTIENT CREATURES. Because God is involved in the world, God experiences pathos, but not in exactly the same way that we do” (91).
In the end analysis, God’s essence changes to have real relation. Pinnock then turns around and says that God’s essence is unchanging while His relationships change. Then, he states that God’s essence is not immutable and cites the incarnation as proof of God’s “mutability.” Last but not least, he attempts to place God’s “changeability” on a different plane than that of humanity. It seems to me, then, that Pinnock clearly struggles with the essence of God. At times, one gets the idea that Pinnock tries all too hard to turn away from the beliefs he formerly held to. And this is supposedly “consistent” Arminianism???
“In fact, by doing so [introducing new interpretations into the discussion], we have made Arminian thinking sharper and clearer and the only and obvious alternative to the conventional options. Our Calvinist critics call it ‘consistent’ Arminianism, a judgment I am not inclined to reject” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, pages 11-12).
But today, it is Pinnock’s system of Open Theism that will be put in the hot seat, not mine. Many Calvinists and Open Theists themselves consider Openness Theology to be a consistent Arminian system, but today’s post will show one of many problems with the system: how the system itself holds to a God who changes in essence, but remains unchanging in His character.
First, let’s note Pinnock’s words regarding God’s changing essence:
“While the creatures can be relational, God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
Yet and still, Pinnock can affirm that God’s character remains unchanging:
“Let us not treat the attributes of God independently of the Bible but view the biblical metaphors as reality-depicting descriptions of the living God, whose very being is self-giving love. When we do so, God’s unity will not be viewed as a mathematical oneness but as A UNITY THAT INCLUDES DIVERSITY; God’s steadfastness will not be seen as A DEADENING IMMUTABILITY BUT CONSTANCY OF CHARACTER THAT INCLUDES CHANGE” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 27).
“Not only are we as persons affected by God, he is affected by us, or to put it another way, GOD IS UNCHANGEABLE WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHARACTER BUT ALWAYS CHANGING IN RELATION TO US” (page 41).
“God’s character is stable but God is not static when it comes to associating with creation” (page 85).
What these examples show us is Pinnock’s desire to maintain that God’s character is unchanging, but that his essence is changing. This, however, poses problems for Open Theism. As Jay Wesley Richards writes:
“While this strategy [to argue constancy only in God’s character] has some appeal, it hardly seems adequate to say that God’s character is merely contingently reliable and steadfast. If God is perfect, then surely God is ESSENTIALLY reliable and steadfast, since it is surely better to be reliable and steadfast in all possible worlds than only in some. So GROUNDING GOD’S RELIABILITY AND UNCHANGEABLENESS IN HIS ESSENCE MAKES SENSE” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity, and Immutability.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003, page 198).
If God’s essence is changing, as Pinnock said it has to for the sake of real relations, how then, can God’s character remain the same? If God must have real relations, then must not his relations with humanity change to fit his changing essence? The point here is that one cannot argue God as unchanging in character when His very nature itself is changing. This not only places God’s character above His essence (which is troubling in itself), but also seems to posit contradiction within God. This notion, however, is contradicted by Jesus’ words regarding good and evil trees:
“A good tree doesn’t produce bad fruit; on the other hand, a bad tree doesn’t produce good fruit. For each tree is known by its own fruit. Figs aren’t gathered from thornbushes, or grapes picked from a bramble bush. A good man produces good out of the good storeroom of his heart. An evil man produces evil out of the evil storeroom, for his mouth speaks from the overflow of his heart” (Luke 6:43-45, Holman Christian Standard Bible).
Every tree is labeled by the fruit that it gives birth to. In addition, “a bad tree doesn’t produce good fruit.” The essence of what the tree is will be made known by public fruit. In other words, the actions (character) testifies to the essence of the tree. Jesus then brings it home: a person will be known by the things they do. “A good man produces good out of the good storeroom of his heart. An evil man produces evil out of the evil storeroom...” How then, could God Himself be one whose essence is changing, while still claiming that He is the Lord and He changes not (in other words, that His character does not change)? That’s quite a contradiction to place on God. And it would contradict His words here. How could God tell us to either be one designation or the other, but then turn around and be both (changing and unchanging) within Himself?
To assert Pinnock’s claim of God’s “changing” essence would undermine the nature of God’s existence as a necessary being. Richards writes:
“Furthermore, for the essentialist God’s essence is not only immutable. IMMUTABILITY IS THE VERY QUALITY THAT DISTINGUISHES GOD’S ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES FROM HIS ACCIDENTAL ONES: the essential properties are, by definition, unchanging, since they are the same in every possible world. The essentialist consigns change or the potential for change only to God’s accidental properties” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 199).
Let’s take an attribute of God, such as “omniscience.” If God’s essence is unchanging, then God will be “omniscient” in every possible world He could have made (possible worlds referring to states of affairs). If, however, there is change in God’s essence, then how can we be sure that God would remain omniscient in ANY world that He could have made? If God changes in essence, then He can be omniscient in one world but lack omniscience in another world. After all, Pinnock’s theology does follow the work of Charles Hartshorne, who is a process theologian. Jay Wesley Richards, in his book, provides a very fitting quote regarding Hartshorne’s view of the divine essence:
“In God’s actual concrete state, he is dependent on every other entity, not for his abstract essence or existence, but for the particularity of his actuality. HIS CONTINGENT STATES ‘CONTAIN’ AS IT WERE HIS NECESSARY ASPECT. For this reason, Hartshorne can claim that relativity is itself the basic principle of contrary theological attributions. It is the one ‘absolute.’ SO GOD IN HIS CONCRETE STATES IS ‘FOREVER INCOMPLETE’ BUT ALSO FOREVER INCREASING IN VALUE. HEREIN LIES TRUE DIVINE PERFECTION” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 168).
If God’s “contingent state” contains the idea of His “unchanging” essence, then in one possible world, God could be unchanging in essence...but He could be “changing in essence” in another possible world. God can change in His essence, according to Charles Hartshorne. Secondly, God in this system is “forever incomplete but also forever increasing in value.” God does not have an identity; His identity is changing, “becoming.” And no matter how much God changes in essence, He will be “forever incomplete,” never allowed to become fully God, regardless of the circumstances. In other words, we now have “an imperfect God” who is as imperfect as His humanity!
And the worst part is that Pinnock advocates some of the views of Charles Hartshorne. I have been very careful to use certain quotes regarding Hartshorne that are characteristic of the statements of Pinnock himself. And if Pinnock were still alive, he would advocate the words regarding Hartshorne above. Just look at the statements below:
“The open view shares something with process thought: what we want to overcome is the tilt towards a METAPHYSIC OF BEING and attain a METAPHYSIC OF BECOMING” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 142).
Interestingly enough, Pinnock has moments when he asserts that God’s essence is unchanging:
“In God’s case, we might say that who God is does not change byt what God experiences changes. GOD’S NATURE DOES NOT CHANGE but his activities and relationships are dynamic” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 85).
“God’s experiences change, while God’s essential nature remains the same...God is changeless in nature but ever changing in his experience of a changing world” (86).
“God is immutable in his essence but flexible in his dealings” (87).
“Immutability is about God’s unchanging trinitarian nature and relational faithfulness...God is changeless in nature but his nature is that of a creative agent and personal God” (88).
This is in contrast to Pinnock’s words earlier on in his work, which state that God’s essence must change in order for Him to relate to His creation.
But then, Pinnock wavers back and forth between God being immutable and God not being immutable:
“Arius too rejected the incarnation because it posited change and suffering in God. And he was right; if God truly enters this world, HE IS NOT IMMUTABLE” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 91).
But then, Pinnock still attempts to place God above mankind:
“At the same time, we need to distinguish, as in the case of immutability, ways in which God does and does not suffer. SURELY GOD DOES NOT SUFFER IN EVERY WAY THAT WE DO AS MORTAL, SENTIENT CREATURES. Because God is involved in the world, God experiences pathos, but not in exactly the same way that we do” (91).
In the end analysis, God’s essence changes to have real relation. Pinnock then turns around and says that God’s essence is unchanging while His relationships change. Then, he states that God’s essence is not immutable and cites the incarnation as proof of God’s “mutability.” Last but not least, he attempts to place God’s “changeability” on a different plane than that of humanity. It seems to me, then, that Pinnock clearly struggles with the essence of God. At times, one gets the idea that Pinnock tries all too hard to turn away from the beliefs he formerly held to. And this is supposedly “consistent” Arminianism???
Friday, September 3, 2010
Biblical Faithfulness: How Calvinism and Open Theism Fail the Test
“To say God knows what we will do in a set of circumstances is to return to determinism. Similarly simple-foreknowledge has the same results. Pinnock notes, ‘I found I could not shake off the intuition that such a total omniscience would necessarily mean that everything we will ever choose in the future will have already been spelled out in the divine knowledge register, and consequently the belief that we have significant choices to make would be mistaken.’ The free-will theists therefore agree with Calvinists like Jonathan Edwards, that foreknowledge implies foreordination and that classical Arminianism is guilty of importing Calvinistic thought into its doctrine of omniscience. Pinnock therefore points the way forward to a MORE CONSISTENT ‘neo-Arminian’ position which attempts to uphold full libertarian freedom and a doctrine of omniscience” (Daniel Strange, “The Price of Internal Consistency?” Tyndale Bulletin 51.1 (2000): 139-150).
I am aware that I provided a portion of this quote in my last
post; but for this post, I wanna focus more on the idea that Classical Arminians are supposedly “guilty of importing Calvinistic thought into its doctrine of omniscience.” Clark Pinnock, an Open Theist, as well as Calvinists (and all Open Theists), accuse Classical Arminians of being inconsistent in their doctrine of omniscience. For me, this is a huge deal because my theological system is in the “hot seat” if Open Theists and Calvinists are right.
First, let me respond by discussing Calvinism, the first opposing system to Classical Arminianism. Classical Calvinism is a coherent, consistent, five-point system which is spelled in the acronym “TULIP”---Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Limited Atonement, Irresistible Grace, Perseverance of the Saints. Each of the points follows in light of the one before it. Each of the points of the system is philosophically consistent. Would I say that Calvinism is philosophically consistent? Yep. The God of Calvinism is the all-determining ruler of the universe, such that God can pick some to be saved while reprobating the rest eternally. The God of Classical Calvinism does not “pass over” anyone; rather, He reprobates them from all eternity to suffer in Hell. And for those that He picks, the outcome is marvelous for them. After all, they are the “specially elect,” are they not?
Now, someone may ask me, “What’s the problem with Calvinism? God is sovereign, right? And we want to exalt the Lord above ourselves, right?” We do. I do. But the problem comes in when you consider that the tenets of Calvinism, while “philosophically” consistent, are “biblically” unfaithful. Take the “L” of Limited Atonement, for example: Limited Atonement states that “Christ’s saving work was limited in that it was designed to save some and not others” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented, Second Edition.” Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2004, page 40). However, the Scriptures themselves testify that Christ came for all (1 Timothy 2:4; John 3:16-17, for example). As a Classical Arminian, I would agree with the Calvinist that there is a “limit” in the atonement; but the “limit” in the atonement is in regards to “those who receive it,” not those for whom Christ died. Christ died for all, but only those who believe appropriate the atonement to their lives. As Jesus says in John 3:18, “the one who believes is not condemned, but the one who does not believe is condemned already.” I could use other examples where I disagree, but I think one will suffice.
What about the God of Open Theism? The God of Open Theism undermines sovereignty and libertarian free will altogether; for, if God is not sovereign, and He gives us power that not even God can control, then, in essence, God gives us power that allows us to become “our own little gods” and therefore, can trump God’s sovereignty. If this is not the case, then God, having no sovereignty, can give us no freedom at all; for if God be helpless, then so are we.
How logical is the Open Theist argument? How is it that God, having made us and created us, cannot know our future choices? God is qualitatively superior to us (Creator, Lord, eternal), while we are qualitatively inferior to God (creatures, servants, temporal). If God is superior to us, then how can we, being inferior, do things that “take The Superior God by surprise”? This is like saying that, for example, because I build an automobile, and the automobile has a life of its own, that the automobile can do things that I cannot know it will do. Did I not build the vehicle? Did I not put the components of the car together? Did I not hook all the wires and perform all the electricity and wiring tests on the car? Did I not make the body of the car? Yes, I did all those things (just an example here...I have never built an actual vehicle). And if I built the car from scratch, then, I should know what is in the car and what could go wrong with the car. And if something does go wrong, then I can have some idea of why the car is doing what it’s doing. And this is all because I know the car in a way that I nothing else...because I made it.
If this is true, then surely, God must know His creatures on a far grander scale than me building a car! After all, does not Scripture say that “even the hairs of [our] head[s] have all been counted” (Matthew 10:30, HCSB)? God knows, then, every itty bitty little thing about us, including the hairs on our head. Since God knows even the number of hairs on my head, what is there that He does not (and cannot) know? Open Theism might seem philosophically consistent (like Calvinism)...but it is biblically unfaithful. To affirm Open Theism, one must look Matthew 10:29-30 in the face and say, “I don’t believe what it says”; and that is simply something I cannot do. I have too much Christian conviction for that.
So Open Theism might seem “philosophically consistent”; but in the end, the system as a whole is biblically unfaithful. And this comes down to the last question I’d like to ask: “Which determines which: theology or philosophy?” Down through the centuries, philosophy has always been seen as “theology’s handmaiden.” And I still believe this to be true: that philosophy’s job is not to “overpower” theology, but to “undergird” it, to support what we know biblically to be true. In Proverbs 9:10 we are told that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding” (HCSB). I still believe that, in order to do philosophy, in order to be “a lover of wisdom” (Grk. “philos,” meaning “love” + “sophia”, meaning “wisdom”), one must first fear God. How do we reverentially fear the Lord? We do, as Solomon states:
“When all has been heard, the conclusion of the matter is: fear God and keep His commands, because this [is for] all humanity. For God will bring every act to judgment, including every hidden thing, whether good or evil” (Ecclesiastes 12:13-14, HCSB).
How do we fear God? We keep His commandments. And where are they spelled out for us? In His Word (“theology” in the Greek means “logia,” “word” and “theos,” God. Theology simply means “Word of God”).
Let theology, the Word of God, be our drive for life and for theological systems. If theology drives our philosophy, Calvinism and Open Theism will both be exposed as systems that are biblically unfaithful. And in this case, we will all be forced to abandon them both in search of something better.
I am aware that I provided a portion of this quote in my last
post; but for this post, I wanna focus more on the idea that Classical Arminians are supposedly “guilty of importing Calvinistic thought into its doctrine of omniscience.” Clark Pinnock, an Open Theist, as well as Calvinists (and all Open Theists), accuse Classical Arminians of being inconsistent in their doctrine of omniscience. For me, this is a huge deal because my theological system is in the “hot seat” if Open Theists and Calvinists are right.
First, let me respond by discussing Calvinism, the first opposing system to Classical Arminianism. Classical Calvinism is a coherent, consistent, five-point system which is spelled in the acronym “TULIP”---Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Limited Atonement, Irresistible Grace, Perseverance of the Saints. Each of the points follows in light of the one before it. Each of the points of the system is philosophically consistent. Would I say that Calvinism is philosophically consistent? Yep. The God of Calvinism is the all-determining ruler of the universe, such that God can pick some to be saved while reprobating the rest eternally. The God of Classical Calvinism does not “pass over” anyone; rather, He reprobates them from all eternity to suffer in Hell. And for those that He picks, the outcome is marvelous for them. After all, they are the “specially elect,” are they not?
Now, someone may ask me, “What’s the problem with Calvinism? God is sovereign, right? And we want to exalt the Lord above ourselves, right?” We do. I do. But the problem comes in when you consider that the tenets of Calvinism, while “philosophically” consistent, are “biblically” unfaithful. Take the “L” of Limited Atonement, for example: Limited Atonement states that “Christ’s saving work was limited in that it was designed to save some and not others” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented, Second Edition.” Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2004, page 40). However, the Scriptures themselves testify that Christ came for all (1 Timothy 2:4; John 3:16-17, for example). As a Classical Arminian, I would agree with the Calvinist that there is a “limit” in the atonement; but the “limit” in the atonement is in regards to “those who receive it,” not those for whom Christ died. Christ died for all, but only those who believe appropriate the atonement to their lives. As Jesus says in John 3:18, “the one who believes is not condemned, but the one who does not believe is condemned already.” I could use other examples where I disagree, but I think one will suffice.
What about the God of Open Theism? The God of Open Theism undermines sovereignty and libertarian free will altogether; for, if God is not sovereign, and He gives us power that not even God can control, then, in essence, God gives us power that allows us to become “our own little gods” and therefore, can trump God’s sovereignty. If this is not the case, then God, having no sovereignty, can give us no freedom at all; for if God be helpless, then so are we.
How logical is the Open Theist argument? How is it that God, having made us and created us, cannot know our future choices? God is qualitatively superior to us (Creator, Lord, eternal), while we are qualitatively inferior to God (creatures, servants, temporal). If God is superior to us, then how can we, being inferior, do things that “take The Superior God by surprise”? This is like saying that, for example, because I build an automobile, and the automobile has a life of its own, that the automobile can do things that I cannot know it will do. Did I not build the vehicle? Did I not put the components of the car together? Did I not hook all the wires and perform all the electricity and wiring tests on the car? Did I not make the body of the car? Yes, I did all those things (just an example here...I have never built an actual vehicle). And if I built the car from scratch, then, I should know what is in the car and what could go wrong with the car. And if something does go wrong, then I can have some idea of why the car is doing what it’s doing. And this is all because I know the car in a way that I nothing else...because I made it.
If this is true, then surely, God must know His creatures on a far grander scale than me building a car! After all, does not Scripture say that “even the hairs of [our] head[s] have all been counted” (Matthew 10:30, HCSB)? God knows, then, every itty bitty little thing about us, including the hairs on our head. Since God knows even the number of hairs on my head, what is there that He does not (and cannot) know? Open Theism might seem philosophically consistent (like Calvinism)...but it is biblically unfaithful. To affirm Open Theism, one must look Matthew 10:29-30 in the face and say, “I don’t believe what it says”; and that is simply something I cannot do. I have too much Christian conviction for that.
So Open Theism might seem “philosophically consistent”; but in the end, the system as a whole is biblically unfaithful. And this comes down to the last question I’d like to ask: “Which determines which: theology or philosophy?” Down through the centuries, philosophy has always been seen as “theology’s handmaiden.” And I still believe this to be true: that philosophy’s job is not to “overpower” theology, but to “undergird” it, to support what we know biblically to be true. In Proverbs 9:10 we are told that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding” (HCSB). I still believe that, in order to do philosophy, in order to be “a lover of wisdom” (Grk. “philos,” meaning “love” + “sophia”, meaning “wisdom”), one must first fear God. How do we reverentially fear the Lord? We do, as Solomon states:
“When all has been heard, the conclusion of the matter is: fear God and keep His commands, because this [is for] all humanity. For God will bring every act to judgment, including every hidden thing, whether good or evil” (Ecclesiastes 12:13-14, HCSB).
How do we fear God? We keep His commandments. And where are they spelled out for us? In His Word (“theology” in the Greek means “logia,” “word” and “theos,” God. Theology simply means “Word of God”).
Let theology, the Word of God, be our drive for life and for theological systems. If theology drives our philosophy, Calvinism and Open Theism will both be exposed as systems that are biblically unfaithful. And in this case, we will all be forced to abandon them both in search of something better.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
"Most Moved Mover," Pt. I-D: Classical Arminianism and the "Calvinistic" Doctrine of Exhaustive Omniscience
“...we have made Arminian thinking sharper and clearer and the only and obvious alternative to the conventional options. Our Calvinist critics call it ‘consistent’ Arminianism, a judgment I am not inclined to reject” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 12).
“One cannot just introduce dynamic and relational features into the doctrine of God without reconsidering undynamic and unrelational features of it like meticulous sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge. The conventional package of attributes is tightly woven. You cannot deny one, such as impassibility, without casting doubt cast[sic] on others, like immutability. It’s like pulling on a thread and unraveling a sweater. A little boldness is required; tentative changes will not do” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 77).
Reading these words a few days ago stirred within me a great need to defend the system I hold to so dearly. Before I get started, then, let me say that as a fallible human being, I (like everyone else) have a tendency to look at my theological system as being more biblically faithful than anyone else’s. I’ve learned while studying these systems, though, that each system makes some good points biblically...and that I have to listen to the other opposing systems out there and let them teach me things that I did not learn from my own.
Having said that, though, I will be as robust in defending Classical Arminianism as I have always been here at the Center for Theological Studies. This post will show why Classical Arminianism is a consistent system and so refute the charges that have been made against the system itself.
Daniel Strange gives us the above challenge in his article, “The Price of Internal Consistency?”:
“The free-will theists therefore agree with Calvinists like Jonathan Edwards, that FOREKNOWLEDGE IMPLIES FOREORDINATION and that CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM IS GUILTY OF IMPORTING CALVINISTIC THOUGHT into its doctrine of omniscience” (Daniel Strange, “The Price of Internal Consistency?” Tyndale Bulletin 51.1 (2000), page 7).
I capitalized the two phrases above to pinpoint the importance of Strange’s quote. First, the charge is made that “foreknowledge implies foreordination”: in other words, if God foreknows everything that will happen (He knows before it happens), then God has “foreordained,” or predetermined, what will happen. Fascinatingly enough, Bruce Ware treats the supposed Classical Arminian “inconsistency” in his work:
“Like it or not, says the open theist, this commitment to exhaustive divine foreknowledge undermines much of what Arminianism cherishes most. If God knows all future choices and actions, then it follows that those choices and actions are not free, that the meaningfulness of human behavior is destroyed, that genuine providential governance of the world is undermined, that real relationship with God is rendered only apparent and illusory, and that in the end a fundamentally determinist model of the God/creature relation, much like that advocated in versions of Calvinism, cannot be avoided” (Bruce A. Ware, “God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism.” Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000, page 41).
Why is it that exhaustive foreknowledge AUTOMATICALLY leads to exhaustive sovereignty? This is a connection that Pinnock (and all open theists) and Ware seem to make: that to affirm God’s exhaustive foreknowledge is to affirm meticulous sovereignty. But this is not necessarily the case. Calvinists affirm both exhaustive sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge; but in Calvinism, man cannot have responsibility for his actions. This explains why a lot of students and professors I’ve met with here at Southeastern have become Molinist in their thought: while Calvinism’s God is absolutely sovereign, He is also responsible (and the author of) sin and evil, which goes against James 1. Dr. Ken Keathley, author of “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach,” has done a marvelous job in getting Calvinist professors and students to change their theology. You simply cannot have responsibility in Calvin’s system, like it or not.
For those who believe that God knows everything, Open Theism is not an acceptable theological system. Therefore, one is left with two choices: either Molinism (and variations on this, even compatibilist middle knowledge, which Ware seems to advocate in his work “God’s Greater Glory”), or Classical Arminianism. These two systems have stood the test of time and continue to do so.
Foreknowledge does not NECESSARILY imply foreordination. To infer that this is true would mean that God’s foreknowledge is necessarily causal (that God causes what He foreknows). If this is true, then God’s foreknowing that David would commit adultery with Bathsheba and kill Uriah was the cause of David murdering Uriah and sleeping with Bathsheba. I think James 1 cancels out the possibility of causal foreknowledge.
Secondly, as Daniel Strange notes above, to affirm the Classical Arminian view of exhaustive divine foreknowledge would mean that “CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM IS GUILTY OF IMPORTING CALVINISTIC THOUGHT into its doctrine of omniscience.” What does this mean, exactly? That, in order to affirm a consistent Arminianism, man’s libertarian freedom must trump God’s sovereignty? God can’t know the actions of creatures if creatures can choose for themselves?
Calvinists and Open Theists seem to believe that Open Theism is consistent Arminianism, but I would argue that Open Theism actually undermines the sovereignty of God. God doesn’t know the actions of man, so He really can’t incorporate the deeds of man into His plans. Open Theism really tries to make God “omnicompetent,” as Pinnock states, but how can God be if He doesn’t know what will happen before it happens?
Now, regarding the claim against Classic Arminianism being “Calvinistic,” let me respond in the following manner: when did Calvinism monopolize the view of exhaustive divine foreknowledge? Is it conceivable that God could foreknow something without actually causing it? For instance, God knew that Israel would rebel against Him after her deliverance from Egypt; does this mean, then, that He caused Israel to rebel against Him and then punished her for so doing by letting the wilderness generation die out in the wilderness? No it doesn’t. If it does, then how could God punish her for doing what He caused the nation to do? Some will argue a case for “compatibilist middle knowledge,” or some “compatibilism” between the divine and human actions. I will not dive into this now.
At the moment, let me just say that God foreknowing all things is not “Calvinistic” at all; to say this is to say that ONLY Calvinists are evangelicals, that only Calvinists hold to the inerrancy of Scripture (since the Scriptures affirm exhaustive foreknowledge), that only Calvinists are Christians. What about Molinists? Surely, Molinists hold to exhaustive divine foreknowledge! And what about four-point Arminians, for example? While I often accuse four-point Arminians of inconsistency, they are “inconsistent” because they hold to the exhaustive sovereignty (and hence, exhaustive foreknowledge) of God! They hold to the idea that once you place your faith in Christ, God holds you...and they look at Classical Arminians like myself and think that we fail miserably to hold to the sovereignty of God! This might explain why R.C. Sproul writes that “People often ask if I believe Arminians are Christians? I usually answer, ‘Yes, barely.’ They are Christians by what we call a felicitious inconsistency” (R.C. Sproul, “Willing to Believe: The Controversy Over Free Will.” Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007, 25). Evidently, R.C. Sproul is not alone in his assessment of Arminianism as a whole.
Some argue that holding to human libertarian freedom is to deny the inerrancy of Scripture. Stephen J. Wellum writes:
“But, someone might object, could not this challenge also be raised against other evangelicals who hold to a view of divine sovereignty that incorporates a libertarian view of human freedom, and not just the viewpoint of open theism? Is it only the open theist who succumbs to this kind of problem? Do not all those who affirm libertarianism also face this same dilemma? And thus, are you not indicting other evangelicals who reject open theism but affirm libertarianism? My answer is both yes and no. Yes, in the sense that IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANY LIBERTARIAN POSITION TO ARGUE CONSISTENTLY HOW GOD CAN GUARANTEE THAT WHAT HE WANTS WRITTEN IS WRITTEN FREELY BY HUMAN AUTHORS. But no, in the important sense that traditional evangelicals who are committed to libertarianism are also committed to exhaustive divine foreknowledge of future free human actions which allows them to maintain simultaneously libertarian freedom and the guarantee necessary in order to uphold a high view of Scripture. An excellent example of this approach is that of William Craig” (Stephen J. Wellum, “Divine Sovereignty-Omniscience, Inerrancy, and Open Theism: An Evaluation.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (June 2002): page 8; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3817/is_200206/ai_n9125078/pg_8/?tag=content;col1).
Wellum is referring to human writers and the Spirit, the Divine Author of Scripture itself, in bringing forth the words of Scripture. How did the Spirit and human writers combine to produce the Scriptures? And what does this tell us about the kind of theological system we should hold to? This is a question that I will get to in my next post.
“One cannot just introduce dynamic and relational features into the doctrine of God without reconsidering undynamic and unrelational features of it like meticulous sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge. The conventional package of attributes is tightly woven. You cannot deny one, such as impassibility, without casting doubt cast[sic] on others, like immutability. It’s like pulling on a thread and unraveling a sweater. A little boldness is required; tentative changes will not do” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 77).
Reading these words a few days ago stirred within me a great need to defend the system I hold to so dearly. Before I get started, then, let me say that as a fallible human being, I (like everyone else) have a tendency to look at my theological system as being more biblically faithful than anyone else’s. I’ve learned while studying these systems, though, that each system makes some good points biblically...and that I have to listen to the other opposing systems out there and let them teach me things that I did not learn from my own.
Having said that, though, I will be as robust in defending Classical Arminianism as I have always been here at the Center for Theological Studies. This post will show why Classical Arminianism is a consistent system and so refute the charges that have been made against the system itself.
Daniel Strange gives us the above challenge in his article, “The Price of Internal Consistency?”:
“The free-will theists therefore agree with Calvinists like Jonathan Edwards, that FOREKNOWLEDGE IMPLIES FOREORDINATION and that CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM IS GUILTY OF IMPORTING CALVINISTIC THOUGHT into its doctrine of omniscience” (Daniel Strange, “The Price of Internal Consistency?” Tyndale Bulletin 51.1 (2000), page 7).
I capitalized the two phrases above to pinpoint the importance of Strange’s quote. First, the charge is made that “foreknowledge implies foreordination”: in other words, if God foreknows everything that will happen (He knows before it happens), then God has “foreordained,” or predetermined, what will happen. Fascinatingly enough, Bruce Ware treats the supposed Classical Arminian “inconsistency” in his work:
“Like it or not, says the open theist, this commitment to exhaustive divine foreknowledge undermines much of what Arminianism cherishes most. If God knows all future choices and actions, then it follows that those choices and actions are not free, that the meaningfulness of human behavior is destroyed, that genuine providential governance of the world is undermined, that real relationship with God is rendered only apparent and illusory, and that in the end a fundamentally determinist model of the God/creature relation, much like that advocated in versions of Calvinism, cannot be avoided” (Bruce A. Ware, “God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism.” Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000, page 41).
Why is it that exhaustive foreknowledge AUTOMATICALLY leads to exhaustive sovereignty? This is a connection that Pinnock (and all open theists) and Ware seem to make: that to affirm God’s exhaustive foreknowledge is to affirm meticulous sovereignty. But this is not necessarily the case. Calvinists affirm both exhaustive sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge; but in Calvinism, man cannot have responsibility for his actions. This explains why a lot of students and professors I’ve met with here at Southeastern have become Molinist in their thought: while Calvinism’s God is absolutely sovereign, He is also responsible (and the author of) sin and evil, which goes against James 1. Dr. Ken Keathley, author of “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach,” has done a marvelous job in getting Calvinist professors and students to change their theology. You simply cannot have responsibility in Calvin’s system, like it or not.
For those who believe that God knows everything, Open Theism is not an acceptable theological system. Therefore, one is left with two choices: either Molinism (and variations on this, even compatibilist middle knowledge, which Ware seems to advocate in his work “God’s Greater Glory”), or Classical Arminianism. These two systems have stood the test of time and continue to do so.
Foreknowledge does not NECESSARILY imply foreordination. To infer that this is true would mean that God’s foreknowledge is necessarily causal (that God causes what He foreknows). If this is true, then God’s foreknowing that David would commit adultery with Bathsheba and kill Uriah was the cause of David murdering Uriah and sleeping with Bathsheba. I think James 1 cancels out the possibility of causal foreknowledge.
Secondly, as Daniel Strange notes above, to affirm the Classical Arminian view of exhaustive divine foreknowledge would mean that “CLASSICAL ARMINIANISM IS GUILTY OF IMPORTING CALVINISTIC THOUGHT into its doctrine of omniscience.” What does this mean, exactly? That, in order to affirm a consistent Arminianism, man’s libertarian freedom must trump God’s sovereignty? God can’t know the actions of creatures if creatures can choose for themselves?
Calvinists and Open Theists seem to believe that Open Theism is consistent Arminianism, but I would argue that Open Theism actually undermines the sovereignty of God. God doesn’t know the actions of man, so He really can’t incorporate the deeds of man into His plans. Open Theism really tries to make God “omnicompetent,” as Pinnock states, but how can God be if He doesn’t know what will happen before it happens?
Now, regarding the claim against Classic Arminianism being “Calvinistic,” let me respond in the following manner: when did Calvinism monopolize the view of exhaustive divine foreknowledge? Is it conceivable that God could foreknow something without actually causing it? For instance, God knew that Israel would rebel against Him after her deliverance from Egypt; does this mean, then, that He caused Israel to rebel against Him and then punished her for so doing by letting the wilderness generation die out in the wilderness? No it doesn’t. If it does, then how could God punish her for doing what He caused the nation to do? Some will argue a case for “compatibilist middle knowledge,” or some “compatibilism” between the divine and human actions. I will not dive into this now.
At the moment, let me just say that God foreknowing all things is not “Calvinistic” at all; to say this is to say that ONLY Calvinists are evangelicals, that only Calvinists hold to the inerrancy of Scripture (since the Scriptures affirm exhaustive foreknowledge), that only Calvinists are Christians. What about Molinists? Surely, Molinists hold to exhaustive divine foreknowledge! And what about four-point Arminians, for example? While I often accuse four-point Arminians of inconsistency, they are “inconsistent” because they hold to the exhaustive sovereignty (and hence, exhaustive foreknowledge) of God! They hold to the idea that once you place your faith in Christ, God holds you...and they look at Classical Arminians like myself and think that we fail miserably to hold to the sovereignty of God! This might explain why R.C. Sproul writes that “People often ask if I believe Arminians are Christians? I usually answer, ‘Yes, barely.’ They are Christians by what we call a felicitious inconsistency” (R.C. Sproul, “Willing to Believe: The Controversy Over Free Will.” Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007, 25). Evidently, R.C. Sproul is not alone in his assessment of Arminianism as a whole.
Some argue that holding to human libertarian freedom is to deny the inerrancy of Scripture. Stephen J. Wellum writes:
“But, someone might object, could not this challenge also be raised against other evangelicals who hold to a view of divine sovereignty that incorporates a libertarian view of human freedom, and not just the viewpoint of open theism? Is it only the open theist who succumbs to this kind of problem? Do not all those who affirm libertarianism also face this same dilemma? And thus, are you not indicting other evangelicals who reject open theism but affirm libertarianism? My answer is both yes and no. Yes, in the sense that IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANY LIBERTARIAN POSITION TO ARGUE CONSISTENTLY HOW GOD CAN GUARANTEE THAT WHAT HE WANTS WRITTEN IS WRITTEN FREELY BY HUMAN AUTHORS. But no, in the important sense that traditional evangelicals who are committed to libertarianism are also committed to exhaustive divine foreknowledge of future free human actions which allows them to maintain simultaneously libertarian freedom and the guarantee necessary in order to uphold a high view of Scripture. An excellent example of this approach is that of William Craig” (Stephen J. Wellum, “Divine Sovereignty-Omniscience, Inerrancy, and Open Theism: An Evaluation.” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (June 2002): page 8; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3817/is_200206/ai_n9125078/pg_8/?tag=content;col1).
Wellum is referring to human writers and the Spirit, the Divine Author of Scripture itself, in bringing forth the words of Scripture. How did the Spirit and human writers combine to produce the Scriptures? And what does this tell us about the kind of theological system we should hold to? This is a question that I will get to in my next post.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
"Most Moved Mover," Pt. I-C: Open Theism as "Consistent" Arminianism
“What we have here is a continuation of an age-old debate that should not stop now just because we have introduced some new interpretations into the discussion. In fact, by doing so, WE HAVE MADE ARMINIAN THINKING SHARPER AND CLEARER AND THE ONLY AND OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS. OUR CALVINIST CRITICS CALL IT ‘CONSISTENT’ ARMINIANISM, a judgment I am not inclined to reject” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, pages 11-12).
My college years were really something. I came from a rural eastern NC background, raised in a town of no more than 10,000 people, and attended a school whose total population was only six-hundred at the time I was a student. When I graduated from high school on May 26, 2002, I graduated Salutatorian (second) in a class of no more than 109 people. Only 97 others graduated with me that May, and the other eleven people were told three days before graduation that they would have to graduate the following year.
But my college years were quite interesting. Having applied to two schools whose traditions and rivalry run deep (Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), I received admission to Carolina in January and entered my undergraduate studies in Fall 2002. I count it God’s blessing that I did not receive admission to Duke University, although I desired to attend the institution...and my mother desired to send me. She was a Duke alumni herself, having received two Batchelors of Arts degrees in Accounting and Economics in the Class of 1978. I was supposed to be the second-generation “Dookie” (humor me here!) in my family, but God had other plans. I am thankful that God did not grant me the desire of my heart. He truly knows what is best for His children.
While at Carolina, I immediately discovered that I was in a place that did not just “assume” God, as my background in a rural town and church had done. While I was in high school, it was typical for me to hear the phrase, “Lord knows” or “Lord have mercy” (as I used twice in my first post on Pinnock’s book). But when I got to college, I didn’t hear the Lord’s name reverenced in speech. If I heard God’s name used, it was being used in a most irreverent manner (for either cursing or swearing). A former classmate of mine, named Robert (whom we called “Rob” for short), asked a question indicative of his view of God when I told him my next step after graduation was to attend seminary: “What’s a seminary?” That’s pretty telling in and of itself! Most Christians have an idea that a “seminary” is a place where people train for ministry; but Rob’s ignorance of that, coupled with his speech and constant discussion, confirmed for me what I believed all along---that Rob was no Christian at all. This was not an isolated encounter in college, but it is one that I still remember rather vividly to this day.
But seminary has been a different kind of life for me. Here, I can mention the words “God,” “Lord,” “Savior,” “sin,” “salvation,” etc., without being looked at rather strangely! And the most surprising experience I’ve had here involves the first day of my now nine-semester-stint at Southeastern: I can still remember the first time I expressed shock when my professor said, “Let us pray.” I couldn’t believe it! People actually pray here? You can mention God here without being deemed a weirdo? It was a new experience for me, but one I welcolmed. And today, despite my many theological issues with Calvinism and complementarianism, I can honestly thank God to be at a place where He is exalted above everything, including ourselves. Yes, Classical Arminians do exalt God above themselves!!!
Why provide details about my life? To get into what I wanna talk about today: the idea of presuppositions. Pinnock tells us in his quote above that Calvinists see Open Theism as a “most consistent Arminianism.” But this should be no surprise to anyone who has studied Calvinism and Open Theism: for both systems start with the same presupposition (background belief): that if God knows the future, the future itself is determined. Hence, all actions are determined by God, and no individual has a say in the matter. This is true even for salvation in this view.
The idea that exhaustive foreknowledge leads to determinism (exhaustive, meticulous sovereignty) is found in the work of many a Calvinist. James White writes:
“Over all His creatures His [sic] is sovereign. He uses them as He pleases, and does for them or to them all that He wills. His sight penetrates to the heart of all things. His knowledge is infinite and infallible. NO SINGLE THING IS TO HIM AT RISK OR UNCERTAIN, FOR HE IS NOT DEPENDENT UPON CREATED THINGS” (James White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, page 35).
White’s mentioning of “at risk or uncertain” demonstrates the target of his attack---Open Theism! In White’s mind, as in the minds of Calvinist critics (Pinnock said), Open Theism is the most consistent Arminianism out there. And Open Theists themselves are guilty of using the word “risk” often in their work. Clark Pinnock writes:
“With the creation of humans (and angels), God found himself in a new situation, having to work out his purposes alongside creatures with liberty of their own, able to project their own intentions. In other words, GOD TOOK A RISK. Risk is a function of the fact that God has limited the degree of his control over the world in granting the creature genuine freedom, and this is not without pain to himself” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 39).
And notice that the title of John Sanders work is “The God Who RISKS: A Theology of Divine Providence”? The word “risk” is located in the title of Sanders’ book to send a message: that is, that God takes risks.
White also denies the free will of man, and only affirms the free will of God:
“Many transfer their ideas of democracy to God’s rule, thinking that God is limited in what He can do by what man ‘agrees’ to allow by his ‘free will.’ THE TRUTH IS THAT THE BIBLE SPEAKS MUCH OF FREE WILL---GOD’S FREE WILL, THAT IS, NOT MAN’S. The utter freedom of God to do with His creation as He sees fit, not as His creatures see fit, is a constant theme” (White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, page 36).
Here, man’s libertarian freedom is denied; instead, we find God determining everything that happens. If Open Theism is not correct, to the Calvinist, Calvinism is the only other option.
White shows his presupposition that meticulous sovereignty leads to exhaustive foreknowledge when he writes the following:
“If God created this universe, knowing what would happen, as Hunt seems to believe (he constantly speaks of God’s foreknowledge but does not give us a ground upon which to understand how God has such knowledge), HOW IS HE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT CREATION AND THE EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE IN TIME?” (White, “Debating Calvinism,” page 57)
Since God created this universe, according to White, God is “responsible” for everything that happens in it. Later in his debate with Dave Hunt, he claims that man is responsible for his sin...but how can he be, when God is the one “responsible”? How can both God and man be responsible for man’s sin when God ordained both man’s good and evil in eternity? The Calvinist answer here matches the question that atheists ask Christians regarding the problem of evil: “If God is all-good and all-powerful, why then, do evil and suffering exist in the world?” Atheists deny the existence of God to deal with the problem of evil, but by so doing, place responsibility on God for the evil in the world. Calvinists give God the same responsibility, while acknowledging His existence.
The idea that exhaustive foreknowledge (knowledge of all things) leads unambiguously to determinism is also found all throughout the work of Clark Pinnock. One example regards Abraham’s prayer to God for the city of Sodom:
“In another incident, Abraham prayed for the city of Sodom. He spoke with God about the fate of the city and they decided together what should be done because its destiny had, apparently, not been sealed (Gen. 18:22). From this incident we see that God does not will to rule the world alone but wants to bring the creature into his decisions...it also suggests that THE FUTURE HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTIVELY SETTLED” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 42).
In the eyes of Pinnock, the fact that Abraham prays to God and God talks with Abraham shows that God did not foreknow the fate of the city. If God knew it, Pinnock would say, why would God even allow Abraham to talk to Him at all? And if God already knew what would happen, why even dialogue about it? Did Abraham really have the power to change the fate of the city through prayer? If God already knew what would happen, Abraham’s prayer was simply illusory to the fate of the city (he couldn’t impact the outcome, either way).
In another place, Pinnock writes:
“Instead of viewing the whole course of history in a timeless instant, God knows events as they take place and takes note of what transpires. God is receptive to new experiences and flexible in the way in which he works toward his objectives in the world...THE COUNSEL OF GOD IS NOT TIMELESS AND FIXED. He did not make all the decisions once and for all apart from the world but IS EVEN NOW MAKING THEM AS HE WORKS OUT THE DETAILS OF THE FINAL RESTORATION” (“Most Moved Mover,” pages 59-60).
God is, according to Pinnock, like us: He too, is looking forward to the future. While I certainly believe that the end in sight is glorious, I don’t think that God is like a little child at Christmas who is anxiously waiting to unravel the gift wrap and find out what his present is. The child unwraps his Christmas gift in suspense, ignorant of what’s inside; God, however, is not like this at all. God knows the end and knows the excitement we will have as we see all that He prepared for us!
The most telling statement regarding foreknowledge comes in Pinnock’s chapter against Thomistic philosophy:
“One cannot just introduce dynamic and relational features into the doctrine of God without reconsidering UNDYNAMIC AND UNRELATIONAL FEATURES OF IT LIKE METICULOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND EXHAUSTIVE FOREKNOWLEDGE. The conventional package of attributes is tightly woven. You cannot deny one, such as impassibility, without casting doubt on others, like immutability. It’s like pulling on a thread and unraveling a sweater” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 77).
For now, let me say that Pinnock seems to automatically connect exhaustive (meticulous) sovereignty with exhaustive foreknowledge. Why is this the case? I will explore Pinnock’s chief assumption and connection between meticulous sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge in my next post. Stay tuned...
My college years were really something. I came from a rural eastern NC background, raised in a town of no more than 10,000 people, and attended a school whose total population was only six-hundred at the time I was a student. When I graduated from high school on May 26, 2002, I graduated Salutatorian (second) in a class of no more than 109 people. Only 97 others graduated with me that May, and the other eleven people were told three days before graduation that they would have to graduate the following year.
But my college years were quite interesting. Having applied to two schools whose traditions and rivalry run deep (Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), I received admission to Carolina in January and entered my undergraduate studies in Fall 2002. I count it God’s blessing that I did not receive admission to Duke University, although I desired to attend the institution...and my mother desired to send me. She was a Duke alumni herself, having received two Batchelors of Arts degrees in Accounting and Economics in the Class of 1978. I was supposed to be the second-generation “Dookie” (humor me here!) in my family, but God had other plans. I am thankful that God did not grant me the desire of my heart. He truly knows what is best for His children.
While at Carolina, I immediately discovered that I was in a place that did not just “assume” God, as my background in a rural town and church had done. While I was in high school, it was typical for me to hear the phrase, “Lord knows” or “Lord have mercy” (as I used twice in my first post on Pinnock’s book). But when I got to college, I didn’t hear the Lord’s name reverenced in speech. If I heard God’s name used, it was being used in a most irreverent manner (for either cursing or swearing). A former classmate of mine, named Robert (whom we called “Rob” for short), asked a question indicative of his view of God when I told him my next step after graduation was to attend seminary: “What’s a seminary?” That’s pretty telling in and of itself! Most Christians have an idea that a “seminary” is a place where people train for ministry; but Rob’s ignorance of that, coupled with his speech and constant discussion, confirmed for me what I believed all along---that Rob was no Christian at all. This was not an isolated encounter in college, but it is one that I still remember rather vividly to this day.
But seminary has been a different kind of life for me. Here, I can mention the words “God,” “Lord,” “Savior,” “sin,” “salvation,” etc., without being looked at rather strangely! And the most surprising experience I’ve had here involves the first day of my now nine-semester-stint at Southeastern: I can still remember the first time I expressed shock when my professor said, “Let us pray.” I couldn’t believe it! People actually pray here? You can mention God here without being deemed a weirdo? It was a new experience for me, but one I welcolmed. And today, despite my many theological issues with Calvinism and complementarianism, I can honestly thank God to be at a place where He is exalted above everything, including ourselves. Yes, Classical Arminians do exalt God above themselves!!!
Why provide details about my life? To get into what I wanna talk about today: the idea of presuppositions. Pinnock tells us in his quote above that Calvinists see Open Theism as a “most consistent Arminianism.” But this should be no surprise to anyone who has studied Calvinism and Open Theism: for both systems start with the same presupposition (background belief): that if God knows the future, the future itself is determined. Hence, all actions are determined by God, and no individual has a say in the matter. This is true even for salvation in this view.
The idea that exhaustive foreknowledge leads to determinism (exhaustive, meticulous sovereignty) is found in the work of many a Calvinist. James White writes:
“Over all His creatures His [sic] is sovereign. He uses them as He pleases, and does for them or to them all that He wills. His sight penetrates to the heart of all things. His knowledge is infinite and infallible. NO SINGLE THING IS TO HIM AT RISK OR UNCERTAIN, FOR HE IS NOT DEPENDENT UPON CREATED THINGS” (James White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, page 35).
White’s mentioning of “at risk or uncertain” demonstrates the target of his attack---Open Theism! In White’s mind, as in the minds of Calvinist critics (Pinnock said), Open Theism is the most consistent Arminianism out there. And Open Theists themselves are guilty of using the word “risk” often in their work. Clark Pinnock writes:
“With the creation of humans (and angels), God found himself in a new situation, having to work out his purposes alongside creatures with liberty of their own, able to project their own intentions. In other words, GOD TOOK A RISK. Risk is a function of the fact that God has limited the degree of his control over the world in granting the creature genuine freedom, and this is not without pain to himself” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 39).
And notice that the title of John Sanders work is “The God Who RISKS: A Theology of Divine Providence”? The word “risk” is located in the title of Sanders’ book to send a message: that is, that God takes risks.
White also denies the free will of man, and only affirms the free will of God:
“Many transfer their ideas of democracy to God’s rule, thinking that God is limited in what He can do by what man ‘agrees’ to allow by his ‘free will.’ THE TRUTH IS THAT THE BIBLE SPEAKS MUCH OF FREE WILL---GOD’S FREE WILL, THAT IS, NOT MAN’S. The utter freedom of God to do with His creation as He sees fit, not as His creatures see fit, is a constant theme” (White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, page 36).
Here, man’s libertarian freedom is denied; instead, we find God determining everything that happens. If Open Theism is not correct, to the Calvinist, Calvinism is the only other option.
White shows his presupposition that meticulous sovereignty leads to exhaustive foreknowledge when he writes the following:
“If God created this universe, knowing what would happen, as Hunt seems to believe (he constantly speaks of God’s foreknowledge but does not give us a ground upon which to understand how God has such knowledge), HOW IS HE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT CREATION AND THE EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE IN TIME?” (White, “Debating Calvinism,” page 57)
Since God created this universe, according to White, God is “responsible” for everything that happens in it. Later in his debate with Dave Hunt, he claims that man is responsible for his sin...but how can he be, when God is the one “responsible”? How can both God and man be responsible for man’s sin when God ordained both man’s good and evil in eternity? The Calvinist answer here matches the question that atheists ask Christians regarding the problem of evil: “If God is all-good and all-powerful, why then, do evil and suffering exist in the world?” Atheists deny the existence of God to deal with the problem of evil, but by so doing, place responsibility on God for the evil in the world. Calvinists give God the same responsibility, while acknowledging His existence.
The idea that exhaustive foreknowledge (knowledge of all things) leads unambiguously to determinism is also found all throughout the work of Clark Pinnock. One example regards Abraham’s prayer to God for the city of Sodom:
“In another incident, Abraham prayed for the city of Sodom. He spoke with God about the fate of the city and they decided together what should be done because its destiny had, apparently, not been sealed (Gen. 18:22). From this incident we see that God does not will to rule the world alone but wants to bring the creature into his decisions...it also suggests that THE FUTURE HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTIVELY SETTLED” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 42).
In the eyes of Pinnock, the fact that Abraham prays to God and God talks with Abraham shows that God did not foreknow the fate of the city. If God knew it, Pinnock would say, why would God even allow Abraham to talk to Him at all? And if God already knew what would happen, why even dialogue about it? Did Abraham really have the power to change the fate of the city through prayer? If God already knew what would happen, Abraham’s prayer was simply illusory to the fate of the city (he couldn’t impact the outcome, either way).
In another place, Pinnock writes:
“Instead of viewing the whole course of history in a timeless instant, God knows events as they take place and takes note of what transpires. God is receptive to new experiences and flexible in the way in which he works toward his objectives in the world...THE COUNSEL OF GOD IS NOT TIMELESS AND FIXED. He did not make all the decisions once and for all apart from the world but IS EVEN NOW MAKING THEM AS HE WORKS OUT THE DETAILS OF THE FINAL RESTORATION” (“Most Moved Mover,” pages 59-60).
God is, according to Pinnock, like us: He too, is looking forward to the future. While I certainly believe that the end in sight is glorious, I don’t think that God is like a little child at Christmas who is anxiously waiting to unravel the gift wrap and find out what his present is. The child unwraps his Christmas gift in suspense, ignorant of what’s inside; God, however, is not like this at all. God knows the end and knows the excitement we will have as we see all that He prepared for us!
The most telling statement regarding foreknowledge comes in Pinnock’s chapter against Thomistic philosophy:
“One cannot just introduce dynamic and relational features into the doctrine of God without reconsidering UNDYNAMIC AND UNRELATIONAL FEATURES OF IT LIKE METICULOUS SOVEREIGNTY AND EXHAUSTIVE FOREKNOWLEDGE. The conventional package of attributes is tightly woven. You cannot deny one, such as impassibility, without casting doubt on others, like immutability. It’s like pulling on a thread and unraveling a sweater” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 77).
For now, let me say that Pinnock seems to automatically connect exhaustive (meticulous) sovereignty with exhaustive foreknowledge. Why is this the case? I will explore Pinnock’s chief assumption and connection between meticulous sovereignty and exhaustive foreknowledge in my next post. Stay tuned...
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
"Most Moved Mover," Pt. I-B (2): Clark Pinnock and Process Theology
In my last post, I focused on Pinnock’s view that God has a conditional essence and nature. I ended the post by saying that Pinnock’s denial of Philo’s definition of the divine essence places him in the camp of Process Theism and Process Theology.
Read these words from Process Theologians John Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin:
“Process theism is sometimes called ‘dipolar theism,’ in contrast to traditional theism with its doctrine of divine simplicity. For Charles Hartshorne, the two ‘poles’ or aspects of God are the abstract essence of God, on the one hand, and God’s concrete actuality on the other. The abstract essence is eternal, absolute, independent, unchangeable. It includes those abstract attributes of deity which characterize the divine existence at every moment. For example, TO SAY THAT GOD IS OMNISCIENT MEANS THAT IN EVERY MOMENT OF THE DIVINE LIFE GOD KNOWS EVERYTHING WHICH IS KNOWABLE AT THAT TIME. The concrete actuality is temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing. IN EACH MOMENT OF GOD’S LIFE THERE ARE NEW, UNFORESEEN HAPPENINGS IN THE WORLD WHICH ONLY THEN HAVE BECOME KNOWABLE. Hence, God’s concrete knowledge is dependent upon the decisions made by the worldly actualities” (John B. Cobb, Jr., David Ray Griffin, “Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition.” Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976, page 47).
God is “dipolar” in that there are two “components” to God: there is a component that is “unchangeable,” but this is met with a part that “is temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing.” Take the example of God’s knowledge: God knows “everything which is knowable at that time.” What does this mean exactly? Doesn’t God know everything that will ever occur at ANY time? Not with process theology. In its system, God only knows what is necessary at that moment. In this sense, God’s knowledge is “unchangeable.” However, because of “new, unforeseen happenings” that occur “in each moment of God’s life,” God gains knowledge from moment #1 to moment #2. God’s knowledge is unchanging in moment #1; between moments 1 and 2, God’s knowledge changes; once moment 2 is reached, God’s knowledge becomes “unchanging” once more.
Jay Wesley Richards sums up the “dipolar theism” of process theology nicely:
“So for Hartshorne there are two divine aspects or poles, which is why his doctrine of God is often called dipolar, in contrast to classical theism, which is monopolar. With this distinction, Hartshorne can attribute to God categorical contraries (not contradictories), while arguing that classical theism erred in attributing to God only one side of such contraries. So, for example, God as absolute, independent, externally related, atemporal, potential, necessary, infinite, simple and generic refers to God in his primordial nature. But this is only God in the abstract. In God’s consequent nature, HE IS RELATIVE (has relations), EXPERIENCING, AFFECTED, BECOMING, TEMPORAL, ACTUAL, CONTINGENT, FINITE, COMPLEX, AND INDIVIDUAL...since God is the total reality of both natures, God as a concrete actuality is always contingent because A CONJUNCTION OF A NECESSARY AND A CONTINGENT PROPOSITION IS ALWAYS CONTINGENT” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity and Immutability.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003, page 167).
While there is a nature of God that is unchanging, there is a nature that is “becoming, temporal, finite”---and this second nature (or aspect) shows that there is change in the very nature of God. As Clark Pinnock wrote in his book, “God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
As a last statement regarding process theology and Pinnock’s view in this post, let me state that the view Pinnock advocates (as well as Process Theology states) shows a close connection in thought between the views of process theology and open theism. Jay Wesley Richards writes:
“Hartshorne, by contrast, develops an intriguing ‘dipolar theism,’ which perhaps has not received the attention it deserves from either mainstream theologians or Christian philosophers. The recent movement within evangelical Christian circles called OPEN THEISM HAS SIGNIFICANT AFFINITIES WITH HARTSHORNE” (Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 20).
Yet and still, Clark Pinnock attempts to distance himself from Process Theology in his book:
“IN CONTRAST TO PROCESS THEOLOGY, God creates unnecessarily out of his love and out of his desire to share life with creatures. God does not need a world in order to love, because his very nature is social and relational” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 29).
Here, Pinnock states that God “unnecessarily” creates the world out of nothing; but, if God is “becoming,” and his very essence is (as process theology states it) “finite” and “changing,” then God creating the world was “a step up” for God because God “becomes more of a God” when He creates the world, then when He didn’t. Why? because God, by “becoming,” is “adding” something to Himself that didn’t exist before. Creating the world “added” something to God that being God prior to creation didn’t have. So how can Pinnock argue that God didn’t need to create, but then argue process theology and change in the essence of God?
It seems that Pinnock and open theists desire to distance themselves from process theologians. I understand the desire to wanna distance oneself from views that one assumes are theologically troubling. Here at the Center for Theological Studies, I constantly try to show that Classical Arminians are not Open Theist. However, I don’t see how Pinnock’s view of God’s changing essence is any different than process theology. Process theology argues change, even in God; and it also argues for theistic evolution as well. Evolution by basic definition is “change”; and when one affirms that everything “evolves” to what it is, how can the Creator God remain left out? Consistency in such a system requires that God “evolve” as well. I desire that Open Theists show me why and how, fundamentally, they are different from Process Theologians. If they expect to contend theologically, this is the homework that they cannot run away from.
Read these words from Process Theologians John Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin:
“Process theism is sometimes called ‘dipolar theism,’ in contrast to traditional theism with its doctrine of divine simplicity. For Charles Hartshorne, the two ‘poles’ or aspects of God are the abstract essence of God, on the one hand, and God’s concrete actuality on the other. The abstract essence is eternal, absolute, independent, unchangeable. It includes those abstract attributes of deity which characterize the divine existence at every moment. For example, TO SAY THAT GOD IS OMNISCIENT MEANS THAT IN EVERY MOMENT OF THE DIVINE LIFE GOD KNOWS EVERYTHING WHICH IS KNOWABLE AT THAT TIME. The concrete actuality is temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing. IN EACH MOMENT OF GOD’S LIFE THERE ARE NEW, UNFORESEEN HAPPENINGS IN THE WORLD WHICH ONLY THEN HAVE BECOME KNOWABLE. Hence, God’s concrete knowledge is dependent upon the decisions made by the worldly actualities” (John B. Cobb, Jr., David Ray Griffin, “Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition.” Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976, page 47).
God is “dipolar” in that there are two “components” to God: there is a component that is “unchangeable,” but this is met with a part that “is temporal, relative, dependent, and constantly changing.” Take the example of God’s knowledge: God knows “everything which is knowable at that time.” What does this mean exactly? Doesn’t God know everything that will ever occur at ANY time? Not with process theology. In its system, God only knows what is necessary at that moment. In this sense, God’s knowledge is “unchangeable.” However, because of “new, unforeseen happenings” that occur “in each moment of God’s life,” God gains knowledge from moment #1 to moment #2. God’s knowledge is unchanging in moment #1; between moments 1 and 2, God’s knowledge changes; once moment 2 is reached, God’s knowledge becomes “unchanging” once more.
Jay Wesley Richards sums up the “dipolar theism” of process theology nicely:
“So for Hartshorne there are two divine aspects or poles, which is why his doctrine of God is often called dipolar, in contrast to classical theism, which is monopolar. With this distinction, Hartshorne can attribute to God categorical contraries (not contradictories), while arguing that classical theism erred in attributing to God only one side of such contraries. So, for example, God as absolute, independent, externally related, atemporal, potential, necessary, infinite, simple and generic refers to God in his primordial nature. But this is only God in the abstract. In God’s consequent nature, HE IS RELATIVE (has relations), EXPERIENCING, AFFECTED, BECOMING, TEMPORAL, ACTUAL, CONTINGENT, FINITE, COMPLEX, AND INDIVIDUAL...since God is the total reality of both natures, God as a concrete actuality is always contingent because A CONJUNCTION OF A NECESSARY AND A CONTINGENT PROPOSITION IS ALWAYS CONTINGENT” (Jay Wesley Richards, “The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity and Immutability.” Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003, page 167).
While there is a nature of God that is unchanging, there is a nature that is “becoming, temporal, finite”---and this second nature (or aspect) shows that there is change in the very nature of God. As Clark Pinnock wrote in his book, “God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
As a last statement regarding process theology and Pinnock’s view in this post, let me state that the view Pinnock advocates (as well as Process Theology states) shows a close connection in thought between the views of process theology and open theism. Jay Wesley Richards writes:
“Hartshorne, by contrast, develops an intriguing ‘dipolar theism,’ which perhaps has not received the attention it deserves from either mainstream theologians or Christian philosophers. The recent movement within evangelical Christian circles called OPEN THEISM HAS SIGNIFICANT AFFINITIES WITH HARTSHORNE” (Richards, “The Untamed God,” page 20).
Yet and still, Clark Pinnock attempts to distance himself from Process Theology in his book:
“IN CONTRAST TO PROCESS THEOLOGY, God creates unnecessarily out of his love and out of his desire to share life with creatures. God does not need a world in order to love, because his very nature is social and relational” (“Most Moved Mover,” page 29).
Here, Pinnock states that God “unnecessarily” creates the world out of nothing; but, if God is “becoming,” and his very essence is (as process theology states it) “finite” and “changing,” then God creating the world was “a step up” for God because God “becomes more of a God” when He creates the world, then when He didn’t. Why? because God, by “becoming,” is “adding” something to Himself that didn’t exist before. Creating the world “added” something to God that being God prior to creation didn’t have. So how can Pinnock argue that God didn’t need to create, but then argue process theology and change in the essence of God?
It seems that Pinnock and open theists desire to distance themselves from process theologians. I understand the desire to wanna distance oneself from views that one assumes are theologically troubling. Here at the Center for Theological Studies, I constantly try to show that Classical Arminians are not Open Theist. However, I don’t see how Pinnock’s view of God’s changing essence is any different than process theology. Process theology argues change, even in God; and it also argues for theistic evolution as well. Evolution by basic definition is “change”; and when one affirms that everything “evolves” to what it is, how can the Creator God remain left out? Consistency in such a system requires that God “evolve” as well. I desire that Open Theists show me why and how, fundamentally, they are different from Process Theologians. If they expect to contend theologically, this is the homework that they cannot run away from.
Monday, August 30, 2010
"Most Moved Mover," Pt. I-B: The Conditional God
“God has sovereignly decided to make some of his actions contingent on our requests and actions. God establishes the project and elicits our collaboration in it. Hence THERE IS CONDITIONALITY IN GOD, in that he truly responds to what we do” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 5).
The words “unconditional” and “conditional” are interesting words used in the study of theology. The first time I encountered these rather “philosophical” terms was when I began to study Calvinism and Arminianism. Now, whenever someone mentions that they believe in “unconditional” election, I am always quick to ask, “What do you mean by ‘unconditional’?” Chances are, the word will be defined in one of two ways: (1) the word means that God has “no conditions” imposed on Him. In other words, God is free to do whatever He pleases. (2) the word means that God requires nothing from the person in regards to salvation. Calvinists are often quick to use the second definition; in the context of election, Calvinists are quick to say that God chooses persons for salvation without any regard to the persons themselves.
Here is how Calvinist James White defines unconditional election:
“Unconditional election is simply the recognition of the biblical teaching that God is free in the matter of salvation. He chooses to exercise mercy and grace toward undeserving creatures solely on the basis of ‘the good pleasure of His will’ (Ephesians 1:5). There is nothing in the creature that merits, earns, or attracts His favor. His election is ‘unconditional’ in that it is based solely on His purpose and His pleasure and not in anything whatsoever in the creature” (James White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, pages 91-92).
For White, “unconditional” tells us that God is free to do anything He desires to do in the world. Nothing can “force His hand” or command Him to do anything. Nothing forces itself on Him from the outside; rather, He does what He wants because of His own will from within God Himself.
Here is what Edwin Palmer had to say about “unconditional”:
“But, amazing as it may seem, divine election is always an unconditional election. GOD NEVER BASES HIS CHOICE ON WHAT MAN THINKS, SAYS, DOES, OR IS” (Edwin H. Palmer, “The Five Points of Calvinism: A Study Guide, The Enlarged Edition.” Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007, page 26).
Loraine Boettner quotes from the Westminster Confession:
“Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of His mere grace and love, WITHOUT ANY FORESIGHT OF FAITH OR GOOD WORKS, OR PERSEVERANCE IN EITHER OF THEM, OR ANY OTHER THING IN THE CREATURE, AS CONDITIONS, OR CAUSES MOVING HIM THEREUNTO; and all to the praise of His glorious grace” (Loraine Boettner, “The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination.” Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1932, page 84).
According to Boettner, God chooses some persons for salvation and glory without considering whether or not these persons will believe. Without going into too much detail, let me say that the Westminster Confession is responsible for why so many laypersons in the church believe that they can confess Christ and live like children of the devil: because their faith, or good works in the faith have nothing to do with their salvation. They were not saved because of faith (according to the Calvinist view), and they were not saved to do good works. They don’t need to do anything but trust in the fact that they are a part of the elect...and they are guaranteed salvation, regardless of their immoral lifestyles.
Here is how authors David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn define the term:
“The doctrine of election declares that God, before the foundation of the world, chose certain individuals from among the fallen members of Adam’s race to be the objects of His undeserved favor. These, and these only, He purposed to save. GOD COULD HAVE CHOSEN TO SAVE ALL MEN (FOR HE HAD THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DO SO) OR HE COULD HAVE CHOSEN TO SAVE NONE (FOR HE WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO SHOW MERCY TO ANY)---but He did neither. Instead, He chose to save some and to exclude others. His eternal choice of particular sinners for salvation was not based upon any foreseen act or response on the part of those selected, but was based solely on His own good pleasure and sovereign will. Thus, election was not determined by, or conditioned upon, anything that men would do, but resulted entirely from God’s self-determined purpose” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented, Second Edition.” Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 2004, page 27).
What I like about Steele, Thomas, and Quinn’s definition is that they argue that God does not have to do anything: God has freedom in everything that He does! And every choice that God makes is not a choice He was bound to make! God makes no choice out of necessity, but out of freedom.
Now, how does Pinnock’s quote fit into the discussion? Let’s see it again:
“God has sovereignly decided to make some of his actions contingent on our requests and actions. God establishes the project and elicits our collaboration in it. HENCE THERE IS CONDITIONALITY IN GOD, in that he truly responds to what we do” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 5).
Pinnock states it here in so many words: “there is conditionality in God.” In God’s essence, there is conditionality. If the definition of “unconditional,” referring to God’s essence, means that He never changes or is ever bound to do anything by any creature, then what does “conditionality in God” look like? I’ll tell you the answer: God’s essence becomes conditional and subject to change; in addition, God is now forced to do what He does because of creatures outside of Him. God is no longer “independent” and free to do what He wants, but “obligated” or “forced” to do what He does because of His creation. To say it bluntly, God is “dependent” upon the creature!!!
One element of conditionality within God refers to a state of change in His essence. Pinnock goes on to discuss this on the page right after he makes the above statement:
“While the creatures can be relational, God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
The “it” of the end of Pinnock’s statement refers to “God’s essence” mentioned right before it. In other words, God’s essence has to change in order for God to have real relationship with His creatures. Pinnock gets more graphic about God’s “change in essence” when he writes the following:
“Philo defined the divine essence as ‘that which is’. THIS IS A NON-RELATIONAL TERM THAT DISPLACES THE PERSONAL GOD OF THE BIBLICAL REVELATION and causes God’s attributes to acquire meanings they would not otherwise have had” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 69).
If God’s essence is not “that which is,” then God cannot be “I am that I am”; rather, God is simply “becoming.” And this is in line with Process Theology. What does Process Theology say? I will reveal Process thought and more of Pinnock’s extremely disturbing words in my next post.
The words “unconditional” and “conditional” are interesting words used in the study of theology. The first time I encountered these rather “philosophical” terms was when I began to study Calvinism and Arminianism. Now, whenever someone mentions that they believe in “unconditional” election, I am always quick to ask, “What do you mean by ‘unconditional’?” Chances are, the word will be defined in one of two ways: (1) the word means that God has “no conditions” imposed on Him. In other words, God is free to do whatever He pleases. (2) the word means that God requires nothing from the person in regards to salvation. Calvinists are often quick to use the second definition; in the context of election, Calvinists are quick to say that God chooses persons for salvation without any regard to the persons themselves.
Here is how Calvinist James White defines unconditional election:
“Unconditional election is simply the recognition of the biblical teaching that God is free in the matter of salvation. He chooses to exercise mercy and grace toward undeserving creatures solely on the basis of ‘the good pleasure of His will’ (Ephesians 1:5). There is nothing in the creature that merits, earns, or attracts His favor. His election is ‘unconditional’ in that it is based solely on His purpose and His pleasure and not in anything whatsoever in the creature” (James White, “Debating Calvinism: Five Points, Two Views.” Colorado Springs: Multnomah Books, 2004, pages 91-92).
For White, “unconditional” tells us that God is free to do anything He desires to do in the world. Nothing can “force His hand” or command Him to do anything. Nothing forces itself on Him from the outside; rather, He does what He wants because of His own will from within God Himself.
Here is what Edwin Palmer had to say about “unconditional”:
“But, amazing as it may seem, divine election is always an unconditional election. GOD NEVER BASES HIS CHOICE ON WHAT MAN THINKS, SAYS, DOES, OR IS” (Edwin H. Palmer, “The Five Points of Calvinism: A Study Guide, The Enlarged Edition.” Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007, page 26).
Loraine Boettner quotes from the Westminster Confession:
“Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of His will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of His mere grace and love, WITHOUT ANY FORESIGHT OF FAITH OR GOOD WORKS, OR PERSEVERANCE IN EITHER OF THEM, OR ANY OTHER THING IN THE CREATURE, AS CONDITIONS, OR CAUSES MOVING HIM THEREUNTO; and all to the praise of His glorious grace” (Loraine Boettner, “The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination.” Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1932, page 84).
According to Boettner, God chooses some persons for salvation and glory without considering whether or not these persons will believe. Without going into too much detail, let me say that the Westminster Confession is responsible for why so many laypersons in the church believe that they can confess Christ and live like children of the devil: because their faith, or good works in the faith have nothing to do with their salvation. They were not saved because of faith (according to the Calvinist view), and they were not saved to do good works. They don’t need to do anything but trust in the fact that they are a part of the elect...and they are guaranteed salvation, regardless of their immoral lifestyles.
Here is how authors David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn define the term:
“The doctrine of election declares that God, before the foundation of the world, chose certain individuals from among the fallen members of Adam’s race to be the objects of His undeserved favor. These, and these only, He purposed to save. GOD COULD HAVE CHOSEN TO SAVE ALL MEN (FOR HE HAD THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO DO SO) OR HE COULD HAVE CHOSEN TO SAVE NONE (FOR HE WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO SHOW MERCY TO ANY)---but He did neither. Instead, He chose to save some and to exclude others. His eternal choice of particular sinners for salvation was not based upon any foreseen act or response on the part of those selected, but was based solely on His own good pleasure and sovereign will. Thus, election was not determined by, or conditioned upon, anything that men would do, but resulted entirely from God’s self-determined purpose” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented, Second Edition.” Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 2004, page 27).
What I like about Steele, Thomas, and Quinn’s definition is that they argue that God does not have to do anything: God has freedom in everything that He does! And every choice that God makes is not a choice He was bound to make! God makes no choice out of necessity, but out of freedom.
Now, how does Pinnock’s quote fit into the discussion? Let’s see it again:
“God has sovereignly decided to make some of his actions contingent on our requests and actions. God establishes the project and elicits our collaboration in it. HENCE THERE IS CONDITIONALITY IN GOD, in that he truly responds to what we do” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 5).
Pinnock states it here in so many words: “there is conditionality in God.” In God’s essence, there is conditionality. If the definition of “unconditional,” referring to God’s essence, means that He never changes or is ever bound to do anything by any creature, then what does “conditionality in God” look like? I’ll tell you the answer: God’s essence becomes conditional and subject to change; in addition, God is now forced to do what He does because of creatures outside of Him. God is no longer “independent” and free to do what He wants, but “obligated” or “forced” to do what He does because of His creation. To say it bluntly, God is “dependent” upon the creature!!!
One element of conditionality within God refers to a state of change in His essence. Pinnock goes on to discuss this on the page right after he makes the above statement:
“While the creatures can be relational, God’s essence cannot be involved in real relationships with a changing world, LEST IT CHANGE TOO” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 6).
The “it” of the end of Pinnock’s statement refers to “God’s essence” mentioned right before it. In other words, God’s essence has to change in order for God to have real relationship with His creatures. Pinnock gets more graphic about God’s “change in essence” when he writes the following:
“Philo defined the divine essence as ‘that which is’. THIS IS A NON-RELATIONAL TERM THAT DISPLACES THE PERSONAL GOD OF THE BIBLICAL REVELATION and causes God’s attributes to acquire meanings they would not otherwise have had” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 69).
If God’s essence is not “that which is,” then God cannot be “I am that I am”; rather, God is simply “becoming.” And this is in line with Process Theology. What does Process Theology say? I will reveal Process thought and more of Pinnock’s extremely disturbing words in my next post.
Sunday, August 29, 2010
"Most Moved Mover," Pt. I: Aquinas in Reverse
“God is not dead, but some of the ways we have presented God are dead. By distancing God so far from the world and from human affairs, theology has prepared the way for secularism and atheism. Of course, the living God is not dead. He is the God of the Bible, the one who is genuinely related to the world, whose nature is the power of love and whose relationship with the world is that of a most moved, not unmoved, Mover” (Clark H. Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001, page 3).
This post will start a new series here at the Center for Theological Studies (CTS). For those of you who may not know, Dr. Clark H. Pinnock, Open Theist theologian from McMaster Divinity College in Hamilton, Ontario, died August 15, 2010 at the age of 73 from alzheimer’s disease. I learned about Dr. Pinnock while taking an introduction to Christian Theology under Dr. Ken Keathley, author of “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach.”
Dr. Pinnock was formerly a five-point Calvinist, conservative Southern Baptist, and former professor at New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was once mentor to the “bulldog” of Southern Baptist life and leader in the Conservative Resurgence, Dr. Paige Patterson. Pinnock later abandoned five-point Calvinism, left Southern Baptist life, and advocated openness theology. My desire to read Pinnock’s work these days is due to a desire I’ve always had to study Openness Theology (Open Theism). While most evangelicals (me included) believe that Open Theism hinges (if not swims) in heresy, I still believe that Openness Theology should be read, examined, and given a fair hearing. For those who wanna read more on Clark Pinnock’s life, see his own “Grace of God, Will of Man” as well as his other books. According to the cover of the book I will discuss for the next several posts, Pinnock “has authored, edited, or coauthored fifteen books.” Google searches can even be done to discover more about the man himself.
Starting with this post, I will discuss Clark Pinnock’s book, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” This post will serve as an introduction to the series. In other words, I hope to show via the three most important words of the title, “Most Moved Mover,” what the readership can expect from Pinnock’s work.
The title “Most Moved Mover” (for those of you who may not know) is a reference to Aquinas’s labeling of God in his work, “Summa Contra Gentiles.” We find Aquinas’s classification of God in Book One (“God”) of the Summa Contra. Aquinas writes as follows:
“Everything that is moved is moved by another. That some things are in motion---for example, the sun---is evident from sense. Therefore, it is moved by something else that moves it. This mover is itself either moved or not moved. If it is not, we have reached our conclusion---namely, that we must posit SOME UNMOVED MOVER. THIS WE CALL GOD. If it is moved, it is moved by another mover. We must, consequently, either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we must posit some prime unmoved mover” (Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God.” Translated by Anton C. Pegis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, page 86).
Aquinas’s words show us that everything that moves is moved by something else. Why, for example, does a ball roll? It rolls because someone “pushed” the ball and set it into physical motion. The ball did not possess the ability within itself to set itself into motion. If the object must be acted upon before it can move, then it cannot move itself. Only self-moveable objects are able to both stand still and move themselves into motion.
So, what do we do with a chain of motion, ball #1 rolling into ball #2, ball #2 then rolling into ball #3, #3 then rolling into #4...etc? Usually, we desire to find the origin or cause of the motion. We must then retrace our steps: how did ball #4 come into motion? Because of ball #3; #3 was pushed into motion by #2, and #2 was pushed by ball #1. But what pushed ball #1 into motion? The person. Someone had to push the first ball into motion, before the other balls (2, 3, 4) even started to roll. Therefore, the person is the cause of the motion. Since the person pushed the other balls into motion, the person becomes the “mover” of the rolling balls...and, since he or she was not pushed into motion, the person becomes the “unmoved mover.”
What Aquinas was getting at is the idea of the origin of life. Everything on earth that we see was brought into motion by something or someone. Whatever that “something” or “someone” is, it cannot be identical to the creation itself. In some sense, the origin of life itself must be superior to, and separate from, the creation. In Aquinas’s theology, we call this “Unmoved Mover” GOD!
But notice the title of Pinnock’s work: “Most Moved Mover.” The question now becomes, what are the implications of Pinnock’s title in relation to God? Aquinas labeled God the “Unmoved Mover,” referring to the fact that God sets things into motion (“mover”), while not being moved by anything Himself (“Unmoved”). What does Pinnock mean by his labeling of God as the “Most Moved Mover”? First, God sets things into motion (“mover”), but GOD HIMSELF IS SET INTO MOTION (“moved”); and finally, to make matters worse, GOD IS SET INTO MOTION BY THINGS THAT ARE ALSO SET INTO MOTION. In short, God is the most inferior of all objects set into motion. Two other objects are superior to Him (which is why He is “most moved”). As a result, the Creator now becomes “a most inferior creation” instead of “a most superior Creator.” In other words, we have the exact reversal of Thomas Aquinas! WOW! Lord, have mercy on us all...
In case my critique of Pinnock does not seem fair, read his words regarding Aquinas:
“The parable (Lk. 15:11-32) dramatizes the truth of the open view of God: he is a loving person who seeks freely chosen relationships of love with his creatures; HE IS NOT A PILLAR AROUND WHICH EVERYTHING MOVES (THOMAS AQUINAS)...” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 4).
In another place, Pinnock critiques Thomism (philosophical and theological system of Thomas Aquinas) as a whole:
“Conventional theism is not a single model but comes in different versions. Thomism, for example, places emphasis on God’s immutability AND MUST BE CRITICIZED FOR THREATENING REAL RELATIONSHIPS...” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 8)
Now, I must admit: there is a problem with some of the implications of Thomist philosophy that have entered evangelicalism today; however, the philosophy itself just makes plain sense. God cannot be the “most moved mover,” even if that means God is less “relational” than you or I would like Him to be. If God really is what Pinnock calls Him (“Most Moved Mover”), then He is ANYTHING but the God of the Bible. Pinnock’s God, in such a case, would be inferior to Aquinas’s God because, at the very least, Aquinas does not have to eradicate God’s sovereignty to make room for the kind of divine-human relationships that Openness Theology demands.
For those who prepare to read this book, I wanna warn you: proceed with caution. Nevertheless, the book will mention quite a few issues that openness theology has with Classical Arminianism. Still, though, at the end of the day, I think Classical Arminians are more orthodox in their theology. The day that we convert to Open Theism, Lord have mercy on us all...Lord, have mercy, on us all.
This post will start a new series here at the Center for Theological Studies (CTS). For those of you who may not know, Dr. Clark H. Pinnock, Open Theist theologian from McMaster Divinity College in Hamilton, Ontario, died August 15, 2010 at the age of 73 from alzheimer’s disease. I learned about Dr. Pinnock while taking an introduction to Christian Theology under Dr. Ken Keathley, author of “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach.”
Dr. Pinnock was formerly a five-point Calvinist, conservative Southern Baptist, and former professor at New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was once mentor to the “bulldog” of Southern Baptist life and leader in the Conservative Resurgence, Dr. Paige Patterson. Pinnock later abandoned five-point Calvinism, left Southern Baptist life, and advocated openness theology. My desire to read Pinnock’s work these days is due to a desire I’ve always had to study Openness Theology (Open Theism). While most evangelicals (me included) believe that Open Theism hinges (if not swims) in heresy, I still believe that Openness Theology should be read, examined, and given a fair hearing. For those who wanna read more on Clark Pinnock’s life, see his own “Grace of God, Will of Man” as well as his other books. According to the cover of the book I will discuss for the next several posts, Pinnock “has authored, edited, or coauthored fifteen books.” Google searches can even be done to discover more about the man himself.
Starting with this post, I will discuss Clark Pinnock’s book, “Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness.” This post will serve as an introduction to the series. In other words, I hope to show via the three most important words of the title, “Most Moved Mover,” what the readership can expect from Pinnock’s work.
The title “Most Moved Mover” (for those of you who may not know) is a reference to Aquinas’s labeling of God in his work, “Summa Contra Gentiles.” We find Aquinas’s classification of God in Book One (“God”) of the Summa Contra. Aquinas writes as follows:
“Everything that is moved is moved by another. That some things are in motion---for example, the sun---is evident from sense. Therefore, it is moved by something else that moves it. This mover is itself either moved or not moved. If it is not, we have reached our conclusion---namely, that we must posit SOME UNMOVED MOVER. THIS WE CALL GOD. If it is moved, it is moved by another mover. We must, consequently, either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we must posit some prime unmoved mover” (Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God.” Translated by Anton C. Pegis. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, page 86).
Aquinas’s words show us that everything that moves is moved by something else. Why, for example, does a ball roll? It rolls because someone “pushed” the ball and set it into physical motion. The ball did not possess the ability within itself to set itself into motion. If the object must be acted upon before it can move, then it cannot move itself. Only self-moveable objects are able to both stand still and move themselves into motion.
So, what do we do with a chain of motion, ball #1 rolling into ball #2, ball #2 then rolling into ball #3, #3 then rolling into #4...etc? Usually, we desire to find the origin or cause of the motion. We must then retrace our steps: how did ball #4 come into motion? Because of ball #3; #3 was pushed into motion by #2, and #2 was pushed by ball #1. But what pushed ball #1 into motion? The person. Someone had to push the first ball into motion, before the other balls (2, 3, 4) even started to roll. Therefore, the person is the cause of the motion. Since the person pushed the other balls into motion, the person becomes the “mover” of the rolling balls...and, since he or she was not pushed into motion, the person becomes the “unmoved mover.”
What Aquinas was getting at is the idea of the origin of life. Everything on earth that we see was brought into motion by something or someone. Whatever that “something” or “someone” is, it cannot be identical to the creation itself. In some sense, the origin of life itself must be superior to, and separate from, the creation. In Aquinas’s theology, we call this “Unmoved Mover” GOD!
But notice the title of Pinnock’s work: “Most Moved Mover.” The question now becomes, what are the implications of Pinnock’s title in relation to God? Aquinas labeled God the “Unmoved Mover,” referring to the fact that God sets things into motion (“mover”), while not being moved by anything Himself (“Unmoved”). What does Pinnock mean by his labeling of God as the “Most Moved Mover”? First, God sets things into motion (“mover”), but GOD HIMSELF IS SET INTO MOTION (“moved”); and finally, to make matters worse, GOD IS SET INTO MOTION BY THINGS THAT ARE ALSO SET INTO MOTION. In short, God is the most inferior of all objects set into motion. Two other objects are superior to Him (which is why He is “most moved”). As a result, the Creator now becomes “a most inferior creation” instead of “a most superior Creator.” In other words, we have the exact reversal of Thomas Aquinas! WOW! Lord, have mercy on us all...
In case my critique of Pinnock does not seem fair, read his words regarding Aquinas:
“The parable (Lk. 15:11-32) dramatizes the truth of the open view of God: he is a loving person who seeks freely chosen relationships of love with his creatures; HE IS NOT A PILLAR AROUND WHICH EVERYTHING MOVES (THOMAS AQUINAS)...” (Clark Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 4).
In another place, Pinnock critiques Thomism (philosophical and theological system of Thomas Aquinas) as a whole:
“Conventional theism is not a single model but comes in different versions. Thomism, for example, places emphasis on God’s immutability AND MUST BE CRITICIZED FOR THREATENING REAL RELATIONSHIPS...” (Pinnock, “Most Moved Mover,” page 8)
Now, I must admit: there is a problem with some of the implications of Thomist philosophy that have entered evangelicalism today; however, the philosophy itself just makes plain sense. God cannot be the “most moved mover,” even if that means God is less “relational” than you or I would like Him to be. If God really is what Pinnock calls Him (“Most Moved Mover”), then He is ANYTHING but the God of the Bible. Pinnock’s God, in such a case, would be inferior to Aquinas’s God because, at the very least, Aquinas does not have to eradicate God’s sovereignty to make room for the kind of divine-human relationships that Openness Theology demands.
For those who prepare to read this book, I wanna warn you: proceed with caution. Nevertheless, the book will mention quite a few issues that openness theology has with Classical Arminianism. Still, though, at the end of the day, I think Classical Arminians are more orthodox in their theology. The day that we convert to Open Theism, Lord have mercy on us all...Lord, have mercy, on us all.
Friday, August 27, 2010
Syncretism Theology: The Modern Church's Molinist View of Perseverance
Syncretism is defined in the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary as “the combination of different forms of belief or practice.” In this definition, we see the phrase “different forms,” which tells us that these ideas that are newly combined were not combined originally. Before their combination, such ideas were separate and distinct.
Ideas such as the points of Calvinism and Arminianism made the two systems separate and distinct. Within Calvinism, one can choose to be a Classical Calvinist (five-point Calvinist), an Amyraldian (four-point Calvinist), or a Molinist (three-point Calvinist). Within Arminianism, a person can be a Classical Arminian (five-point), a four-point Arminian, and even a three-point Arminian; the four-point Arminians and three-point Arminians can be labeled “Molinists.” In any case, Calvinism and Arminianism were distinct systems with their distinct views on the five points of depravity, election, atonement, grace, and perseverance.
But today’s Calvinists and Arminians (and even some Molinists) have embraced views within their systems that are foreign to the systems themselves; in other words, they have begun to syncretize their theologies with ideas from opposing theologies, such that the systems themselves hardly look distinct anymore. Take for example, the beliefs of William Lane Craig. Craig is a phenomenal apologist for the Christian faith, and his book “Reasonable Faith” is one of the best apologetics works out there in academia today. However, Craig calls himself a Molinist, while claiming to hold to “conditional election.” The problem with this is that Molina himself never held to conditional election. As Kirk MacGregor notes in his “Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,”
“In book seven of the ‘Concordia,’ Molina queries ‘whether the cause of predestination may be ascribed to the part of the predestinate’ and ‘whether the cause of reprobation may be ascribed to the part of the reprobate.’ Contra those who follow ‘the errors of Origen and Pelagius,’ he answers both questions decidedly in the negative. On the basis of the Pauline statement, ‘Before the twins were born or had done anything good or evil...not by works but by him who calls...[God said,] Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated’ (Rom. 9:11-13), Molina declares that ‘foreseen faith cannot be the ground of justification or predestination,’ as affirming otherwise would undermine the prima facie implication that God’s decree to elect Jacob and reprobate Esau did not take into account their future good or evil works” (Luis de Molina, “Concordia,” 7.23.4—5.1, 5.2, 5.4; Kirk R. MacGregor, “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology.” Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007, pages 66-67).
Molina, then, held to “unconditional” election; why then, does Craig hold to “conditional election,” while still calling himself a Molinist? No one knows.
But Craig is not alone in his syncretism of theological ideas; much of the modern-day church could join him. Most Calvinists, although holding to Calvin’s theology, actually advocate a view of perseverance that does not fit within Calvinism itself.
John Calvin, the founder of what is known as “Calvinism” (named after him), explained the rocky soil in the Parable of the Sower (Luke 8, Mark 4, Matthew 13) as that soil to which God only gave temporary faith. In his commentary on Hebrews 6:4, Calvin writes,
“But here arises a new question, how can it be that he who has once made such a progress should afterwards fall away? For God, it may be said, calls none effectually but the elect, and Paul testifies that they are really his sons who are led by his Spirit, (Romans 8:14;) and he teaches us, that it is a sure pledge of adoption when Christ makes us partakers of his Spirit. The elect are also beyond the danger of finally falling away; for the Father who gave them to be preserved by Christ his Son is greater than all, and Christ promises to watch over them all so that none may perish. To all this I answer, That God indeed favors none but the elect alone with the Spirit of regeneration, and that by this they are distinguished from the reprobate; for they are renewed after his image and receive the earnest of the Spirit in hope of the future inheritance, and by the same Spirit the Gospel is sealed in their hearts. But I cannot admit that all this is any reason why he should not grant the reprobate also some taste of his grace, why he should not irradiate their minds with some sparks of his light, why he should not give them some perception of his goodness, and in some sort engrave his word on their hearts. Otherwise, where would be the temporal faith mentioned by Mark 4:17? There is therefore some knowledge even in the reprobate, which afterwards vanishes away, either because it did not strike roots sufficiently deep, or because it withers, being choked up.” (http://www.biblestudyguide.org/comment/calvin/comm_vol44/htm/xii.ii.htm)
Calvin’s words above make it clear that he believed God even gives “temporal” or “temporary” faith to some of the reprobate, such that they become the “temporary elect.” In Calvin’s thought, there were two types of elect: the eternally elect and the temporary elect...and everyone who is “elect” isn’t necessarily the eternally elect. But what is the view of today’s Calvinists? David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn write:
“The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints does not maintain that all who profess the Christian faith are certain of heaven...many who profess to believe fall away, but THEY DO NOT FALL FROM GRACE, FOR THEY WERE NEVER IN GRACE” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented,” Second Edition. Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2004, page 64).
According to Dr. Ken Keathley, even Wayne Grudem holds to what is called the “Evidence of Genuineness” position (see Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty,” page 178). Here is a classic quote from Wayne Grudem’s chapter, titled “Perseverance of the Saints: A Case Study from the Warning Passages in Hebrews”:
“Therefore, confining our attention to the Book of Hebrews itself, and examining 6:4-6 in its immediate and broader context within the book, leads us to the conclusion that the people in this passage who experienced many blessings and then fell away HAD NEVER TRULY BEEN SAVED IN THE FIRST PLACE” (Wayne Grudem, “Perseverance of the Saints: A Case Study from the Warning Passages in Hebrews”; from “Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace” by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, eds. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000, pages 172-173).
Loraine Boettner echoes this sentiment:
“Some fall away from a profession of faith, but NONE FALL AWAY FROM THE SAVING GRACE OF GOD. Those who do fall have never known the latter. THEY ARE THE STONY-GROUND HEARERS, WHO HAVE NO ROOT IN THEMSELVES, BUT WHO ENDURE FOR A WHILE; AND WHEN TRIBULATION OR PERSECUTION ARISES, STRAIGHTWAY THEY STUMBLE. THEY ARE THEN SAID TO HAVE GIVEN UP OR TO HAVE MADE SHIPWRECK OF THAT FAITH WHICH THEY NEVER POSSESSED EXCEPT IN APPEARANCE. Some of these become sufficiently enlightened in the scheme of the doctrines of the Gospel that they are able to preach or to teach them to others, and yet are themselves entirely destitute of real saving grace. WHEN SUCH FALL AWAY THEY ARE NO PROOFS NOR INSTANCES OF THE FINAL APOSTASY OF REAL SAINTS” (“The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination” by Loraine Boettner. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1932, page 191).
David Steele, Curtis Thomas, S. Lance Quinn, Wayne Grudem, and Loraine Boettner, all Calvinists, do not hold to Calvin’s view of faith as being eternal and temporary; rather, those who do not endure to the end, in their opinion, never had faith at all. This is a departure from Calvin’s thought regarding apostasy. But it does, however, fit the Molinist view of perseverance. Ken Keathley writes:
“The Evidence-of-Genuiness position, traditionally understood as the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, agrees with the Once-Saved-Always-Saved view that the believer’s salvation is eternally secure. They also agree that good works are not necessary to procure salvation. However, unlike those who advocate the doctrine of eternal security, the advocates of the Evidence-of-Genuineness position contend that the fruits of salvation will necessarily and eventually manifest themselves in the life of a believer” (Ken Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach.” Nashville: B&H Academic, 2010, page 177).
In Keathley’s definition of the Molinist view on perseverance, we see elements like the Calvinist view, and elements that are foreign (not native) to the Calvinist view. The Molinist position agrees with Calvinism in that “the believer’s salvation is eternally secure.” Having said this, Keathley makes it clear that Molinists hold to eternal security. This is a Calvinist belief. In contrast, though, Keathley does differ from the Calvinist perspective when he states that “the fruits of salvation will necessarily and eventually manifest themselves in the life of a believer.” The Calvinist position does not argue for works as being necessary in the life of the believer; rather, a person is eternally secure by trusting that he or she will receive eternal life because God promises it to those who believe. In the words of Keathley,
“According to this view [Once Saved, Always Saved], assurance of salvation comes only by trusting the promises of the Word of God. The believer should manifest the fruit of salvation, but there is no guarantee that he will. At best, works provide a secondary, confirmatory function” (Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty,” page 176).
In the Calvinist system, fruit of salvation may or may not exist, but what matters most is the promise of God to grant salvation to all who believe. In the Molinist system, while there is that decree of “unconditional election,” and the guarantee of eternal life, there is still a need for the fruit (evidence) of salvation. Hence, we see the Calvinist idea of guarantee and unconditional election coupled with the Arminian view of the necessity of good works in the life of the believer.
And Dr. Keathley’s view is the view I hear most about today. Even those who label themselves Calvinists (not just Calvinist theologians, but laypersons) espouse a Molinist view on perseverance without even knowing it. While this does wonders to push people towards the Molinist view, it begins to blur the lines of distinction between the theologies of Calvin and Molina. But these two men had two different theologies; and failure to preserve theological distinctions will lead to the destruction of Calvinism as a theological system. And for Arminians, failure to adhere to five-point Arminianism will lead to a destruction of the Arminian system as well.
Despite attempts to push a Calvinist resurgence, the modern-day church still has a little Arminianism within its veins. Truth be told, I think there is a little Arminianism in all of us...
Ideas such as the points of Calvinism and Arminianism made the two systems separate and distinct. Within Calvinism, one can choose to be a Classical Calvinist (five-point Calvinist), an Amyraldian (four-point Calvinist), or a Molinist (three-point Calvinist). Within Arminianism, a person can be a Classical Arminian (five-point), a four-point Arminian, and even a three-point Arminian; the four-point Arminians and three-point Arminians can be labeled “Molinists.” In any case, Calvinism and Arminianism were distinct systems with their distinct views on the five points of depravity, election, atonement, grace, and perseverance.
But today’s Calvinists and Arminians (and even some Molinists) have embraced views within their systems that are foreign to the systems themselves; in other words, they have begun to syncretize their theologies with ideas from opposing theologies, such that the systems themselves hardly look distinct anymore. Take for example, the beliefs of William Lane Craig. Craig is a phenomenal apologist for the Christian faith, and his book “Reasonable Faith” is one of the best apologetics works out there in academia today. However, Craig calls himself a Molinist, while claiming to hold to “conditional election.” The problem with this is that Molina himself never held to conditional election. As Kirk MacGregor notes in his “Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology,”
“In book seven of the ‘Concordia,’ Molina queries ‘whether the cause of predestination may be ascribed to the part of the predestinate’ and ‘whether the cause of reprobation may be ascribed to the part of the reprobate.’ Contra those who follow ‘the errors of Origen and Pelagius,’ he answers both questions decidedly in the negative. On the basis of the Pauline statement, ‘Before the twins were born or had done anything good or evil...not by works but by him who calls...[God said,] Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated’ (Rom. 9:11-13), Molina declares that ‘foreseen faith cannot be the ground of justification or predestination,’ as affirming otherwise would undermine the prima facie implication that God’s decree to elect Jacob and reprobate Esau did not take into account their future good or evil works” (Luis de Molina, “Concordia,” 7.23.4—5.1, 5.2, 5.4; Kirk R. MacGregor, “A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology.” Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007, pages 66-67).
Molina, then, held to “unconditional” election; why then, does Craig hold to “conditional election,” while still calling himself a Molinist? No one knows.
But Craig is not alone in his syncretism of theological ideas; much of the modern-day church could join him. Most Calvinists, although holding to Calvin’s theology, actually advocate a view of perseverance that does not fit within Calvinism itself.
John Calvin, the founder of what is known as “Calvinism” (named after him), explained the rocky soil in the Parable of the Sower (Luke 8, Mark 4, Matthew 13) as that soil to which God only gave temporary faith. In his commentary on Hebrews 6:4, Calvin writes,
“But here arises a new question, how can it be that he who has once made such a progress should afterwards fall away? For God, it may be said, calls none effectually but the elect, and Paul testifies that they are really his sons who are led by his Spirit, (Romans 8:14;) and he teaches us, that it is a sure pledge of adoption when Christ makes us partakers of his Spirit. The elect are also beyond the danger of finally falling away; for the Father who gave them to be preserved by Christ his Son is greater than all, and Christ promises to watch over them all so that none may perish. To all this I answer, That God indeed favors none but the elect alone with the Spirit of regeneration, and that by this they are distinguished from the reprobate; for they are renewed after his image and receive the earnest of the Spirit in hope of the future inheritance, and by the same Spirit the Gospel is sealed in their hearts. But I cannot admit that all this is any reason why he should not grant the reprobate also some taste of his grace, why he should not irradiate their minds with some sparks of his light, why he should not give them some perception of his goodness, and in some sort engrave his word on their hearts. Otherwise, where would be the temporal faith mentioned by Mark 4:17? There is therefore some knowledge even in the reprobate, which afterwards vanishes away, either because it did not strike roots sufficiently deep, or because it withers, being choked up.” (http://www.biblestudyguide.org/comment/calvin/comm_vol44/htm/xii.ii.htm)
Calvin’s words above make it clear that he believed God even gives “temporal” or “temporary” faith to some of the reprobate, such that they become the “temporary elect.” In Calvin’s thought, there were two types of elect: the eternally elect and the temporary elect...and everyone who is “elect” isn’t necessarily the eternally elect. But what is the view of today’s Calvinists? David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn write:
“The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints does not maintain that all who profess the Christian faith are certain of heaven...many who profess to believe fall away, but THEY DO NOT FALL FROM GRACE, FOR THEY WERE NEVER IN GRACE” (David Steele, Curtis Thomas, and S. Lance Quinn, “The Five Points of Calvinism: Defined, Defended, and Documented,” Second Edition. Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2004, page 64).
According to Dr. Ken Keathley, even Wayne Grudem holds to what is called the “Evidence of Genuineness” position (see Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty,” page 178). Here is a classic quote from Wayne Grudem’s chapter, titled “Perseverance of the Saints: A Case Study from the Warning Passages in Hebrews”:
“Therefore, confining our attention to the Book of Hebrews itself, and examining 6:4-6 in its immediate and broader context within the book, leads us to the conclusion that the people in this passage who experienced many blessings and then fell away HAD NEVER TRULY BEEN SAVED IN THE FIRST PLACE” (Wayne Grudem, “Perseverance of the Saints: A Case Study from the Warning Passages in Hebrews”; from “Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace” by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, eds. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000, pages 172-173).
Loraine Boettner echoes this sentiment:
“Some fall away from a profession of faith, but NONE FALL AWAY FROM THE SAVING GRACE OF GOD. Those who do fall have never known the latter. THEY ARE THE STONY-GROUND HEARERS, WHO HAVE NO ROOT IN THEMSELVES, BUT WHO ENDURE FOR A WHILE; AND WHEN TRIBULATION OR PERSECUTION ARISES, STRAIGHTWAY THEY STUMBLE. THEY ARE THEN SAID TO HAVE GIVEN UP OR TO HAVE MADE SHIPWRECK OF THAT FAITH WHICH THEY NEVER POSSESSED EXCEPT IN APPEARANCE. Some of these become sufficiently enlightened in the scheme of the doctrines of the Gospel that they are able to preach or to teach them to others, and yet are themselves entirely destitute of real saving grace. WHEN SUCH FALL AWAY THEY ARE NO PROOFS NOR INSTANCES OF THE FINAL APOSTASY OF REAL SAINTS” (“The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination” by Loraine Boettner. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1932, page 191).
David Steele, Curtis Thomas, S. Lance Quinn, Wayne Grudem, and Loraine Boettner, all Calvinists, do not hold to Calvin’s view of faith as being eternal and temporary; rather, those who do not endure to the end, in their opinion, never had faith at all. This is a departure from Calvin’s thought regarding apostasy. But it does, however, fit the Molinist view of perseverance. Ken Keathley writes:
“The Evidence-of-Genuiness position, traditionally understood as the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, agrees with the Once-Saved-Always-Saved view that the believer’s salvation is eternally secure. They also agree that good works are not necessary to procure salvation. However, unlike those who advocate the doctrine of eternal security, the advocates of the Evidence-of-Genuineness position contend that the fruits of salvation will necessarily and eventually manifest themselves in the life of a believer” (Ken Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach.” Nashville: B&H Academic, 2010, page 177).
In Keathley’s definition of the Molinist view on perseverance, we see elements like the Calvinist view, and elements that are foreign (not native) to the Calvinist view. The Molinist position agrees with Calvinism in that “the believer’s salvation is eternally secure.” Having said this, Keathley makes it clear that Molinists hold to eternal security. This is a Calvinist belief. In contrast, though, Keathley does differ from the Calvinist perspective when he states that “the fruits of salvation will necessarily and eventually manifest themselves in the life of a believer.” The Calvinist position does not argue for works as being necessary in the life of the believer; rather, a person is eternally secure by trusting that he or she will receive eternal life because God promises it to those who believe. In the words of Keathley,
“According to this view [Once Saved, Always Saved], assurance of salvation comes only by trusting the promises of the Word of God. The believer should manifest the fruit of salvation, but there is no guarantee that he will. At best, works provide a secondary, confirmatory function” (Keathley, “Salvation and Sovereignty,” page 176).
In the Calvinist system, fruit of salvation may or may not exist, but what matters most is the promise of God to grant salvation to all who believe. In the Molinist system, while there is that decree of “unconditional election,” and the guarantee of eternal life, there is still a need for the fruit (evidence) of salvation. Hence, we see the Calvinist idea of guarantee and unconditional election coupled with the Arminian view of the necessity of good works in the life of the believer.
And Dr. Keathley’s view is the view I hear most about today. Even those who label themselves Calvinists (not just Calvinist theologians, but laypersons) espouse a Molinist view on perseverance without even knowing it. While this does wonders to push people towards the Molinist view, it begins to blur the lines of distinction between the theologies of Calvin and Molina. But these two men had two different theologies; and failure to preserve theological distinctions will lead to the destruction of Calvinism as a theological system. And for Arminians, failure to adhere to five-point Arminianism will lead to a destruction of the Arminian system as well.
Despite attempts to push a Calvinist resurgence, the modern-day church still has a little Arminianism within its veins. Truth be told, I think there is a little Arminianism in all of us...
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
Pouring on the Rhetoric, Pt. III: The Logical Ordering of Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Salvation
“I often ask my Arminian friends why they are Christians and other people are not. They say it is because they believe in Christ while others do not. Then I inquire why they believe and others do not? ‘Is it because you are more righteous than the person who abides in unbelief?’ They are quick to say no. ‘Is it because you are more intelligent?’ Again the reply is negative. They say that God is gracious enough to offer salvation to all who believe and that one cannot be saved without that grace. But this grace is cooperative grace. Man in his fallen state must reach out and grasp this grace by an act of the will, which is free to accept or reject this grace. Some exercise the will rightly (or righteously), while others do not. When pressed on this point, the Arminian finds it difficult to escape the conclusion that ultimately his salvation rests on some righteous act of the will he has performed. He has ‘in effect’ merited the merit of Christ, which differs only slightly from the view of Rome” (R.C. Sproul, “Willing to Believe: The Controversy Over Free Will,” Fifth Edition. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2007, page 26).
I’ve dealt with the Calvinist idea that “faith is a meritorious work” here at the Center for Theological Studies. In this post, however, where I will differ from most posts that contain a quote similar to R.C. Sproul’s above is that I will spend far less time on defending faith as a response to the merit of Christ, and more time on the concepts of divine sovereignty and human responsibility and their roles in salvation. The concepts of divine sovereignty and human responsibility are both affirmed by the Scriptures; and a sound theology will properly incorporate both into its system without negating, diminishing, or nullifying the other.
From the outset, Sproul’s belief that faith is “to merit the merit of Christ” shows his view of the relationship between the concepts of sovereignty and responsibility: that is, that sovereignty brings about salvation, while responsibility acts post-salvation to confirm new life in Christ (regeneration). In other words, divine sovereignty is SOLELY responsible for a person’s salvation: one is either saved or unsaved because of the choice of God. God saves some and damns others, and He does so because of His own choosing. One’s responsibility does not “kick in” until a person is regenerated.
There is a problem here, though: what do we do with the person who does not believe? If a person does not gain responsibility for accepting Christ until “after” they are already saved, does the unsaved person bear any responsibility? To affirm Sproul’s scheme above would mean that those who are unsaved find themselves in unbelief because of God’s sovereignty. God then becomes guilty of unconditional reprobation (which is something that moderate Calvinists shy away from), and the sinner has no responsibility.
Next, the idea of being saved (regenerated) before belief is contrary to the
Scriptures themselves. What about Romans 10:9, for example? The verse does not read, “if one is first saved, then one shall confess and believe”; rather, the verse says, “If one shall confess and believe, then one shall be saved.” To affirm regeneration before faith would “put the cart before the horse” in salvation, so to speak.
Last but not least, to affirm Sproul’s view that regeneration (salvation) precedes faith would mean that divine sovereignty and human responsibility do not work together, but apart; that is, that God requires nothing of the individual to be saved. But what about Paul’s words in Romans 4 that “Abraham believed God”? What about Jesus’ distinction that the one who believes is saved but the one who does not believe is condemned (John 3:16-18)? Surely, God requires the individual to profess faith! If God does not, then the Bible is nothing more than a book of mass deceit.
Let’s explore Sproul’s view of regeneration before faith a little more. Were Adam and Eve responsible in the Garden to obey God’s commands? Yes; and the fact that they did not is what forced them to flee the Garden and guaranteed for them spiritual and physical death. Did man ever lose his responsibility to his Maker after the fall in the Garden (Gen. 3)? No. Despite the fact that man fell from the grace of God, he still had the human responsibility to obey God...even though he could not obey God without the aid of divine grace. So, up until the moment of salvation, man still has human responsibility. If human responsibility exists before regeneration (which it does), then Sproul’s scheme cannot fit: for how can responsibility (professing faith) come after salvation, if human responsibility already exists “before” salvation? Responsibility cannot come into existence before and after salvation simultaneously. One must win: either responsibility exists before salvation, and man is responsible for professing faith...or, responsibility is absent until salvation, and the unsaved man is not responsible for his unbelief. Calvinists cannot have it both ways. Here is a simple syllogism:
#1) Regeneration brings the responsibility of professing faith (Calvinism)
#2) the unsaved are those who are not regenerated
#3) then the unsaved do not have the responsibility of professing faith
As a result, the unsaved bear no responsibility whatsoever for their unbelief and thus, lack of salvation. They are unsaved because of God: God is responsible for their eternal damnation. But why then, does Jesus say that “he that believes not is condemned already” (John 3:18), if what He really meant was “he that is not regenerated to believe is condemned already”? That’s a question that Calvinists cannot shy away from.
Divine sovereignty and human responsibility are two biblically-cherished concepts. The Bible does not nullify or exclude either concept. But I fear that Calvinism does nullify and eliminate human responsibility...and replaces human responsibility with “divine responsibility.” But the Bible never tells me that God “makes” me believe. Rather, what it tells me is that the Spirit draws me (John 6:44) to the truth of the Gospel and that I believe because I exercise the grace and faith that are given to me by God (Eph. 1:13; 2:8-9). I’ll leave it to you to decide which camp (Calvinism or Arminianism) is most faithful to Scripture.
I’ve dealt with the Calvinist idea that “faith is a meritorious work” here at the Center for Theological Studies. In this post, however, where I will differ from most posts that contain a quote similar to R.C. Sproul’s above is that I will spend far less time on defending faith as a response to the merit of Christ, and more time on the concepts of divine sovereignty and human responsibility and their roles in salvation. The concepts of divine sovereignty and human responsibility are both affirmed by the Scriptures; and a sound theology will properly incorporate both into its system without negating, diminishing, or nullifying the other.
From the outset, Sproul’s belief that faith is “to merit the merit of Christ” shows his view of the relationship between the concepts of sovereignty and responsibility: that is, that sovereignty brings about salvation, while responsibility acts post-salvation to confirm new life in Christ (regeneration). In other words, divine sovereignty is SOLELY responsible for a person’s salvation: one is either saved or unsaved because of the choice of God. God saves some and damns others, and He does so because of His own choosing. One’s responsibility does not “kick in” until a person is regenerated.
There is a problem here, though: what do we do with the person who does not believe? If a person does not gain responsibility for accepting Christ until “after” they are already saved, does the unsaved person bear any responsibility? To affirm Sproul’s scheme above would mean that those who are unsaved find themselves in unbelief because of God’s sovereignty. God then becomes guilty of unconditional reprobation (which is something that moderate Calvinists shy away from), and the sinner has no responsibility.
Next, the idea of being saved (regenerated) before belief is contrary to the
Scriptures themselves. What about Romans 10:9, for example? The verse does not read, “if one is first saved, then one shall confess and believe”; rather, the verse says, “If one shall confess and believe, then one shall be saved.” To affirm regeneration before faith would “put the cart before the horse” in salvation, so to speak.
Last but not least, to affirm Sproul’s view that regeneration (salvation) precedes faith would mean that divine sovereignty and human responsibility do not work together, but apart; that is, that God requires nothing of the individual to be saved. But what about Paul’s words in Romans 4 that “Abraham believed God”? What about Jesus’ distinction that the one who believes is saved but the one who does not believe is condemned (John 3:16-18)? Surely, God requires the individual to profess faith! If God does not, then the Bible is nothing more than a book of mass deceit.
Let’s explore Sproul’s view of regeneration before faith a little more. Were Adam and Eve responsible in the Garden to obey God’s commands? Yes; and the fact that they did not is what forced them to flee the Garden and guaranteed for them spiritual and physical death. Did man ever lose his responsibility to his Maker after the fall in the Garden (Gen. 3)? No. Despite the fact that man fell from the grace of God, he still had the human responsibility to obey God...even though he could not obey God without the aid of divine grace. So, up until the moment of salvation, man still has human responsibility. If human responsibility exists before regeneration (which it does), then Sproul’s scheme cannot fit: for how can responsibility (professing faith) come after salvation, if human responsibility already exists “before” salvation? Responsibility cannot come into existence before and after salvation simultaneously. One must win: either responsibility exists before salvation, and man is responsible for professing faith...or, responsibility is absent until salvation, and the unsaved man is not responsible for his unbelief. Calvinists cannot have it both ways. Here is a simple syllogism:
#1) Regeneration brings the responsibility of professing faith (Calvinism)
#2) the unsaved are those who are not regenerated
#3) then the unsaved do not have the responsibility of professing faith
As a result, the unsaved bear no responsibility whatsoever for their unbelief and thus, lack of salvation. They are unsaved because of God: God is responsible for their eternal damnation. But why then, does Jesus say that “he that believes not is condemned already” (John 3:18), if what He really meant was “he that is not regenerated to believe is condemned already”? That’s a question that Calvinists cannot shy away from.
Divine sovereignty and human responsibility are two biblically-cherished concepts. The Bible does not nullify or exclude either concept. But I fear that Calvinism does nullify and eliminate human responsibility...and replaces human responsibility with “divine responsibility.” But the Bible never tells me that God “makes” me believe. Rather, what it tells me is that the Spirit draws me (John 6:44) to the truth of the Gospel and that I believe because I exercise the grace and faith that are given to me by God (Eph. 1:13; 2:8-9). I’ll leave it to you to decide which camp (Calvinism or Arminianism) is most faithful to Scripture.
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